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The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the first organisation of such 
scope in the region, and one of the oldest in the world. Explaining its longevity are the 
principles and working methods that have been embodied in the organisation since its 
inception in 1967. Amongst the most prominent, and least studied, of these has been the 
so-called ASEAN Way. This thesis traces the troubled origins of ASEAN as an 
organisation, and the place in it of this paramount principle. It does so by examining its 
watershed period, defined here as 1945-1968. This is achieved by focussing on the many 
sources of dissonance and disharmony that had characterised the Southeast Asian region 
before ASEAN’s inception, and most strongly so in the Cold War period. Despite this, the 
thesis suggests, the countries of the region were constantly searching for ways in which 
some degree of harmonisation, and solid forms of working relations between quite diverse 
states, could be achieved.     
 
The thesis looks at the historically important staging posts of regional cooperation by 
examining interactions between countries in ASEAN: the formation process of the 
Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and Maphilindo, both of which should be regarded as 
the forerunners of ASEAN, in addition to the formation of ASEAN itself. In the ASA, the 
practice of ‘consultation’ was regarded as important to ensure regional cooperation. The 
practices of ‘face-saving behaviour’ and ‘informality’ were added to these through the 
subsequent association of Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines (Maphilindo). Maphilindo 
also introduced the idea of ‘working together’, this being written in its charter. In the 
period between the ending of the three-way dispute after the collapse of Maphilindo and 
the formation of ASEAN, the working method of ‘shelving thorny issues’, on which no 
compromise could be achieved, emerged. The thesis shows that the latter was first brought 
into the settlement process of the territorial dispute over Sabah, which was in important 
respects the catalyst for the formation of ASEAN. The thesis also looks at the settlement 
process employed in the so-called Corregidor affair, which occurred only one year after the v 
 
establishment of ASEAN, and was most important in shaping the working nature of the 
new association. In the course of the settlement process of the Corregidor affair, ASEAN 
first exercised in a loosely, and flexibly, integrated way all four of the above-mentioned 
practices, and did so under the overarching principle of ‘working together’; a notion that in 
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Fig. 1  The ASEAN Way (Concept and conventions) 






This thesis looks at the origins of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
and, specifically, of the ASEAN Way in the period 1945-1968. The periodisation is 
significant because it encapsulates the decolonisation of many of the Southeast Asian states, 
the subsequent search for stability in the region, and, beyond that, for a broadly acceptable 
working method in maintaining good relations between economically and politically 
diverse states. The period is also a momentous one, given the range of political upheavals 
that characterised it. The end of the war brought processes of decolonisation to both 
Malaya and Indonesia, but very different ones. Malaya adopted a more moderate approach, 
maintaining close relations with the former metropolitan power there, Britain. Indonesia, 
on the other hand, broke its colonial ties in a violent, troubled way. Partly as a result of this, 
these two neighbouring states quickly entered into a period of confrontation, known as 
Konfrontasi. As scholars such as Leifer observe of the latter, ‘ASEAN was a primary 
product of the termination of Indonesia’s campaign of “Confrontation”’.
1 But the end of 
Konfrontasi was not the only catalyst, nor was ASEAN the sole regional organisation 
created in that period. The earlier organisations, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) 
and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), did not work well enough, and 
provided neither a broad enough base for confidence-building in the region, nor 
sufficiently workable platforms for conflict resolution. And while scholars such as Leifer 
interpret Konfrontasi as a watershed, they pay less attention to the immensely troubling 
Indochinese conflicts,
2 and to the territorial disputes evident in the period. At its heart, this 
thesis argues that this all-important period of diplomatic innovation, together with the 
urgency of resolving tensions, diplomatic rows and conflicts in the region gradually, and 
through earlier attempts for regional cooperation, gave rise to the idea of forming an 
ASEAN-like regional organisation. Its emergence was, however, very much contingent 
upon evolving a working method, coming to be known as the ASEAN Way. Elements of 
                                                 
1 Michael Leifer, ‘The ASEAN peace process: a category mistake’, The Pacific Review, 12/1 (1999), pp. 26-
27. 
2 These were proxy wars between the Eastern and the Western blocs in the Cold War structure. 2 
 
the latter are visible in the course of the conflicts and processes of conflict-resolution, 
attempted severally and collectively by Southeast Asian states. With the emergence of the 
overarching notion of ‘working together’, a number of formal and informal diplomatic 
methods gave body to that principle. 
 
While the thesis argues that many of the rudiments of regional cooperation had existed a 
decade or more before the establishment of ASEAN; setting down philosophical continuity 
for regional cooperation in the region, this longer history has been largely overlooked by 
existing scholarship, which focuses on a particular event or crisis as a watershed in the 
development of ASEAN and the ASEAN Way. The thesis therefore suggests a need to 
revise existing approaches to the subject. In examining the period, the work makes 
extensive use of official documents from Japan and Britain; both countries being strongly 
interested in contributing to stability in the Southeast Asian region. Japanese foreign 
ministry documents are especially interesting in this regard, as they have hitherto never 
been used in work on the formation of ASEAN. 
  
 
The history of international relations in Southeast Asia 
The Second World War finally ended with the Japan’s surrender. In the wake of this 
surrender, colonies in Southeast Asia began to press for independence, a process which in 
some cases continued for a period of nearly 40 years.
3 The Cold War began just after the 
end of the war, and the two opposing blocs divided Southeast Asia into spheres of 
influence and client states. For example, in Vietnam, communist pressure at first focussed 
on the overthrow of French colonial rule, but after a cease-fire was agreed upon in 1954, 
Communist power continued to expand across Indochina, backed as it was by the Soviet 
Union and Communist China. Perhaps in anticipation of this, the West pressed for the 
creation of SEATO. Formed in the same year as the cease-fire in Vietnam, the defence 
organisation was intended as a bulwark against the emerging Communist threat. And while 
foreign policy changes in the Soviet Union gave rise to détente in Europe in mid 1950s and 
                                                 
3 The first county to gain independence was the Philippines in 1946, and the last one was Brunei in 1984. 3 
 
after, the armed conflict between East and West continued to smoulder in Southeast Asia, 
and notably in Indochina. In the first half of 1960s, Communist power gained some 
momentum, with anti-American leaders’ governments seizing power in Laos and 
Cambodia. Furthermore, while Burma maintained an isolationist policy, it was one that 
showed a very strong independent socialist line. Internally, this country remained highly 
politically unstable, and therefore quite vulnerable. 
 
In this insecure regional environment, the ASA, the first regional organisation, was 
established in 1961, through the initiative of Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand, its 
founding members. However, Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines descended into 
conflict in 1963 over the formation of Malaysia, resulting in further regional instability. As 
a result of these pressures, the ASA became dysfunctional just two years after its 
establishment. A series of Manila agreements were signed in mid-1963 between Indonesia, 
Malaya and the Philippines for the second regional cooperation (Maphilindo), aiming at 
peaceful settlement of the tripartite dispute. The agreements themselves brought into being 
some significant concepts for regional cooperation. However, Maphilindo soon collapsed 
too, and the three-way dispute continued for another two years. After the abortive coup 
against him on 30 September 1965, Indonesian President Sukarno lost his power and 
General Suharto came to office. The latter changed the policy direction of Indonesia, 
which brought the regional disturbances to a sudden end. In parallel with this process, a 
new regional cooperation plan was sought by countries in the region in order to realise 
peace and stability in Southeast Asia. In this way, the third regional cooperation scheme, 
ASEAN, was established in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand.            
 
ASEAN came into existence at an important juncture in regional history while the political 
situation was going to be chaotic in Indochina. The US heightened its military presence 
and activities in Vietnam, particularly after the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964. 
The increased conflict there brought no quick solution, which resulted in a strategic 
impasse. The British announcement of the withdrawal of troops from East of Suez in 1967 4 
 
cast a further shadow over regional security in Southeast Asia. Two years later, the 
American President, Richard Nixon, announced the so-called Guam doctrine, which 
proposed: first, that allied countries in Asia should share the responsibility for their 
regional security and, second, that US troops should begin to withdraw from Vietnam. The 
Americans withdrew completely from Vietnam, after the signing of the Paris Peace 
Agreement in January 1973. However, the war did not cease: the Communist-controlled 
North Vietnam occupied South Vietnam. In the rest of Indochina, Pol Pot and his Khmer 
Rouge came to power in Cambodia, and Pathet Lao seized Laos.
4 In this way, all of 
Indochina fell into the hands of the Communists.   
 
At the end of 1978, when Vietnam, backed by the Soviet Union, invaded Cambodia, 
ASEAN had its first opportunity to contribute to extra-regional peace. From 1979, ASEAN 
continuously submitted motions to the United Nations, repeatedly denouncing the 
Vietnamese for their invasion of Cambodia. The Association also played a mediator’s role 
between the parties concerned in the Cambodian situation. Although the Vietnamese 
withdrawal from Cambodia in 1991 was not directly brought about by ASEAN’s political 
activities,
5 its moderator’s role should not be underestimated.
6        
 
By contrast with the highly volatile situation in Indochina, in the rest of Southeast Asia, 
ASEAN had steadily attracted international attention with its notable economic growth. In 
addition, it received considerable praise for its international efforts to influence the 
situation in Cambodia. However, this praise did not last, as with the end of the Cold War, 
new international paradigms emerged, such as human rights and democratisation. These 
replaced the conventional ideological antagonism between the East and the West; this is 
the so-called Asian values debate.
7     
                                                 
4 Both historical events occurred in 1975. 
5 It was triggered by the change in international circumstances, and notably the end of the Cold War. 
6 Yoneji Kuroyanagi, ASEAN 35 Nen no Kiseki: ‘ASEAN Way’ no Koyo to Genkai [The trajectory for 35 
years of ASEAN:Tthe Good and the Limit of the ‘ASEAN Way’] (Tokyo: Yushindo Kobun Sha, 2003), p. 95. 
7 Western countries began to criticise ASEAN countries for the unsatisfactory domestic conditions in human 
rights and democratisation. ASEAN countries, having great confidence in their international reputation, 
opposed this criticism by presenting a new thesis: the Asian Way, in which they argued that there was a 5 
 
In addition to the Asian values debate, two notable developments occurred in ASEAN 
during 1990s. Firstly, the Association’s membership expanded sharply after 1995, when 
Vietnam joined the Association. This expansion continued until Cambodia became a 
member in 1999, and, with that, all ten countries in Southeast Asia had become members 
of ASEAN.
8 Secondly, ASEAN’s extra-regional role became a reality when ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) was set up in 1994, including the US, Canada, Japan, Australia and 
New Zealand. In addition to the ARF, the Association created foundations for non-binding 
political cooperation in East Asia through the East Asia Summit, the latter involving 
countries such as China, Japan, India and Australia.  
 
In this way, ASEAN countries increased their international status and learned how to work 
together peacefully, and did so through a distinctive form of organisational cooperation. It 
is noteworthy that no major armed conflict has occurred in the ASEAN region in the forty 
years since its formation. Part of the reason for this has been, of course, the impetus for 
socio-economic development there; itself based to a degree on the adoption of the ASEAN 
Way, as it will be argued in the thesis. To this end, there is a specific code of practices in 
place in ASEAN for maintaining cooperation for peace and stability, the sum total of 
which are now known collectively as the ASEAN Way. The latter has, indeed, been 
expanded into the work ASEAN carries out in international forums, such as the ARF.    
 
 
The thesis  
The thesis argues that ASEAN and the ASEAN Way work in a comprehensive fashion. It 
addresses three aspects of the organisation and its approach to confidence-building. Firstly, 
the importance of the history of locally-generated regional cooperation in post-War 
Southeast Asia is examined. Secondly, the thesis identifies the specific practices for 
                                                                                                                                                    
specific way of national development in Asia.  However, this new axis of antagonism between Asia and the 
West disappeared when ASEAN countries became inward-looking in response to as a result of the Asian 
financial crisis in late 1990s. 
8 Brunei became an ASEAN member after its independence in 1984, whereas Myanmar and Laos joined the 
Association in 1997. 6 
 
establishing and maintaining regional cooperation. Thirdly, it vivifies from a novel 
perspective the role of the ASEAN Way in ASEAN itself.  
 
Although the ASEAN Way has been frequently referred to and examined in scholarly and 
broader contexts, its actual nature has until now remained vague. This, it can be argued, is 
because too much attention has been paid to the structural aspects of ASEAN, and that 
these have often been found to be weak.
9 Little work has been done on the ideology 
underpinning the association, and so by examining the origins of the ASEAN Way, a more 
refined understanding of ASEAN itself should be developed. The thesis argues that the 
ASA and Maphilindo are forerunners of ASEAN and that there is a considerable 
ideological continuity between these organisations. Existing scholarly literature pays little 
attention to this factor.
10 In addition to these landmark formations in the pre-history of 
ASEAN,
11 are the all-important matters of dispute resolution between member states in 
less formal and fluid contexts.
12 In exploring this further, and most important, dimension, 
one other dispute-resolution process occurred in 1968, and in significant ways crystallised 





                                                 
9 The critical view of ASEAN varies from scholar to scholar. For sharp criticism, see David Martin Jones and 
Michael L. R. Smith, ‘ASEAN’s Imitation Community’, Orbis, 46/1 (Winter 2002), pp. 93-109. For 
sympathetic criticism, see Simon S. C. Tay, ‘Institutions and Process: Dilemmas and Possibilities’, in Simon 
S. C. Tay, Jesus P. Estanislao and Hadi Soesastro (eds.), Reinventing ASEAN (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), pp. 243-272. 
10 Exceptions are: Estrella D. Solidum, Towards a Southeast Asian Community (Quezon City: University of 
the Philippines Press, 1974); Susumu Yamakage, ASEAN: Shinboru kara Shisutemu he [ASEAN: From 
Symbol to System] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Syuppankai [University of Tokyo Press], 1991); Amitav Acharya, 
Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem of regional order (London: 
Routledge, 2001); and Jurgen Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, development and 
prospects (London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003).  
11  The ASA was launched in 1961whereas Maphilindo was formed in 1963. 
12 Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines worked on solving the tripartite dispute in 1966, on the eve of 
ASEAN’s formation. 7 
 
The structure of the thesis 
Chapter One outlines the nature of the ASEAN Way through an examination of the 
existing literature, and sets the broader themes of this thesis. The first part focuses on 
exploring statements given by ASEAN leaders and reviewing existing scholarly 
discussions; then attempts to draw the silhouette of the ASEAN Way. The second part sets 
forth the importance of cultural influence in the region, and presents the significance of 
ideological impact from ASEAN’s precursors, the ASA and Maphilindo. 
 
Chapter Two explores the formation process of the ASA. In particular, it focuses on the 
region’s leaders and their perspectives on regional cooperation. The chapter pays particular 
attention to the fact that the formation of these perspectives came at a very early stage in 
the nation-building processes of these states, and Southeast Asia as a whole. This period 
was also the beginning of the Cold War, which, to a lesser or greater extent, affected the 
whole Southeast Asia. The chapter depicts how, through complex initiatives, the states 
involved came to form the first regional organisation (the ASA).
13 Although the ASA is 
significant in terms of regional cooperation, its formation process has been neglected.
14 
The chapter argues that the ASA was an important staging post for the formation of 
ASEAN, and that its history deserves far more attention in this regard. 
 
Chapter Three examines the formation process of a series of agreements – the Manila 
agreements – in 1963, which were concluded during the three-way conflict over the 
incorporation of British territories in Southeast Asia into Malaysia. Indonesia and the 
                                                 
13 There were some regional conferences led by Asian countries in order to establish the framework of 
regional cooperation, such as the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in 1947 and the Baguio 
Conference in the Philippines in 1950. For the details, see Estrella D. Solidum, Towards a Southeast Asian 
Community, pp. 19-25. However, these attempts were transient and, in addition, they did not hold any clear 
objectives. In this context, the ASA can be said to be the first regional cooperation, established by a regional 
initiative. 
14 For examples of intellectual discussions about the ASA, see Bernard K. Gordon, The Dimensions of 
Conflict in Southeast Asia (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), PP. 162-187; Arnfinn Jorgensen-
Dahl, Regional Organization and Order on South-East Asia (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 
1982), pp. 9-44; Susumu Yamakage, ASEAN, pp. 23-51; Vincent K. Pollard, ‘ASA and ASEAN, 1961-1967: 
Southeast Asian Regionalism’, Asian Survey, 10/3 (March 1970), pp. 244-255; and Nicholas Tarling, 
Regionalism in Southeast Asia: To Foster the Political Will (Oxford: Routledge, 2006), pp. 95-140. 8 
 
Philippines strenuously opposed the formation of a British-influenced Malaysia. Indonesia 
objected to the Malaysia plan because the latter was drafted without respecting the right of 
self-determination in the British Borneo territories, which were to be incorporated into 
Malaysia
15. The Philippines, on the other hand, raised a territorial claim to Sabah, and 
therefore threatened to undermine the building of the new state. Maphilindo was formed 
after the three leaders signed the Manila agreements at a Summit conference in August 
1963. However, Maphilindo as well as the agreements collapsed within a month, and the 
three countries subsequently descended into deep discord. Nevertheless, the idea 
underlying Maphilindo provided an important foundation for the ASEAN Declaration. 
Therefore, the formation process of the Manila agreements is a significant area to look at in 
order to deepen our understanding of the philosophy behind ASEAN cooperation.  
 
Maphilindo too has attracted little attention from scholars. In particular, few works have 
examined how the idea of regional cooperation was built up, and how the idea of 
regionalism was shaped.
16 This chapter argues that Maphilindo, contrary to received 
opinion, was an important precursor of ASEAN.
17 
 
Chapter Four looks at the resolution of the dispute over the formation of Malaysia. After 
Suharto took power from Sukarno, Indonesia showed its renewed desire for reconciliation 
with Malaysia. The mood for peace also quickly drew in the Philippines, which resumed 
bilateral relations with Malaysia without further reference to the Sabah problem. As a 
result, regional disturbances, arising from this episode, were quickly settled. The chapter 
also deals with the formation of ASEAN.   
 
                                                 
15 In addition, Indonesia also posed the question regarding its national security and, in a sense, regional 
security in Southeast Asia as a whole. 
16 Exceptions are J. A. C. Mackie, Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute, 1963-1966 (Kuala Lumpur: 
Oxford University Press, 1974); and Susumu Yamakage, ASEAN. 
17 In addition, it was not the historical cul-de-sac that it has frequently been seen as. 9 
 
Chapter Five focuses on the settlement process of a bilateral territorial dispute between 
Malaysia and the Philippines, the so-called Corregidor affair. This chapter examines how 
ASEAN members maintained harmonious relations and successfully saved their new 
association from an early collapse. The affair had its origin in the recurrent territorial 
dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah. Although this threatened to 
plunge ASEAN into a state of terminal dysfunction, member countries successfully 
overcame difficulties through the holding of secret consultations. Some scholars point out 
the importance of the Corregidor affair in terms of the emergence of the ASEAN Way. 
However, most of them do not describe the details of the settlement process, and therefore 
do not wholly clarify the formation process of the ASEAN Way.  
 
Chapter Six draws together the nature of the ASEAN Way. It is, as discussed above, an 
examination that clarifies the ideological background of ASEAN itself. In this context, the 
chapter identifies the factors directly/indirectly affecting the establishment of ASEAN 
throughout the post-war period of the region. It also examines the particular practices 
contained in the ASEAN Way, and the fashion in which these manage ASEAN’s 




THE ASEAN WAY – HOW HAS IT BEEN IDENTIFIED? 
 
 
The leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have often used the 
term the ‘ASEAN Way’ in their speeches or statements. However, the Association itself 
has never stated its official definition and seldom uses the term in its official documents. 
On the other hand, active discussion about the specific aspects of the ASEAN Way has 
been done among scholars. This chapter first looks at statements delivered by the leaders 
of ASEAN states, and draws the outline of the ASEAN Way. Then, it reviews scholarly 
works, and picks up and argues the specificity of the components of the ASEAN Way. 
Furthermore, this chapter reviews discussions about its origin by looking at ASEAN’s 
precursors, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and Maphilindo.  
 
 
The ASEAN Way  
Although the Association rarely refers formally to the term the ASEAN Way, the Hanoi 
Declaration of 1998 employed the term in the following way: ‘We shall endeavour to 
resolve outstanding problems and prevent the emergence of disputes in the ASEAN way 
and in accordance with international law and practice’.
1 Although there is no definition of 
it in the Declaration itself, the ASEAN Way is clearly significant in addressing problems 
or disputes among member countries. It is quite different from international law and 
practice, which, so to say, was the accumulation of diplomatic practice of Western 
countries. 
   
                                                 
1 Hanoi Declaration, 16 December 1998, <http://www.aseansec.org/2018.htm>, accessed 5 December 2008. 
Italics added. 11 
 
It is unclear when the term the ASEAN Way was used for the first time. Two high-ranking 
politicians made mention of it in their speeches at the formative period of ASEAN. In 
particular, a speech from Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman was the first one in which 
the term was mentioned.
2 On 25 June 1968, ten months after the establishment of ASEAN, 
Thanat gave an opening address at the First Meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on Civil 
Aviation of ASEAN in Bangkok: 
 
I would not dwell on these activities…, except to highlight the significance of ASEAN 
cooperation and to emphasize the earnestness with which the Association has been 
awakened by the new spirit of neighbourly partnership and mutually beneficial cooperation. 
This is what all of us believe to be the path to peace, progress and prosperity. Such is the 
ASEAN way to preserve our national independence and regional integrity.
3 
 
Considering the fact that the meeting was held in Bangkok at the same time as the 
reconciliation talks between Malaysia and the Philippines over the Sabah issue,
4 it is not 
difficult to imagine that Thanat was indirectly expressing his wish for a peaceful settlement 
of the dispute. In his speech, the ASEAN Way is presented as a mode of dispute settlement 
based on neighbourliness and mutual benefit for the sake of peace and prosperity in the 
ASEAN region.     
 
Six years after Thanat’s speech, Lieutenant General Ali Murtopo,
5 an advisor of the 
Indonesian President, used the term the ‘ASEAN Way’ in a speech he gave as an opening 
                                                 
2 Amitav Acharya, a leading academic of ASEAN studies, made a brief reference in his book of Ali 
Murtopo’s speech in 1974 as one of the oldest ones. See his book, Constructing a Security Community in 
Southeast Asia, p. 63. However, the thesis identifies Thanat’s speech as the oldest one in which the term of 
the ASEAN Way was used.   
3 Thanat Khoman, Opening address of The First Meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on Civil Aviation of 
ASEAN, 25 June 1968, in Foreign Affairs Bulletin, 7/6 (June-July 1968), pp. 540-541. Italics added. 
4 The so-called Corregidor affair, which is to be discussed in Chapter 5. 
5 Murtopo was the foreign affairs advisor of President Mohamed Suharto. Before this, he first served Suharto 
in 1950s when the latter was the Commander of the Central Java Diponegoro division. Then he served 
Suharto again as a senior member of Kostrad (Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat: Army 
Strategic Reserve Command) as a head of its affiliated intelligence agency, Opsus (Operasi Khusus: Special 
Operations). In August 1966, Murtopo became a member of Spri (Staf pribadi: Personal Staff), which 
Suharto established, and dealt with political affairs. The Spri had a stronger influence on Indonesian politics 
than the existing Cabinet and was called the ‘invisible government’. (Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics 
in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), p.243.) Murtopo was also the architect of 
Suharto’s political philosophy and became a co-founder of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) in Indonesia in 1971. 12 
 
address to the First Conference of ASEAN Students of Regional Affairs in Jakarta on 22 
October 1974: 
 
[M]any observers overseas see the ASEAN as a success, among other things, because of 
the system of consultations that has marked much of its work, what I may call the ASEAN 
way of dealing with a variety of problems confronting its member nations’.
6  
 
In Murtopo’s speech, the term became more specific in its nature: the ASEAN Way is a 
specific mode of addressing problems or disputes among member countries using 
consultations. 
 
In the late 1990s,
7 the definition of the ASEAN Way became even narrower. By that time, 
there had been a considerable accumulation of practice in its application. The Indonesian 
Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, defined it in the following way in 1998:   
 
The ASEAN Way is to ‘discuss within ourselves without adopting a confrontational 
approach and not putting to shame or embarrassing the other party. If we make official 
statements, it can result in people becoming displeased, and give rise to tension’.
8 
 
It can be said, therefore, that the ASEAN Way became defined as an amicable process of 
discussion, incorporating the additional practice of face-saving. By this, member countries 
do not criticise one another in public. In other words, losing face should be strictly avoided 
in order to maintain friendly relations between the countries concerned. Thai Foreign 
Minister Surin Phitsuwan gave an opening address at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 
(AMM) in 1999:  
 
                                                 
6 Ali Murtopo, Opening Address at the First Conference of ASEAN Students of Regional Affairs (ASEAN I), 
Jakarta, 22 October 1974, in Centre for Strategic and International Studies (ed.), Regionalism in Southeast 
Asia, Papers Presented at the Fist Conference of ASEAN Students of Regional Affairs (ASEAN I), 22-25 
October 1974, Jakarta (Jakarta, 1975), pp. 11-16. Italics added. 
7 It was during the period of the argument over the usefulness of the so-called ASEAN principle of ‘non-
interference’. The argument was first given by Anwar bin Ibrahim, the then Deputy Prime Minister of 
Malaysia, and he proposed the new principle of ‘flexible engagement’ to be involved in domestic issues in 
other member countries. 
8 Asiaweek, 28 July 1998. 13 
 
To be sure, tremendous success has been achieved over the past 30 years by what some 
people called the “ASEAN Way” – a process of consultation, engagement and consensus-




It can be clearly seen from this that the ASEAN Way also includes consensus-building, 
employing as it does a consultative process.  
 
Thus, the cumulative profile of the ASEAN Way, as depicted in speeches by ASEAN 
leaders in the span of thirty years, can be defined as a distinctive way in which ASEAN 
countries cooperate and harmonise the process of maintaining peace, and especially so 
when differences, problems or disputes arise between them. More specifically, it can be 
identified as consensus-building through a friendly process of consultation, and 
incorporated into this is the facility of face-saving practice for the parties involved.  
 
 
Scholarly discussion of the ASEAN Way 
The ASEAN Way has often been referred to in scholarly studies, and particularly so since 
the 1990s.
10 However, definitions vary, and there is no definitive rendition of it to date. 
Based on the discussions in existing literature, the characteristics of the ASEAN Way can 
                                                 
9 Surin Phitsuwan, BBC Monitoring Service: Asia-Pacific, 26 July 1999. The term of ‘engagement’ was used 
in his speech as Surin Phituswan was one of ardent proponents of introducing flexible engagement into 
ASEAN practice. 
10 See, for example, Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia; Zakaria Haji 
Ahmad, ‘The World of ASEAN Decision-makers: A Study of Bureaucratic Elite Perceptions in Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Singapore’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 8/3 (1986), pp. 192-212; Jose T. Almonte, 
‘Ensuring Security the “ASEAN Way”’, Survival, 39/4 (Winter 1997), pp. 80-92; Michael Antolik, ASEAN 
and the Diplomacy of Accommodation (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1990); Mely Caballero-Anthony, 
Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN Way (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2005);  Jurgen Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture; Timo Kivimaki, ‘The Long 
Peace of ASEAN’, Journal of Peace Research, 38/1 (2001), pp. 5-25; Yoneji Kuroyanagi, ASEAN 35 Nen no 
Kiseki; Kay Moller, ‘Cambodia and Burma: The ASEAN Way Ends Here’, Asian Survey, 38/12 (December 
1998), pp. 1087-1104; Shaun Narine, ‘‘ASEAN and ARF: The Limits of the “ASEAN Way”’, Asian Survey, 
37/10 (October 1997), pp. 961-978; Tobias Ingo Nischalke, ‘Insights from ASEAN’s Foreign Policy Co-
operation: The “ASEAN Way”, A Real Spirit or a Phantom?’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 22/1 (April 
2000), pp. 89-112; Estrella D. Solidum, Towards a Southeast Asian Community; Richard Stubbs, ‘ASEAN: 
Building Regional Cooperation’, in Mark Beeson (ed.), Contemporary Southeast Asia: Regional Dynamics, 
National Differences (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 222-224; and Susumu 
Yamakage, ASEAN. 14 
 
be categorised as: (i) the principle of non-interference, (ii) face-saving behaviour, (iii) 
consultations, (iv) informality and (v) the spirit of working together.
11   
 
     (i) The principle of non-interference 
Many of the discussions which argue the limitations of the ASEAN Way employ the 
question of the principle of non-interference. While this principle comes from the 
international law, as articulated in the United Nations Charter, it is argued that the principle 
lies ‘at the heart of the approach adopted by ASEAN members’.
12 The important question 
here is why such universally-applied principle can have a unique manifestation in the 
context of ASEAN. Kuroyanagi sets out the principle of non-interference as a core element 
of the ASEAN Way. The other elements observed in international relations between 
countries in the region, such as: (1) ambiguity, (2) sensitivity towards sovereignty, national 
interest and face-saving, (3) evolution (mutual understanding through a continuous 
dialogue), (4) avoidance (shelving a problem) and (5) neighbourliness, are in complete 




Acharya offers a different, more formalistic, definition of the ASEAN Way: 
 
The ‘ASEAN Way’ consists of a code of conduct for inter-state behaviour as well as a 
decision-making process based on consultations and consensus. The code of conduct 
incorporates a set of well-known principles, e.g. non-interference in the domestic affairs of 
                                                 
11 Khoo How San proposes the concept as a mode of regional cooperation, a ‘neighbourhood watching 
group’. He describes the concept as good neighbourliness, non-interference, consultation and consensus. 
‘Strongly suggestive of these ideas are the notions that trouble-makers could come from within the 
neighbourhood or elsewhere, and that member households would cultivate goodwill towards each other’. See 
his work, ‘ASEAN as a “Neighbourhood Watching Group”’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 22/2 (August 
2000), p. 280.  Michael Antolik, on the other hand, gave another point of view. He presented the so-called 
3Rs: restraint, respect and responsibility as a central tenet of accommodation in ASEAN. Restraint is being 
non-interference each other. ‘[R]eciprocal restraint serves each government’s domestic interests: each can 
focus on internal problems’. ‘Respect is evident in the customary approaches to decision making, consensus 
and ambiguity’. For responsibility, ‘states must consciously consider the effects their domestic policies might 
have on a neighbor’. (Michael Antolik, ASEAN and the diplomacy of accommodation, pp. 156-157) 
12 Alan Collins, ‘Mitigating the Security Dilemma, the ASEAN Way’, Pacifica Review, 11/2 (June 1999), p. 
106. The same view is in Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, pp. 57-60.  
13 Yoneji Kuroyanagi, ASEAN 35 Nen no Kiseki, p. 155. For the same view, see Kay Moller, ‘Cambodia and 
Burma’, pp. 1087-1088.   15 
 
each other, non-use of force, pacific settlement of disputes, respect for the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of member states, that can be found in the Charter of the United Nations 
as well as regional political and security organisations elsewhere in the world.
14  
 
He argues that the inter-state relations based on international law itself are ‘hardly 
unique’.
15 The characteristic of the ASEAN Way is a process in which international law 
(such as non-interference or sovereign equality) was implemented throughout the specific 
practices in the region. He continues, ‘To this extent, the “ASEAN Way” is not an unusual 
construct. But where it can claim a certain amount of uniqueness is the manner in which 
these norms are operationalised into a framework of regional interaction’.
16 Acharya lists 
specific regional elements such as, ‘discreetness, informality, pragmatism, expediency, 
consensus-building, and non-confrontational bargaining style’.
17   
 
Tay finds the background of the principle of non-interference in ASEAN in the post-World 
War II history of the region, and in particular, independence, nation-building and the 
influence of the Cold War: 
 
The ASEAN emphasis on this principle [of non-interference] can be seen against the 
background of its historical development: the colonial history of the region; continuing 
interventions by the great powers during the Cold War; the relatively fragile nation-states 
that emerged, with disputed boundaries and cross-border ethnicities; the internal problems 
of different states, such as communist insurgencies and separatist tendencies; the lack of a 
uniting principle of integral governance, such as democracy, and the coexistence of 
regimes with differing bases and levels of legitimacy.
18 
 
There is some difference among member countries over the role of external powers. As 
Acharya points out, ‘One of the major points of contention and constraints on regionalism 
in Southeast Asia since the Second World War had to do with the dependence of the 
regional countries on extra-regional powers for protection against internal as well as 
                                                 
14 Amitav Acharya, Regionalism and Multilateralism: Essays on Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific 
(2nd edn., Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2003), pp. 253-254. 
15 Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, p. 63. 
16 Amitav Acharya, Regionalism and Multilateralism, pp. 253-254. 
17 Ibid, p. 254 
18 Simon S. C. Tay, ‘Institutions and Process’, p. 251. 16 
 
external threats’.
19 Indeed, ASEAN members have had mixed feelings with regard to the 
maintenance of regional security (in the context of the principle of non-interference). On 
one hand, four of five original members have relied on Western powers for their defence. 
The Philippines and Thailand are members of Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation 
(SEATO), while Malaysia and Singapore have been members of the Five Power Defence 
Arrangement with Britain, Australia and New Zealand. Indonesia, on the other hand, 
adopted a non-aligned position without having any defence agreements with external 
powers.
20 Nevertheless, all of ASEAN countries display great sensitivity to the importance 
of sovereignty or the principle of non-interference. At the same time, they are entirely 
sympathetic to the particularity and the repeatedly iterated words, ‘Asian solutions to 
Asian problems’.  
 
This is because ASEAN states gradually realised that the diplomatic principles of 
international relations in the region were different from those in Western countries. They 
developed a regional consciousness in the process to seek to ‘solve their own problems in 
their own way, rather than inviting Western countries to proffer advice about policies 
concerning national development and international conflict’.
21 The sense of regional self-
reliance was increased by two major factors. In 1967, Britain announced its decision to 
withdraw its forces from East of Suez by the mid-1970s. Then, in1969, American President 
Nixon declared a new US doctrine, phasing out its military involvement in Asian 
security.
22 The idea of regional responsibility for regional issues therefore provided a 




                                                 
19 Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, p. 51. 
20 Mohammad Hatta, ‘Indonesia’s Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, 31/3 (April 1953), p. 449. 
21 Michael Haas, The Asian Way to Peace: A Story of Regional Cooperation, New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1989, p. 5. 
22 Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, pp. 52-53. 
23 Michael Haas, The Asian Way to Peace, p. 15. 17 
 
The principle of non-interference ‘was intended to apply not only to interference by extra-
regional powers…but also by Southeast Asian countries in the affairs of their own 
neighbours’.
24 Indeed, Soesastro points out that the principle of non-interference was seen 
as ‘a significant factor which made it possible for member countries to avoid conflicts, thus 
allowing their governments to concentrate on the primary task of putting one’s house in 
order as a basis of regime legitimacy’.
25 
 
To this, Kraft adds that ‘[the principle of non-interference] has been a major factor in 
sustaining ASEAN solidarity over the years’.
26 At the same time, however, non-
interference ‘has become a stumbling block to ASEAN’s potential for pushing social 
transformation in the region’ over the issue of the membership expansion in late 1990s.
27  
In this regard, ASEAN’s obstinate adherence to the principle of non-interference has, of 
course, led to considerable criticism.
28 This was especially so when ASEAN could not, or 
would not, take any action on human rights abuses in Myanmar in 1990s. The Association 
admitted that ‘acceding to sanctions would not only be tantamount to intervening in the 
internal politics of Myanmar, it would also signify consent to interference from external 
powers in regional affairs’.
29 Namely, ASEAN countries recognised that if they interfere in 
the internal affairs of other countries, they themselves would potentially be laid open to 
external intervention.  
 
In looking at this aspect of the Association, Moller argues that the widening of its 
membership in the mid- to late-1990s did not involve a commensurate deepening of its 
administrative and political ‘machinery’.
30 In particular, he points out that it is problematic 
                                                 
24 Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, p. 57. 
25 Hadi Soesastro, ‘ASEAN in 2030: The Long View’, in Simon S. C. Tay, Jesus P. Estanislao and Hadi 
Soesastro (eds.), Reinventing ASEAN (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), p. 282. 
26 Herman Joseph S. Kraft, ‘ASEAN and Intra-ASEAN relations: Weathering the Storm?’, The Pacific 
Review, 13/3 (2000), p. 462. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid, pp. 462-463. 
29 Ibid, p. 463. 
30 Kay Moller, ‘Cambodia and Burma’, p. 1104. 18 
 
to widen the membership without partially transferring sovereignty of member countries 
(transferring a state’s sovereignty to a regional organisation, inevitably reduces a member’s 
right to advocate the principle of non-interference, because member states involve in their 
interfering each other in order to justify the organisation’s raison d’être).
31 Tay points out, 
however, that the principle of non-interference ‘does not mean that ASEAN members do 
not or have not become involved in each other’s affairs’.
32 Indeed, the Association had 
been actively engaged in the matter of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia (1979-1991), 
both as a mediator holding the peace talks, and also as a protester against the Vietnamese 
action, bringing a resolution to the United Nations.
33 Goh adds to this that ‘the “ASEAN 
Way” is much more than the principle of non-intervention’.
34 
 
     (ii) Face-saving behaviour  
When a debate arose over flexible engagement,
35 the new proposition challenging 
ASEAN’s long-iterated tenet of non-interference, the Filipino Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 
Domingo Siazon, said in 1998, ‘Times have changed. After 31 years, we are now adults 
and should be able to discuss problems frankly’.
36 The ASEAN Secretary-General, 
Rodolfo Severino, sent a similar message in 1998: ‘As the ASEAN family, we should be 
free to talk frankly’.
37 These statements are evidence that ASEAN countries had refrained 
from mentioning issues occurring in other countries. This practice can also be interpreted 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Simon S. C. Tay, ‘Institutions and Process’, p. 251. 
33 ASEAN’s response to the Cambodian issue has been widely argued. See for example, Mely Caballero-
Anthony, Regional security in Southeast Asia, pp. 83-112; Michael Leifer, ‘The ASEAN Peace Process’, pp. 
30-31; and Yoneji Kuroyanagi, ASEAN 35 Nen no Kiseki, pp. 81-99.  For more critical view on ASEAN in 
Cambodia, see for example, Kay Moller, ‘Cambodia and Burma’, pp.1087-1104; and Samuel Sharpe, ‘An 
ASEAN Way to Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia?’, The Pacific  Review, 16/2 (2003), pp.231-250. 
34 Gillian Goh, ‘The “ASEAN Way”: Non-intervention and ASEAN’s Role in Conflict Management’, 
Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs, 3/1 (Spring 2003), p. 118. 
35 For discussions about the principle of non-interference versus a counter-proposal of flexible engagement, 
see, for example, Jurgen Haacke, ‘The concept of flexible engagement and the practice of enhanced 
interaction: Intramural challenges to the “ASEAN way”’, The Pacific Review, 12/4 (1999), pp. 581-611; and 
Erik Martinez Kuhonta, ‘Walking a tightrope: democracy versus sovereignty in ASEAN's illiberal peace’, 
The Pacific Review, 19/3 (2006), pp. 337-358. 
36 The Sun, 12 December 1998. 
37 Asiaweek, 28 July 1998. 19 
 
as non-interference in other countries’ business. But at the same time, it shows a face-
saving attitude. In particular, the principle of non-interference in newly-independent 
countries allows them to be involved in their own affairs without losing face. This is 
because an emerging country is inexperienced in managing its government, and has weak 
political foundations. In such a situation, criticism from other countries will affront its 
dignity. Therefore, in such contexts, it is important to behave in a face-saving manner and 
employ low-key diplomacy between member states.
38 In this regard, Pushpa Thambipillai 
et al. point out that face-saving has been prominently exercised in the consensus formation 
process: ‘[N]egotiations and decision-making are also conducted in a manner to “save 
face” and maintain a conciliatory relationship among the participants’.
39 Behind-the-scenes 
activities are a derivative of face-saving behaviour, and they take place as consultations by 
‘“sending out feelers” to the member countries’.
40  
 
The practice of saving face takes various modes. For example, an issue on which 
compromise cannot be achieved is shelved in order to avoid highlighting the parties as 
‘winners’ and ‘losers’.
41 Making an issue that has occurred opaque, and therefore 
neutralising the controversial point, is also an important dimension of this element.
42 
Caballero-Anthony points out that if ‘a consensus cannot be reached, the members agree to 
put off a decision, or agree to disagree’.
43 This is ‘quite a salient feature’ of the ASEAN 
                                                 
38 Solidum sees the customs, such as restraint and face-saving, are common in Asia as a whole. She 
recognises that ‘problems in Asia should be solved only by those who are from the region. Only Asian 
solutions which contain Asian values are legitimate…the Asian Way of solving a problem involves very low-
key diplomacy and avoids fanfare before an agreement is achieved’.  See Estrella D. Solidum, ‘‘The Role of 
Certain Sectors in Shaping and Articulating the ASEAN Way’, in R. P. Anand and Purificacion V. 
Quisumbing (eds.), ASEAN: Identity, Development and Culture (Quezon City: University of the Philippines 
Law Centre and Honolulu: East-West Centre Culture Leaning Institute, 1981), p. 136. Michael Haas takes the 
same view. See his work, The Asian Way to Peace, pp. 2-3.  
39 Pushpa Thambipillai and J. Saravanamuttu, ASEAN Negotiations: Two Insights (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), p. 13. 
40 Ibid, p. 14. 
41 ‘Adjournment of the problem’ is another expression of it. (Alan Collins, ‘Mitigating the Security 
Dilemma’, pp. 107-108.) The good example of shelving the uncompromisable issue can be seen in the 
territorial dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines (the Corregidor affair). For the details, see Chapter 5. 
42 Susumu Yamakage, ASEAN, p. 275. 
43 Mely Caballero-Anthony, ‘Mechanisms of Dispute Settlement: The ASEAN Experience’, Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, 20/1 (April 1998), p. 58. 20 
 
Way.
44 To agree to disagree ‘allows for “acceptance time” whereby states will be able, 
perhaps over a longer time-frame, to adjust their positions and eventually reach 
agreement’.
45 In addition, disagreement is ‘rarely stated openly’.
46 This mechanism can be 
categorised as face-saving.  
 
Haacke points out that ASEAN, in comparison with previous forms of regional 
cooperation, pays ‘much greater attention to the exercise of restraint and respect for 
national sensitivities’.
47 Narine interprets this specific feature as a product of ‘a sense of 
mutual weakness’ in ASEAN.
48 Indeed, ASEAN members would not want a full resolution 
of issues ‘when this comes at the expense of maintaining stable inter-state relations’.
49  
 
     (iii) Consultations 
Because of the great social and political diversity in the region during ASEAN’s formative 
years, a lot of problems against their cooperation were expected between the member 
countries. Therefore, ‘[f]requent contacts or communication among the political elite help 
to crystallise a community of sentiments’.
50 Indeed, face-to-face conversation of an 
amicable sort is important to remove any sense of suspicion between states. Leifer 
recognises that frequent consultation in the informal working group largely contributed to 
develop common norms among countries.
51 Lengthy consultations will be held informally 
so that consensus can be reached.
52 In the frequent consultation process,  
 
                                                 
44 Ibid, p. 60. 
45 Ibid, pp. 60-61. 
46 Ibid, p. 58. 
47 Jurgen Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, p. 50. 
48 Shaun Narine, ‘ASEAN and ARF’, pp. 974-975. 
49 Ramses Amer, ‘Conflict Management and Constructive Engagement in ASEAN’s Expansion’, Third 
World Quarterly, 20/5 (1999), p. 1036.  
50 Estrella D. Solidum, Towards a Southeast Asian Community, p. 205. 
51 Michael Leifer, ‘The ASEAN Peace Process’, p. 28. 
52 Mely Caballero-Anthony, ‘Mechanisms of Dispute Settlement’, p. 58. 21 
 
ASEAN members get to know one another, learn about each other’s interests and 
sensitivities, and explore possibilities for expanded co-operation. Additionally, officials at 
different levels are encouraged to contact one another and establish personal relationships 
so that in the event of crisis they can pick up the telephone and call each other, thus 
increasing the possibility of containing any dispute.
53 
 
In this context, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) provides an effective place of 
‘continuous consultation and repeated deliberations’.
54 Soesastro states that the AMM and 
its preparatory meetings hold four functions: (1) They serve as a ‘useful vehicle by which 
ASEAN high officials become more acquainted with one another’, (2) constitute ‘a forum 
for the institutionalisation of a habit of dialogues among member states’, (3) provide ‘a 
venue for consultation and exchange of views over bilateral and regional problems’, and 
(4) play ‘a central role as a forum for regional confidence-building measures’.
55 After time-
consuming consensus building through informal talks, ‘more formal ties are frequently 
established’.
56 Indeed, peace and stability in the region have been maintained by precisely 
such ‘intra-mural dialogue and consultation’.
57    
 
Many scholars argue that ASEAN employs the Malay practices of musyawarah 
(consultation) and mufakat (consensus).
58 The reason why member states emphasise 
musyawarah as the principle of decision-making in ASEAN is ‘not only to realise the 
importance of the mechanism of consensus-building itself, but also to regard consultation 
                                                 
53 Hoang Anh Tuan, ‘ASEAN Dispute Management: Implications for Vietnam and an Expanded ASEAN’, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 18/1 (June 1996), p. 67. 
54 Michael Antolik, ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation, p. 91. 
55 Hadi Soesastro, ‘ASEAN in 2030’, p. 282. 
56 Timo Kivimaki, ‘The Long Peace of ASEAN’, p. 17. 
57 Michael Leifer, ‘The ASEAN Peace Process’, p. 28. 
58 See, for example, Amitav Acharya, ‘‘Ideas, Identity and Institution-building: the “Asia-Pacific Way”’, The 
Pacific Review, 10/3 (1997), p. 330; Tobias Ingo Nischalke, ‘Insights from ASEAN’s Foreign Policy Co-
operation’, p. 90; Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum (Adelphi Papers, London: Oxford University 
Press, 1996), p. 40; Mely Caballero-Anthony, ‘Mechanisms of Dispute Settlement’, p. 58; Rajshree Jetly, 
‘Conflict Management Strategies in ASEAN: Perspectives for SAARC’, The Pacific Review, 16/1 (2003), p. 
57, Hoang Anh Tuan, ‘ASEAN Dispute Management’, pp. 66-67; Pushpa Thambipillai and J. Saravanamuttu, 
ASEAN Negotiations, p. 11; Jose T. Almonte, ‘Ensuring Security the “ASEAN Way”’, p. 81; Miles Kahler, 
‘Legalization as Strategy: The Asia-Pacific Case’, International Organization, 54/3 (Summer 2000), p. 552;  
Ramses Amer, ‘Conflict Management and Constructive Engagement in ASEAN’s Expansion’, p. 1036; and 
Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, Regional Organization and Order on South-East Asia, p. 166. 22 
 
as the most important custom in the Association’.
59 These states frequently refer to 
themselves as one family, friends or neighbourhoods, and this helps to establish a custom 
of consultation or working together. In this respect, Kurus argues that ‘ASEAN has 
gradually fostered a family feeling of togetherness and shared interests among a group of 
states that had very little in common to begin with’.
60   
 
    (iv) Informality 
ASEAN’s preference to informality has been pointed out by a number of scholars, such as 
Caballero-Anthony.
61 Informality has two aspects. The first one is related to the 
institutional structure. Suffice it to say here that an ASEAN Summit Meeting was not held 
until 1976, nine years after the organisation was established. In addition, fewer hard rules 
can be found in official documents issued by ASEAN than in the case of other 
international organisations, such as the European Union. This practice originated in the 
ASA, which was finally materialised as a loose association of states rather than a formal 
treaty-based organisation. It is often pointed out that the foundation document of ASEAN, 
the ASEAN Declaration, was just that: a ‘declaration’, not a constitution or a charter.
62 
Additionally, the rule of decision-making (majority or unanimous decision) is not formally 
stipulated in any official documents. The second point of informality is in the 
communication style between ASEAN leaders. They prefer to employ informal talks over 
golf, breakfast and so on which lead to formal negotiations. It is important to note that in 
this context, informal talks are more important than formal ones, and a decision is often 
reached well before the formal talks take place. 
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     (v) The spirit of working together 
The slogan of ‘working together’ has encouraged ASEAN to maintain cooperative 
relations to overcome difference among member countries. When ASEAN members refer 
to ‘working together’ in ASEAN, the term strengthens cooperation and works as if it has 
long been a common value held between them. As Almonte points out, ‘The basic lesson 
ASEAN teaches is that differences or even disputes should not stop countries from 
promoting mutually beneficial relationship – because the very act of sitting down together 
can begin to build mutual trust and confidence’.
63  
 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the current Indonesian President, in 2007 stated that: ‘The 
formation of ASEAN was regarded as the last chance for the nations of Southeast Asia to 
achieve some kind of unity’.
64 ASEAN members believe that if they break the all-
important foundations of the Association, then the region would become insecure. Such 
sentiment encourages member countries to work together for the sake of ASEAN’s 
longevity, and cooperate through frequent consultation. Snitwongse recognises that the 
reason why members were willing to work together, she says, is that ‘[few] demands were 
made on members and the resulting peaceful relations served both their national and 
regime interests’ on the basis of the lowest common denominator.
65 Indeed, ASEAN 
countries believe that working together is the most important philosophy to overcome any 
existing, or potential rifts between them.
66 In this respect, Ahmad suggests that there is a 
basic concept of cooperation in ASEAN, which gave birth to a series of conventions. He 
lists three specific elements: ‘solidarity’, ‘consensus’ and ‘the primacy of ASEAN’, and 
points out that these elements are linked together under one concept of ‘working 
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together’.
67 However, his novel definition has not been further developed by other scholars, 
or even by himself. 
 
 
The influence of Southeast Asian cultures on the ASEAN Way 
Some scholars emphasise the importance of the cultural component in the ASEAN Way.  It 
is pointed out that ASEAN uses the earlier-mentioned Malay practices, musyawarah and 
mufakat, which are culturally dominant in the region (including Indonesian Village politics, 
and to some extent those of Malaysia and the Philippines too).
68 In particular, behind-the-
scene mediation, face-saving behaviour, and furthering a conciliatory relationship during 
the negotiation process, are specific features of musyawarah and mufakat, and this 
distinguishes the ASEAN Way from other negotiation styles.
69 Askandar et al. point out 
that traditional values in the decision-making process: respecting consultation and 
consensus, ‘play a significant role’ when a dispute happens in ASEAN.
70 Solidum 
recognises an important dimension of cultural similarity amongst the member states, 
therefore recognises culture as one of constitutional factors of the ASEAN Way.
71   
 
Peter Boyce points out that musyawarah and mufakat prevailed even in non-Malay 
countries, such as Thailand and Singapore:  
 
It seems that all ASEAN governments are familiar with musyawarah and accept its 
implications for diplomacy. For the Thais and for the three ASEAN states inhabited 
principally by Malays, musyawarah or something akin to it (such as the Filipino pulong) is 
                                                 
67 Zakaria Haji Ahmad, ‘The World of ASEAN Decision-makers’, p. 203. 
68 Pushpa Thambipillai and J. Saravanamuttu, ASEAN Negotiations, p. 11. Mely Caballero-Anthony gives the 
same view. See her book, Regional security in Southeast Asia, pp. 72-74. She also points out that the 
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apparently an indigenous tool, and even the predominantly Chinese leadership of 
Singapore seems to have adjusted to it.
72 
 
Given the fact that the consensus-building process stemmed from Malay culture, how did 
Thailand and Singapore come to accept, and indeed embody, that value? Callister et al. 
observe that harmony and face-saving are both conflict-resolution techniques and core 
values in Thailand.
73 This is also applicable to Singapore.
74 Indeed, such a shared attitude 
towards conflict-resolution in the region is what Trood and Booth conclude might be 




Acharya, on the other hand, raises the issue of relevance of a broader cultural aspect: 
‘[T]he cultural underpinnings of the ASEAN Way of managing disputes and advancing 
security cooperation could be overstated’,
76 he writes, ‘[t]he ASEAN Way itself resulted 
not so much from preordained cultural sources, Javanese or otherwise, but from 
incremental socialisation’.
77 Haacke supports this view because frequent consultations 
were the product of two key international norms (sovereign equality and mutual respect) 
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rather than the loan of the existing indigenous practice.
78 Kurus says, ASEAN members 
became ‘more attuned and sensitive to each other’s interest’ and this created a common 
sense of togetherness.
79 ‘At a deeper level, he concludes, ASEAN has afforded the member 
states a vehicle to identify with the region’.
80 
 
Caballero-Anthony gives a different, and more functional, explanation for this question: 
ASEAN leaders are able to forge consensus because decision-making is centralised in 
leaders themselves: ‘[I]n most ASEAN states, decision-making is highly centralised, and 
almost always limited to a small number of elites. The political set-up of most states does 
not really require political leaders to explain to their respective populations why certain 
decisions have been reached’.
81 She also argues that another related, but no less important, 





ASEAN and its precursors: The origin of the ASEAN Way 
Despite the preceding discussion about the components of the ASEAN Way in the existing 
literature, there is nonetheless little discussion on its origin, and this stands in stark contrast 
to the literature devoted to its definition. Indeed, as Haacke puts it: ‘Dating the origins of 
the “ASEAN Way” is an endeavour fraught with difficulty’.
83 Therefore, commentators 
have steered clear of tackling the issue. In this context, endeavour to trace the origin of the 
ASEAN Way to ASEAN’s precursors, the ASA and Maphilindo, has produced limited 
results. Although the details of the formation process of the ASA are described by such 
authors as Jorgensen-Dahl, Gordon and Yamakage, these descriptions did not refer to the 
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82 Ibid, p. 60. 
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origin of the ASEAN Way.
84 In addition, from their perspectives, the ASA suddenly 
emerged without any ideological accumulation towards regional cooperation among the 
leaders in Southeast Asia. They do not examine the reason why the Philippines and 
Thailand were not satisfied with the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) led by 
the US, and why they developed the first local-made regional organisation instead.  
 
Some scholars argue that ASEAN took over the Malay custom of musyawarah and 
mufakat from Maphilindo.
85 Modelski points out Indonesia’s ideological influence on 
Maphilindo. He sees that its ideology was ‘derived from the concepts guiding Indonesian 
foreign policy’.
86 Peter Boyce further argues such a view in his own work:  
 
Musyawarah diplomacy seems to have been adopted, for publicly purposes at least, as a 
central and distinctive element in the inter se relations of ASEAN states. Promulgated by 
Sukarno as the basis of his Guided Democracy, it was adopted by him and by other 
Southeast Asian leaders as an instrument of diplomacy during the 1960s, notably from the 
first ministerial discussions on ASA (which did not include Indonesia) in 1961 and the first 
heads-of-government meetings on Maphilindo at Manila in mid-1963.
87 
 
Tamaki, on the other hand, directly seeks the philosophical basis of the ASEAN Way in 
Indonesia’s ideology, Pancasila.
88 Pancasila, or the five principles of Indonesia, was 
announced by Sukarno before the Investigating Committee of Preparation for 
Independence in June 1945.
89 It was basically the ideology of a new Indonesia, engaged in 
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nation-building, and directed to the necessary harmonisation of a broad range of ethnic and 
religious groups in the country.
90 Its third principle is consensus decision-making by 
consultation: ‘unanimity arising out of deliberation amongst representatives’,
91 which is 
supposed to be originated in musyawarah and mufakat in Indonesian village politics.
92  
 
Haacke, on the other hand, sees that the ASEAN Way has its roots in the common history 
of the region, rather than in traditional culture.
93 According to such an approach, the 
ASEAN Way is based on the historical background of shared colonial experience, struggle 
for independence, and the origins of intra-regional disputes. Countries in the region 
encountered Westphalian principles, such as sovereign equality, non-interference and the 
non-use of force in the colonial period.
94 Consequently, and with the exception of Thailand, 
they awoke to such ideas as independence, nationalism and sovereignty that were strongly 
linked to Western perceptions.
95 In large part because of the uncompromising factors 
associated with such an outlook (and political method), after independence, a three-sided 
struggle broke out between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines in 1963. Haacke’s 
conclusion is that the ASEAN Way was created in the course of these historical 
interactions. This perspective, while being valuable, does not fully explain the origin or the 
formation process of the ASEAN Way. 
 
                                                 
90 Pancasila is regarded as Indonesian ideology unifying ethnic and religious diversity for peaceful 
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In this regard, but also in a limited fashion, Acharya is the only scholar who has alluded to 
a broader process from which the ASEAN Way emerged. He recognises that the main 
body of the ASEAN Way was socially constructed by member countries. But even he 
somewhat limits the scope of his investigation by arguing that the appearance of the 
ASEAN Way was attributable, finally, to a single event: the Corregidor affair of 1968 (a 
territorial dispute between the Philippines and Malaysia over Sabah). He points out in this 





This thesis argues that the origin of the ASEAN Way should be traced not only in 
accordance with the uses and features of the concept, but also by paying attention to the 
crises and conflicts that they were applied to, and, to some extent, emerged from. Most of 
commentators who refer to the origin of the ASEAN Way do not identify the specific 
events from which the ASEAN Way emerged. In addition, none of these does examine the 
interactions between states during conflicts. This thesis focuses on this significant, but 
largely underexplored, element in the existing scholarship, while also specifying important 
factors for regional cooperation.  
 
None of the authors surveyed here provides a holistic approach to the creation of the 
ASEAN Way. This is because they limit their attention to separate key factors or events in 
constructing this concept. This thesis will go on to explain that a number of important 
processes were at work in the gestation period of the ASEAN Way, and none was by itself 
responsible for this birth. In addition, broad historical processes were also at play, and 
these were encouraging states in the region to seek a working method that was not reliant 
on an imperfect Western approach to diplomacy and conflict-resolution. There was, 
however, every urgency in seeing such a method emerge, as the tightly framed nature of 
the Southeast Asian region after the end of World War II (and the attendant process of 
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decolonisation coming with it) would not allow comfortable political cohabitation without 






AN AWAKENING OF REGIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
 
This chapter explores historical influences on the ASEAN Way, encompassing the 15 
years between the end of World War II and the establishment of the Association of 
Southeast Asia (ASA). The premise of the argument in this chapter is that ASEAN’s 
foundation philosophy was deeply impacted upon by the history of the countries in the 
region. Firstly, it describes the processes of achieving independence and nation-building in 
these countries after the war. In this regard, it pays particular attention to their different 
views of nation-building. Secondly, and building on this, it argues that at the core are their 
different attitudes towards the Cold War antagonism. It also explores how Western-made 
regional organisations, such as Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and the 
Colombo Plan, influenced the shaping of the politics of the region. Lastly, it analyses the 
reason why countries in the region agreed to establish the first locally-made regional 
organisation, the ASA, by taking some distance from existing regional organisations 
provided by Western countries, and in particular SEATO. The analysis teases out the 
specific features of locally-formed regional cooperation, and clarifies the background of 
the formation of the ASA itself.  
  
 
Southeast Asia after the Japanese surrender 
In Asia, the end of World War II was marked by Japan’s acceptance of the Potsdam 
Declaration on 15 August 1945. Various relations were created between Southeast Asian 
countries and Western countries after the withdrawal of the Japanese. The first country in 
Southeast Asia to achieve independence was the Philippines, which maintained close 
bilateral relations with the United States after its peaceful withdrawal in July 1946. The 
Federation of Malaya, replacing the former British colony of Malaya in February 1948, 32 
 
suffered from continual disturbances (the Malayan Emergency) generated by the Malayan 
Communist Party (MCP). Its independence was not realised until 1957.
1 In Indonesia, 
Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta declared independence from the Netherlands, establishing 
the Republic of Indonesia on 17 August 1945. However, this was not recognised by the 
Dutch, thus plunging the country into four years of fierce struggle. Indonesia finally 
became independent in December 1949, when the Hague Agreement was reached through 
American mediation.
2 Indonesia’s suspicion and distrust of the Netherlands (and, in a sense, 
Western power as a whole) ultimately resulted in the creation of an independent foreign 
policy.
3 In Thailand, the only country in Southeast Asia which had no colonial experience, 
the army had been in power since the replacement of the absolute monarchy in 1932.   
 
 
The advent of the Cold War 
Soon after the end of the Second World War, the rapid growth of Communist power 
brought on armed conflicts with the ‘free world’ in Europe and Asia, thereby creating the 
bipolar system, which lasted for over four decades. In Asia, military action occurred in the 
Korean and Indochina Peninsulas, backed by the two major blocs of the Cold War. The 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), supported by the Soviet Union and 
Communist China,
4 went to war in 1950 against the Republic of Korea (South Korea), 
which was backed by the United States and the United Nations. The battle came to a 
standstill, and an armistice was signed in July 1953 in the presence of the UN, North Korea 
and China.   
   
                                                 
1 The MCP, which was composed of the Chinese Malayan, opposed the privileges of the Malayan population 
in the proposed Malay-favoured federation. The British diplomat, Harold MacMichael, initially proposed the 
Malay Union in 1946 where all ethnic groups would have equal rights. However, the proposal was withdrawn 
because of strong opposition from the Malay. Instead, the Malay-favoured Federation was launched. The 
Chinese Malay’s anger has been directed toward the British in Malaya since June 1948.  
2 Herbert Feith, ‘Indonesia’, in George McT. Kahin (ed.), Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia (2nd 
edn., Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1964), p. 203. 
3 Mohammad Hatta, ‘Indonesia’s Foreign Policy’, p. 444. 
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In Vietnam, several days after Japan’s surrender, Ho Chi Minh, the Communist leader, 
forced Emperor Bao Dai to step down and created the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
(North Vietnam) in Hanoi. However, the French government did not recognise it and 
restored Cochin China (its puppet government) in southern Vietnam in March 1946. In 
December, France attacked North Vietnam, and the First Indochina War began. In March 
1949, the French government established the State of Vietnam (South Vietnam) led by 
Emperor Bao Dai in Saigon. In January 1950, the Soviet Union and Communist China 
recognised North Vietnam and began providing it with military assistance. The US, on the 
other hand, recognised South Vietnam in February. By then, the conflict in Vietnam had 
become an international issue backed by the two blocs.   
 
Soon after the end of the Second World War, most of the countries in Southeast Asia, and 
in particular Malaya and the Philippines, suffered from anti-government actions by 
Communist groups, which mostly developed from the anti-Japanese resistance during 
wartime. Malaya and its metropolitan government, Britain, had been annoyed by the 
rioting and troubles generated by the MCP for over 12 years since 1948.
5 Thus, the country 
was tense with guerrilla warfare and the ‘primary task was restoration of law and order’ in 
Malaya.
6 The rebellion was at its height when Sir Henry Gurney, the British High 
Commissioner, was assassinated on 6 October 1951 while travelling through the winding 
road to the government house in Frayser’s Hill. In the Philippines, the Hukbalahap 
movement, which originated from the People’s Anti-Japanese Liberation Army, was 
conducting anti-government military activities throughout the country since its 
independence ten years earlier.  
 
The West tried to protect Southeast Asia from the Communists’ infiltration by launching 
two regional forms of cooperation: the Colombo Plan launched by Britain, and SEATO led 
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by the US.
7 These regional organisations contrasted sharply: the Colombo Plan focused on 
socio-economic development, whereas SEATO gave considerable weight to military 
defence.
8 However, in reality, since ‘small nations, particularly the countries of South East 
Asia, do not have many policy choices’,
9 they eventually continued their relations with 
external powers on the basis of historical ties. The Philippines joined SEATO, whereas 
Malaya became a member of the Colombo Plan. Thailand joined SEATO because it 
received aid for its post-war reconstruction from the US. Indonesia, on the other hand, 
adopted a non-aligned position.    
 
The Colombo Plan originated from the conference of Ministers of the Commonwealth 
countries, Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ceylon, India and Pakistan, at 
Colombo, Ceylon in January 1950.
10 They ‘agreed upon the vital importance of the 
economic development of South and South-East Asia in the maintenance of the political 
stability of the countries in that area’
11 as ‘[t]he present state of development in South and 
South-East Asia is probably as low as anywhere in the world’.
12 The main purpose of the 
Colombo Plan was to build up strong nations that could resist Communist infiltration, and 
this was to be achieved through financial aid and technical assistance.
13 In launching the 
Plan, the British were required ‘to persuade the people of the region that their true interests 
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cooperation established by the United Nations on 28 March 1947. Including geographically distant countries 
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Pact, 8 September 1954, in Department of State Bulletin, 31/795 (20 September 1954), pp. 393-395. 
9 Thanat Khoman, ‘A Policy of Regional Cooperation’, Foreign Affairs Bulletin, 8/1 (August-September 
1968), p. 1.  
10 Ceylon is present-day Sri Lanka. 
11 CAB 134/226, EPC(50)105, October 1950 (Final Report of the Commonwealth Consultative Committee 
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12 Ibid., paragraph 4. 
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<http://www.colombo-plan.org/>. Britain was not concerned about the establishment of Communist China. 
(Evelyn Colvert, Southeast Asia in International Politics, 1941-1956 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
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are best served by continued association with the free world’.
14 The Plan originally focused 
on Commonwealth countries in South and Southeast Asia, but it later opened associate 
status to other countries in the region.
15 Indonesia joined in 1953, and Thailand and the 
Philippines did in 1954.
16 
 
SEATO was established on 8 September 1954 in Manila through, as stated earlier, a US 
initiative.
17 There were eight signatories (Australia, Britain, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, 
the Philippines, Thailand and the United States) and three protocol states (Cambodia, Laos 
and South Vietnam). It had three main purposes: defence cooperation, economic aid and 
technical assistance. Through these, SEATO could ‘strengthen the fabric of peace and 
freedom’ and ‘promote the economic well-being and development’ in the treaty area.
18 
However, its main function was to form an anti-Communist military alliance, particularly 
against Communist China, which was growing in influence in the region, and to avoid the 
‘“falling domino” principle’ of Indochina.
19 At the inaugural conference of SEATO in 
Manila, John Foster Dulles, the American Secretary of State, stated,  
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17 John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State of the United States, was the principal architect of SEATO. 
SEATO dissolved on 30 June 1977. 
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19 Dwight D. Eisenhower, The President’s News Conference, 7 April 1954, in US Presidential Library (ed.), 
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We are confronted by those who believe in the power of intimidation by violence. The 
Korean Armistice negotiations reached their climax to the accompaniment of suicidal 
assaults by the red Chinese and North Korean forces. The Geneva Conference on 
Indochina was accompanied by violent Communist military activity in that area.
20 
 
In Southeast Asia, the policies towards Communism varied from country to country. As 
Pye puts it, ‘the politics of all the countries are strongly influenced by the question of how 
best to deal with the realities of Communism in Asia’.
21 The Philippines and Thailand were 
engaged in Cold War politics by fully supporting the American security policy of 
‘containment’. They sent troops to South Korea and South Vietnam.
22 Indeed, Philippine 
President Elpidio Quirino said in 1950 that ’he was anxious to keep Philippine policies 
attuned to that of the U.S.’
23 In 1951, the Mutual Security Act of 1951 was passed in the 
US Congress. It allowed much larger military aid to favoured Asian countries so that 
America could reinforce its defence function in Asia to withstand Communist aggression.
24 
Although Thailand was very fearful of Communist infiltration, it did not have a bilateral 
defence treaty with the US. Therefore, Thailand ‘welcomed the more formal commitment 
provided by SEATO’.
25 The Philippines, on the other hand, did not seem more concerned 
about the Communist infiltration than Thailand; however, its attitude towards Communist 
China remained resistant.
26 Both SEATO ally countries, the Philippines and Thailand, 
inevitably brought most attention to military defence rather than nation-building. 
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Malaya was suffering from the Malayan Emergency and held a strong sense of threat from 
Communist activities. However, it did not join SEATO, but rather focused on national 
development, in line with the Colombo Plan. Malaya fully enjoyed the British ‘benevolent 
tutelage’ in national security, as well as socio-economic development.
27 It believed that the 
most effective strategy in withstanding Communist expansion was to raise its standards of 
living.
28 Malaya did not send its troops outside of the country. Although British forces 
successfully suppressed Communist riots during the Emergency, Tunku Abdul Rahman, 
the Malayan Prime Minister, later expressed his view that ‘no amount of British arms 
would by itself ever rid Malaya of the menace of Communism. The solution could not 
come about by military means alone; it was essential to win the minds and hearts of the 
people, to satisfy their aspirations, and thus draw them away from the enticements of 
Communism’.
29   
 
When the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949, Indonesia was quick to 
recognise it. In domestic politics, the Indonesian government tried to keep a balance 
between political groups on the basis of Pancasila.
30 In his address to the Constituent 
Assembly in April 1959, Indonesian President Sukarno said, ‘Independent Indonesia is a 
golden bridge on which we should not push each other, or elbow each other aside, because 
this golden bridge is our collective possession’.
31 The sense of tolerance characterising 
Pancasila shaped the ‘independent and active foreign policy’ and let Indonesia keep away 
from the Cold War antagonism.
32 Indonesia declared that it would play ‘no favourites 
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between the two opposed blocs and follow its own path’ because joining the either bloc 
‘would merely create new suspicions and new enmities’.
33 However, in terms of foreign 
aid, Indonesia relied on Western countries (mainly the US) for its economy as ‘[o]nly the 
West at this time was prepared to provide such assistance’.
34 
 
Two incidents in mid-1950s gave rise to a change in the security environment in Southeast 
Asia. Firstly, Nikita S. Khrushchev, the successor of Joseph Stalin, became the First 
Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1953. He presented the new 
Soviet strategy of ‘peaceful competition’ with the free world by saying, ‘[L]et us compete 
without war’.
35 His new strategy was to expand Communist power by financial aid and 
technical assistance towards the non-Communist countries, while ‘[p]reviously Soviet 
leaders had made it abundantly clear that they couldn’t care less about the progress of the 
newly developing areas’.
36 The Soviet Union was particularly keen to connect the leading 
forces of the non-aligned Third World, such as Indonesia and Burma.
37 Russia became 
increasingly confident in the exercise of its economic influence on outside of the countries: 
Communist’s economic power ‘will help … to consolidate world peace’.
38 Khrushchev’s 
policy reduced the imminent threat of nuclear war between the two opposing blocs.
39 
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A second factor was the cease-fire in Vietnam. After the French lost the battle of Dien 
Bien Phu in northern Vietnam in March 1954, peace talks were initiated in Geneva in April. 
On 21 July, both sides signed the Geneva accord, which stated that the country should be 
divided into two at the 17
th parallel; and thus the First Indochina War ended.  
 
With the new policy of Khrushchev and the end of the First Indochina War, a need for 
change in the American policy towards Southeast Asia was called for within the US. In 
1954, the former US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, W. Averell Harriman,
40 issued the 
government with a warning regarding its attitude towards the Communists: ‘Underlying 
both our current defence policies and our diplomacy has been a preoccupation with the 
idea of strength through our possession of nuclear weapons’.
41 He envisaged that the 
Communist bloc would achieve economic growth and the free world’s margin of economic 
superiority would narrow. He then claimed,  
 
We can frustrate this Soviet design by using our energy and great resources not only to 
strengthen military defences throughout the free world, but to root freedom more firmly in 
economic development, rising standards of living, national dignity and the political and 
social conditions in which democracy flourishes.
42 
 
This view was shared broadly towards the end of 1950s. As Douglas MacArthur II put it,
43 
 
The chief and present threat to independence in Asia is not an external military threat.  It is 
the danger of unrest and subversion, directed from without, in countries where free 
governments seem unable to raise the material standards of living of their peoples.  That is 
why Asian economic progress is so important for the peoples of free Asia.
44   
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However, Dwight David Eisenhower, the President of the United States, was not able to 
tear himself away from his obsession with the possibility of a major war breaking out in 
Southeast Asia: 
 
The principal and continuing factor is the persistently aggressive design of Moscow and 
Peiping, which shows no evidence of genuine change despite their professed desire to relax 
tensions and to preserve peace. ….The major new factor in the world today, beside the 
absence of fighting, is the rapid development in military weapons – weapons that in total 
war would threaten catastrophe.
45   
 
The US was more actively engaged in South Vietnam after the Geneva Conference in 1954, 
in place of the French colonial government. It supported the new leadership of Ngo Dinh 
Diem and helped him purge Communist elements from South Vietnam. The State of 
Vietnam was taken over by the Republic of Vietnam in 1955 and Ngo Dinh Diem became 
its first President.  
 
In early 1957, SEATO still held a militant perspective:
46 ‘[W]hile the immediate military 
threat to peace in Southeast Asia has diminished, the forces of international Communism is 
still working for the ultimate objective of world domination’.
47 It saw that the military 
strength in China and North Vietnam had not been reduced, and therefore ‘SEATO could 
not relax its vigilance and must maintain its capacity to deter and repel aggression’.
48 
Countries in Southeast Asia feared the recurrence of war in Indochina, which might give 
rise to an unstable situation in their countries. They recognised the fact that nation-building 
in such circumstances is impossible. 
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However, a review of these perspectives was finally commenced in May 1957. Douglas 
Dillon, the Deputy Under-Secretary for Economic Affairs of the US, announced a new 
approach to security in Southeast Asia: ‘During the past year our programs of mutual 
security have been going through a period of critical re-examination’.
49 He suggested that 
military-oriented aid since the Mutual Security Act of 1951 would be partially allocated to 
national development programmes in the region. John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State, 
stated in June 1957, ‘The President [Eisenhower] now recommends the establishment of a 
development loan fund as the most economical and effective way to stimulate the needed 
economic growth’.
50 Dillon made Dulles’s statement clear: the US would accept the 
request from Southeast Asian countries, such as the Philippines and Thailand, because they 
‘can only survive as free governments if they can respond in some way to the demands of 






However, as the British government saw it, ‘[t]he conduct of American foreign policy 
towards Asia…has left the United States with few friends, many enemies and almost 
universal critics amongst Asian Governments and peoples’ during this period.
52 While the 
US was engaged in South Vietnam after the Geneva Conference in July 1954, 
disagreement over the American security policy arose among the countries of Southeast 
Asia. The Americans were seen as the ‘real “war-mongers” in the world’.
53 In particular, 
                                                 
49Douglas Dillon, Address made before the American Assembly, at Harriman, N. Y., on 2 May 1957: ‘A 
New Approach to Mutual Security’, Department of State Bulletin, 36/934 (20 May 1957), pp. 800-804. 
50 John Foster Dulles, Address made before the House Foreign Affairs Committee: ‘Major Purposes of the 
Mutual Security Programs (Press release on 10 June 1957)’, Department of State Bulletin, 37/940 (1 July 
1957), pp. 3-8. 
51 Douglas Dillon, Address made before the Advertising club of New Jersey at Newark, N. J.: ‘Encouraging 
Economic Growth in Less Developed Countries of the Free World’, on 4 June 1957, in Department of State 
Bulletin, 37/940 (1 July 1957), pp. 31-33. Indeed, economic aid to Thailand increased after this year. See, 
‘Foreign Aid – Too Little or Too Much?’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 31 August 1961, pp. 389-390. 
52 FO 371/111852, no5, 8 August 1954 (Note by M J MacDonald (Singapore)). 
53 Ibid. 42 
 
the Philippines and Thailand, the members of SEATO, sought to distance their security 
policy from the American Cold War strategy. This is because they came to realise that they 
wanted to fight for their own interests, not ‘for the vague concept of a free world’.
54 What 
the US was, in effect, doing in Vietnam was not in the interests of Southeast Asia, but in 
support of the Western bloc.
55 The Philippines and Thailand started to consider the way in 
which they should maintain their countries by themselves rather than relying heavily on the 
American security policy. Thanat Khoman, the Thai Foreign Minister, later referred to the 
imperative situation of small states: ‘[T]he Cold War…came into being without…the 
advice and consent of the smaller powers…. In the last resort, small nations may find that 
it is in their own interest to limit the degree of their involvement in the light of their 
assessment of the situation’.
56 Countries in Southeast Asia hoped for a situation in which it 




Another background factor of influence to the process of gaining self-reliance was the end 
of the First Indochina War, in which both the Philippines and Thailand participated by 
sending troops. They believed that peace would allow them to concentrate their efforts on 
economic development. By doing so, they could eradicate poverty, which would give 
Communists an opportunity to infiltrate their societies. In this context, economic well-
being was considered to be the most effective way to protect the country from 
Communism.
58 Carlos P. Romuro, the Philippine Foreign Secretary, pointed out in 1954 
that:  
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Military measures are best a short-term for staving off an immediate threat of Communist 
aggression. The long-term struggle against communism, however, requires economic and 
financial assistance that will enable the Asian peoples to raise their standards of living.
59 
 
Tunku Abdul Rahman later spoke about his idea of non-military national security against 
Communists: ‘I am not referring to our armed strength because we are not strong but rather 
to the way we have run our country which has made the people of Malaysia happy and 
contented’.
60   
 
Both the Philippines and Thailand began to put a serious effort into tackling national 
development. Indeed, they had not been able to do this previously as they had been 
engaged in preventing the proliferation of communism in Asia by sending their people to 
the battlefield. King Bhumidol Adulyadej of Thailand visited Washington and gave a 
speech on 28 June 1960. He emphasised the importance of economic development, rather 
than military defence, by saying, ‘When a country feels reasonably confident of its own 
security, it can devote more attention to economic development. … You will understand 
what great urgent need there [in Thailand] is to increase the income and raise the living 
standard of my people’.
61   
 
In mid-May 1958, Carlos P. Garcia, the Philippine President, visited Eisenhower in 
Washington, and recommended that:  
 
we start a new chapter in the unending work of Nation building we face another great 
challenge, namely, the building of a national economy capable of affording down to the 
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humblest citizen of a democratic Philippines economic well-being, social security, and 
stability.
62   
 
The Philippines and Thailand became aware of the advantages of ‘standing on their own 
feet’, and that they should ‘rely more on neighbourly mutual support than on stronger 
states that serve their own national interests rather than those of smaller partners’.
63 In 
Thailand, the US government had praised the military regime as an ardent supporter of 
freedom. America’s support provided legitimacy with the ruling Thai government and 
reduced the people’s criticism against nepotism, corruption and suppression. However, by 
mid-1950s, the people’s dissatisfaction was transferred to the development of an anti-
American sentiment.
64 The people required the Thai government to cut its close ties with 
the US, to leave SEATO and to adopt an independent foreign policy. Eventually, a more 
‘neutral’ policy direction was favoured
65 although the Thai government denied its 
adherence to neutralism because, ostensibly, it was ‘not a solution’.
66   
 
In the Philippines, ‘U.S. influence was predominant in almost every sphere’ before Ramon 
Magsaysay came into office in 1953.
67 The US government said, ‘We consider that we 
have a vital interest in the Philippines and that we must do everything necessary to insure 
its safety and reasonable stability’.
68 The Philippines were at odds with the US over a 
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number of bilateral issues, such as the extraterritorial rights for US troops in the 
Philippines and the US’s unilateral policy-making of national security in the Philippines. 
However, in this case, strong antagonism against the Americans did not emerge, as it did in 
Thailand. Instead, anti-American sentiment in the Philippines took pragmatic forms. The 
Philippine government sought to form a genuinely sovereign state, but doing so without 
sharply antagonising the US. This is the so-called new ‘Philippine-American solidarity on 
the basis of equality’.
69 Indeed, when Eisenhower was invited to Manila in June 1960, 
Garcia told him that any anti-American sentiment would not harm the close bilateral ties.
70 
 
When Malaya became independent in 1957, it developed an independent and non-aligned 
foreign policy, although this new state did rely on the bilateral defence agreement with 
Britain (Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement: AMDA) for its national security. In the 
agreement,  
 
In the event of a threat of armed attack against any of the territories or forces of the 
Federation of Malaya or any of the territories or protectorates of the United Kingdom in the 
Far East...the Governments of the Federation of Malaya and of the United Kingdom will 
consult together on the measures to be taken jointly or separately to enlist the fullest co-
operation between them for the purpose of meeting the situation effectively.
71 
 
Eventually, Malaya did not join SEATO as it was ‘quite satisfied with’ AMDA.
72 However, 
it is often said that Malaya was linked with SEATO (or the US) indirectly via Britain.
73 
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Malayan leaders ‘ritually scoffed at SEATO from time to time and they took care not to be 
too closely identified with American policies on Cold War issues’.
74  Tunku Abdul 
Rahman said about SEATO:     
 
Although it is agreed that Malaysia has both a military agreement and foreign bases, this 
arrangement is significantly different from such multilateral military alliances as SEATO, 
NATO… Malaysia’s agreement with Britain is bilateral and for mutual defence and not 
concluded in the context of any East-West conflict.
75   
 
In Malaya, the awareness of self-reliance developed without particular anti-British 
sentiment.
76 The Tunku used a press conference in the early 1957 to state that he 
appreciated the excellent Government machinery that Malaya had inherited from the 
British, and it could successfully embark upon nation-building with this.
77 He saw that 
Malaya was able to achieve socio-economic progress quicker than any other country in the 
region. The Tunku added that the defence agreement with Britain ‘has enabled us [the 
Malayan people] to make far more rapid progress in every field of development because 
we have not had to spend vast sums on our armed forces’.
78 Indeed, in the early 1960s, 
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The birth of regional consciousness 
The policy change in both the Philippines and Thailand – two countries which would prove 
to be devoted to the pursuit of economic development – allowed them to turn their 
attention towards neighbouring countries. They sought self-reliance through regional 
cooperation because they were too small and underdeveloped to achieve self-reliance alone. 
The awakening to neighbourliness made up the stepping-stones leading to the first regional 
organisation. In his letter to Garcia, the Tunku described their previous aloof relations.  
 
For historical reasons, the cultural and economic development of most countries of South 
East Asia has been principally influenced in the present century by the relations which they 
have had with other countries outside South East Asia. As a consequence, the growth of 
any sense of South East Asian consciousness, or of a common heritage in the great cultural 
achievements and possibilities of this part of Asia has been arrested. Through force of habit 
and historical circumstances, we have too often looked for help and inspiration outwards – 
instead of inwards depending on our own resources and effort.
80 
 
Two leaders of Malaya and the Philippines initiated this plan.
81 In February 1958, only half 
a year after Malaya’s independence, the Tunku revealed the first initiative to create 
regional cooperation when he was in Colombo. In January 1959, he visited Garcia in 
Manila with his plan, the proposal for a Southeast Asian Friendship and Economic Treaty 
(SEAFET). His plan overtly aimed at broad economic and cultural cooperation, and 
covertly sought to establish the custom of consultation between neighbouring countries in 
the region. Although the Tunku expected to raise the standards of living through the treaty 
so that Malaya could forestall Communist infiltration, he tried not to emphasise the anti-
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Communist element to his proposal, so that the treaty could include non-aligned countries 
such as Indonesia and Burma.  
 
Garcia, on the other hand, proposed the obvious pro-Western and anti-Communist security 
alliance.
82 Indeed, in December 1958, a month before the Tunku’s visit, Garcia announced 
a new Philippine foreign policy, which aimed for ‘fresh responsibilities on the international 
stage, and particularly in South-East Asia’.
83 Although the views on regional cooperation 
of the two leaders were different, they issued a Joint Statement, which stated that they 
sought regional cooperation based on racial kinship and friendship in order to raise the 
standards of living. 
 
The Thai government showed its interest in regional cooperation in April 1959.
84 It 
circulated its own plan to countries in Southeast Asia in July of the same year. The Thai 
plan was broader in scope than the Malayan plan, including as it did an element of political 
cooperation too.
85 When the Malayan Premier sent a letter to countries in the region in 
October 1959, the objective of regional cooperation became clearer and the importance of 
‘consultation’ between countries was emphasised. In his letter to Garcia, ‘the countries of 
South East Asia should establish some organisation to facilitate consultation and closer 
collaboration between these countries’.
86 Indeed, they wanted to create neighbourliness, 
encourage frequent communication and foster a habit of cooperation. Except for these 
three countries, however, no other Southeast Asian State showed any interest in regional 
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cooperation. Rather, Cambodia, Burma and Indonesia saw that the plans were pro-
Western.
87  
    
 
The political situation in Indonesia 
In Indonesia, an independent and active foreign policy could not successfully induce the 
sufficient amount of foreign aid and investment necessary for national development. 
Economic growth in Indonesia was less than that of its neighbouring countries in the mid-
1950s. In the political sphere, many small parties competed with each other and each 
cabinet did not last long.
88 This led to a stalling of the nation-building process. Sukarno, 
the President of Indonesia, insisted that Indonesia’s nation-building was at a standstill 
because it had employed a Western model of modernisation, and liberalism in politics and 
economy. He declared Guided Democracy in October 1956:  
 
I am suggesting that the leaders should hold a musyawarah and take a joint decision to 
bury the parties!’ He continued, ‘...the democracy I crave for Indonesia is not a liberal 
democracy such as exists for Western Europe. No! What I want for Indonesia is a guided 
democracy, a democracy with leadership.
89  
 
In addition, the so-called PRRI rebellion let Indonesia remain largely aloof from its 
neighbouring countries. 
 
Instability in domestic politics and the Indonesian economy finally led to an outbreak of 
political disturbances. On 15 February 1958, Central Sumatran commander Lieutenant 
Colonel Hussein declared the establishment of the Revolutionary Government of the 
Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) in Padan, Central Sumatra. It spread to the Celebes 
(Sulawesi) Island in June, but was suppressed by the end of July, although guerrilla 
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activities by the defiant group continued until 1961. The rebellion originated in the power 
struggle between the two groups: one was composed of the Sukarno-phile and the Murba 
party;
90 the other group was made up of adherents to the Masyumi party.
91 The former 
advocated political centralisation and anti-Westernism, whereas the latter sought to pursue 
more liberal political lines and were anti-Communist. The latter occupied local councils in 
Central, North and South Sumatra from December 1956. The rebel leaders required 
Mohammad Hatta’s return to Indonesian politics. They claimed that Hatta should be 
returned to the role of Prime Minister, and should form a duumvirate regime with Sukarno. 
Sukarno did not accept the demand and instead tabled a counter-proposal, according to 
which the political grouping should be composed of four parties: Communist, Masyumi, 
Nationalist and Nahdatul Ulama. The Army leader, Major General Abdul Haris Nasution, 
tried to act as a mediator. However, reconciliation was not brought. Hussein subsequently 
sent an ultimatum to the government.
92 Sukarno refused it, and then Hussein proclaimed 
the PRRI on 15 February. 
 
The US covertly supported the rebellion, hoping that the Indonesian government could 
return to, at least, the neutral position, by putting Hatta in the leader’s position.
93 The US 
government recognised that Indonesia leaned heavily towards the left, when the Russian 
President, Marshal Kliment Voroshilov, visited Sukarno in May 1957.
94 In addition, when 
the results of the local elections in mid-1957 favoured the Communists, the US became 
convinced that ‘Indonesia was on the brink of falling into the Communist camp’.
95 It 
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secretly delivered firearms through an air-drop over West Sumatra, and its officials gave 
statements in support of the rebellion.
96 However, eventually no country recognised the 
PRRI, because it failed to mobilise the people, and ‘[i]t quickly became obvious that the 
rebels would not succeed without overt American intervention’.
97  
 
The Indonesian government launched an offensive attack against the rebels and quickly 
suppressed them by the end of May.
98 Nevertheless, the PRRI rebellion was ‘a turning 
point in Indonesian politics’.
99 After the rebellion, the regionalist groups, such as Masyumi, 
were excluded from the central government, and only the Sukarno group and the Army 
would remain in power.
100 Sukarno also completed the takeover of the Dutch companies by 
mid-1958 and launched the so-called ‘Guided Economy’, allowing the government to 
intervene more directly in the economy. Sukarno criticised the trade relationship between 
the Netherlands and Indonesia, in addition to his opposition to western-style democracy. 
After independence, Indonesian economy could not be completely independent from the 
Dutch because the exports in Indonesia relied on plantation products by Dutch-owned 
companies in Indonesia. Indonesian labourers were still exploited by the former colonial 
power; and the living standards in the country did not improve. Guided Economy was the 
tool of ‘an attack on “economic liberalism”’,
101 by saying that liberal economy failed to 
stimulate economic progress. Sukarno put Guided Democracy into practice in July 1959, 
and did so by Presidential decrees in order to focus political power on himself.
102   
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Moreover, the domestic situation in Indonesia was not stable enough, and cooperation with 
the neighbouring countries was increasingly difficult because of the growing West Irian 
Campaign. Indonesia had been in negotiations with the Dutch for incorporating West Irian 
into the Indonesian territory since its independence in 1949. Indonesia successfully put the 
issue into the final communiqué of the Asian-African Conference in 1955: ‘The Asian-
African Conference, in the context of its expressed attitude on the abolition of colonialism, 
supported the position of Indonesia in the case of West Irian’.
103 However, it had not borne 
fruit. By the early 1960, the Indonesian navy and air force were greatly strengthened by the 
large support from both the Soviet Union and the US. In August 1960, Sukarno broke 
diplomatic relations with the Netherlands. Indonesia and the Netherlands debated the issue 
during the United Nations General Assembly in late 1961; however, both sides failed to 
secure sufficient support from the chamber. The United States gave a hand to Indonesia on 
the grounds that the latter, a major regional state in Southeast Asia in terms of its 
population and natural resources, was of ‘strategic importance, together with the fact that 
its future political direction was still very much in doubt’.
104 The US was worried about the 
future of Indonesia, which, it thought, might fall into the power of Communist. 
  
The United States ‘was actively engaged in finding a solution on broadly pro-Indonesian 
terms’.
105 In February 1962, a US’s investigating mission was involved in this issue.
106 In 
the following month, the US government organised negotiations between Indonesia and the 
Dutch in Washington. However, Indonesia abruptly withdrew from the negotiating table 
and resumed infiltration into West Irian.
107 It pressed the Dutch government to abandon 
West Irian, and did so by introducing sporadic military actions. On 15 August, Indonesia 
successfully made an agreement with the Dutch and took the territory over on 1 May 1963. 
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Through the West Irian Campaign, Indonesia eliminated the control of one of the former 
colonisers from Southeast Asia and successfully enhanced its reputation in the Afro-Asian 
World. In addition, it established ‘the [use of] unconventional methods of diplomacy and 
low-level use of force’ as a means to force the former coloniser out of the region.
108 Indeed, 
the success of the campaign heightened Sukarno’s confidence in his political ideology 
(such as non-alignment and anti-colonialism) and its embodiment, the so-called Guided 
Democracy. 
 
Indonesia ‘was cool to say the least’ about the regional cooperation plan.
109 It was not 
comfortable cooperating with the Philippines and Thailand because they were the members 
of SEATO, which Indonesia felt hostile to. In addition, tacit cross-strait tensions existed 
between Indonesia and Malaya: Malaya’s suspicion of the expansionist policy of Indonesia, 
and Indonesia’s doubt about Malaya’s involvement in the PRRI rebellion. The Secretary-
General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, Kusmowidadjo Suwito, explained 
Indonesia’s view of the situation by saying that Indonesians tended to regard the regional 
cooperation plan ‘as the SEATO countries’ efforts to make a subtle link between SEATO 
and non-SEATO countries in Asia’.
110 As Hatta concluded:  
 
The memory of the colonial status that bound them [the newly independent states] for 
centuries makes them resist anything they consider an attempt to colonize them again, 
whether by economic or ideological domination. This psychological factor profoundly 
influences Indonesia in her insistence upon an independent policy.
111 
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Three months after the Tunku-Garcia meeting on the regional cooperation scheme in 
January 1959, Malaya arrived at the Treaty of Friendship with Indonesia. In the Treaty, the 
two countries pledged ‘[to] strive through cooperation, collaboration and consultation to 
achieve the greatest possible uniformity in their use and development’.
112 Based on racial 
commonality, the two states were expected to hold consultations when issues arose 
between them. However, in the mid-1961, Suwito Kusumowidagdo expressed his 
objection to the Tunku’s initiative of regional cooperation. In an interview in Far Eastern 
Economic Review, he said, ‘I don’t think there were any prior official consultations with us 
[about the regional cooperation plan]’.
113While it is too simple to conclude that the entire 
reason of Indonesia’s non-involvement in the first regional organisation scheme was due to 
the Tunku’s mismanagement, it can be said that the Malaya’s failure of consultation with 
Indonesia made Indonesia maintain its negative position towards regional cooperation. 
 
 
The development of the plan 
 In April 1960, the Malayan government decided to take the initiative in relation to the 
regional cooperation plan. The development of the plan proceeded with the help of the 
Philippines and Thailand. An envoy of the Malayan government, Mohamed Sopiee, was 
sent, to Manila and Bangkok. The talks in both countries were ‘very encouraging indeed’ 
and the three countries agreed to set up a Working Group to deal with the cooperation 
plan.
114 In July 1960, Malaya abandoned the treaty plan and proposed a more ‘practical and 
informal’ one.
115 The reason was that a formal organisation, based on the treaty, bound 
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potential member countries to conform to the decisions of the organisation, whereas 
national policy varied among these countries.
116 
 
The new proposal was called the Association of South East Asian State (ASAS). It 
emphasised the importance of ‘consultations’. The ASAS was to be a ‘friendly association 
among South East Asian countries as a means of providing consultation, collaboration and 
mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural and administrative fields’.
117 In a sense, 
the ASAS was expected to establish the practice of sitting down together and developing ‘a 
new sense of community’.
118 In February 1961, the Foreign Ministers of the three countries 
met in Kuala Lumpur and agreed to set up a working group in each country in order to 
facilitate the establishment of the organisation.
119 The working group was first held in 
Bangkok in June. Although it was not able to include Indonesia, by far the largest country 
in the region, the first attempt at such a regional initiative bore fruit. On 31 July 1961, the 
first vehicle for regional cooperation, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), ‘inspired 
and organised by Asians’ was established.
120 In the initial Declaration, the ASA pledged to 
cooperate in ‘the economic, social, cultural, scientific and administrative fields’.
121 
 
The second Foreign Ministerial Meeting was supposed to be held in late 1962 in Manila. 
However, it was postponed until April 1963 at Malaya’s request. This is because since the 
mid-1962, bilateral tensions between Malaya and the Philippines over the Federation of 
Malaysia plan, which was announced by Malaya in May 1961, had intensified. The 
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Philippines claimed its dominion over Sabah, one of the British colonies, which was to be 
incorporated into Malaysia.
122 In addition, Malaya accused the Philippine government of 
hiding Azahari bin Sheikh Mahmud, who raised the revolt in December 1962 against 
Brunei’s joining Malaysia. Referring to the rebellion of Azahari, Indonesia posed a 
question to the Malaysia plan, because of lack of regional consensus. As political tensions 
between Malaya and Indonesia intensified, Indonesia declared its confrontation with 
Malaysia (known as Konfrontasi). Since 1963, skirmishes occurred along the Indonesian-
British border in Borneo, and the region suffered from a pattern of disturbances. However, 
the ASA was not able to manage the three-sided issue including a non-member state, 
Indonesia. It was not able to manage even the bilateral issues between members, Malaya 
and the Philippines. ‘[T]he role of [the] ASA became limited’ in the course of the 
development of disturbance among three countries.
123 The Ministerial Meeting of the ASA 
was suspended until 1966 when Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines resumed 
diplomatic relations.  
 
 
The significance of the establishment of the ASA 
It is said that Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, the proposer of regional 
cooperation in 1958, took the idea for regional cooperation in Southeast Asia from the 
European Economic Community.
124 However, as was described above, distrust of the US 
policy and disappointment in the inability of the SEATO to act effectively had grown 
among US allies in Southeast Asia, and notably in the Philippines and Thailand. Although 
they recognised the need of American military support, the Philippines and Thailand 
nonetheless tried to reduce their burden of military commitment to SEATO and turn their 
efforts to nation-building, which they had been neglecting since the end of World War II. 
This is because of the belief that socio-economic development was the most effective way 
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to withstand Communist subversion. This belief prevailed among leaders in Southeast Asia. 
The Tunku picked up this movement and called for regional cooperation. 
 
Therefore, the formation of the ASA can be said to be the first step of ‘awakening to self-
reliance’ in Southeast Asia. In other words, the countries in the region realised that they 
should have responsibility for their own security by building up self-reliance, in particular, 
through the economic development. In doing so, they could stand on their own feet and 
then avoid extra-regional interference. At the same time, however, in this period they had 
no choice but to acknowledge that military presence of external power was essential in 
case of an emergency. Indeed, all three countries of the ASA were homes to foreign bases, 
and, more specifically, these were SEATO-related bases. This paradoxical reality created 
the specific view of national security in Malaya and of bilateral relations with external 
power. Namely, it was responsible for its national security only when it was peace time. 
When in emergency, Malaya was relying on external power, the British, to help it. As the 
Tunku said, British presence gave Malaya a free hand to focus on its national development, 
and doing so without spending their human resources to bolster defence security.
125 In the 
hope of having the same relations, both the Philippines and Thailand hoped the US would 
provide unilateral support without asking them to share military responsibility.
126 
 
Another factor for encouraging regional cooperation was the fact that all three countries 
were too small and too poor to achieve self-reliance separately. They realised that it was 
better to cooperate with each other in order to achieve self-reliance. As Thanat Khoman 
later said, ‘What a rich nation can do single-handed, poor nations must accomplish in 
concert’.
127 This was echoed by Ahmad, who wrote that: ‘[F]ive is better than four than 
three...than one’.
128 Indeed, awareness of self-reliance stimulated the countries to look at 
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their neighbours as their partners in national development. These two factors: awakening to 
self-reliance and a sense of neighbourliness, led the region into cooperation.  
 
It is noteworthy that the importance of consultations had been continuously emphasised in 
the course of the formation of the ASA, and the term ‘consultation’ was stipulated in the 
Bangkok Declaration, the foundation document of the ASA. Indeed, it was the first step to 
the emergence of a sense of neighbourliness and mutual understanding. The orientation 
towards regional cooperation gained momentum when the Philippines and Thailand turned 
their policies to national development, leaving behind the commitment to the bipolar 
military rivalry. In other words, regional cooperation became a reality when these countries 
recognised that nation-building was far more important in insuring their countries against 
external interference.  
 
There were two types of external interference, as recognised by the countries in question. 
The first one was Communists’ externally-aided attempts to subvert their governments (aid 
was provided by China and North Vietnam). The second one they envisaged was a 
Western/American intervention provoked by Communist infiltration. They were witnesses 
of this during the conflict in Vietnam, and they did not want to see such tragedy at home. 
They realised that eradicating poverty was the most effective means to prevent the first 
step. Thus, it was most desirable to improve the socio-economic conditions at home.  
 
The member states of the ASA determined to take responsibility for drawing the blueprint 
for national development. However, all of them were late starters of modernisation; 
therefore, there were a lot of obstacles in front of them. In addition, they had to rely on 
foreign aid and investment for national development. It was useful for exchanging views of 
nation-building, or for helping each other as neighbouring countries, which were 
experiencing similar problems. It can be said that first regional cooperation by the regional 




The sense of regionalism in Southeast Asia began to develop in the mid-1950s, which is 
earlier than is normally recognised by scholars. Regional consciousness in Southeast Asia 
was stimulated by the end of the First Indochina War and the formation of SEATO. 
Although not drastically so, SEATO member countries, the Philippines and Thailand, 
slightly shifted their regional policy from depending totally on the external power (the US) 
to taking the initiative for their own business. In the meantime, the Southeast Asian states 
recognised the imminent need for nation-building. As a result, countries in Southeast Asia 
began to look to their neighbours, and formed the first system of regional cooperation that 
had been led by the region. However, the regional organisation was destined to face 








Although the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), the first locally made regional 
organisation, was successfully established in 1961, it became dysfunctional almost 
immediately. From the beginning of 1963 the region was plunged into a three-way dispute 
between Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines over the formation of Malaysia. Since the 
ASA was not able to address the problem, the three countries were forced to look for an 
alternative. After reaching a series of agreements in Manila in mid-1963, they formed a 
new grouping, the so-called Maphilindo.
1   One of the major achievements of the 
agreements was that the three countries in this grouping agreed to work together and to 
hold frequent consultations. It is noteworthy that during this period these states began to 
recognise the region of Southeast Asia as their own. They formally acknowledged the need 
to assume primary responsibility in managing regional matters by strengthening ties 
between neighbouring countries and by breaking with their historical dependence on the 
West. This chapter elucidates these important changes of political perspectives in 
Maphilindo member states and identifies the key characteristic features of the organisation.  
 
 
The declaration of the Malaysia plan 
On 27 May 1961, at a press conference in Singapore,
2 Malayan Prime Minister Tunku 
Abdul Rahman announced his intention to explore the possibility of the formation of 
Malaysia. He stated: 
 
                                                 
1 The name Maphilindo is an acronym of its three members, Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia. 
2 However, he did not disclose the details at that time. 61 
 
Malaya today as a nation realises that she cannot stand alone and in isolation. … Sooner or 
later she should have an understanding with Britain and the peoples of the territories of 
Singapore, North Borneo [Sabah], Brunei and Sarawak. It is premature for me to say now 
how this closer understanding can be brought about, but it is inevitable that we should look 
ahead to this objective and think of a plan whereby these territories can be brought closer 
together in political and economic cooperation.
3  
 
The plan stemmed from Britain’s long-cherished decolonisation scheme in the region,
4 
which intended to incorporate the British Borneo territories and Singapore into the 
Federation of Malaya. Even when Singapore was administered separately from the Malay 
Union in 1949, the British government maintained its vision: Singapore would eventually 
be merged with Malaya. A major complication, however, was to calm down neighbouring 
states, which might fear the increasing scourge of Communism by redrawing of the 
regional map. On his way back to Jakarta from the Hague,
 Mohammad Hatta, the Vice-
President of Indonesia, stopped over in Singapore in mid-November 1949 to talk with 
Malcom MacDonald, the British Commissioner-General in Southeast Asia.
5 At this time, 
MacDonald argued that the best plan to combat Communism in the region was to integrate 
the five British colonies in Southeast Asia – Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, Sarawak and 
Brunei – into one federation under Malaya.
6  It was important for the British to avoid 
segmenting British Borneo territories – Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei – into three small 
countries, which were likely to provide fertile soil for subversive Communist activities. In 
addition, by including these three areas, the Chinese population would become a minority 
in the proposed Federation.
7 
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4 The British officials had envisaged the plan since 1887 (Arnold Brackman, Southeast Asia’s Second Front: 
The Power Struggle in the Malay Archipelago (London: Pall Mall Press, 1966), p. 42). 
5 He had just finished the conference for independence of Indonesia in The Hague. 
6 MacDonald was said to be ‘a great enthusiast’ for the five-in-one plan. See A. J. Stockwell, ‘Britain and 
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Hatta had a feeling that the British ‘had definitely decided to combine these three areas 
[Malaya, Singapore and North Borneo]’ regardless of the wishes of local inhabitants.
8 
Clearly, Indonesia did not want Malaya, and by extension Britain, to increase its influence 
in the region. This highlights the underlying hostility between the two countries.
9 Hatta 
said to MacDonald: ‘This would not only be very dangerous for the Malays themselves, 
but also for us Indonesians’.
10 He did not welcome the creation of a pro-British country 
adjacent to Indonesia, and especially so if it included a shared land border on the island of 
Borneo. Instead, he proposed that the three North Borneo territories, Malaya and Singapore 
should each be granted independence to avoid uniting the Chinese in the five territories. 
 
The Tunku’s announcement of the Malaysia scheme
11 was grounded on his underlying fear 
of Indonesian expansionism, which had emerged since Indonesia’s independence.
12 
Apprehension about Indonesian expansionism stemmed from a speech given by 
Muhammad Yamin, an Indonesian leading parliamentarian and the former Chairman of the 
National Planning Council,
13 who held that Indonesia should incorporate Sabah as well as 
West Irian and East Timor into its territory. He made his address on 31 May 1945 at the 
meeting of the Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Indonesia’s Independence, 
which was established during the wartime by the Japanese Military Administration:
14 
                                                 
8 Ibid.  
9 The tacit antagonism originated in the different nature of their relations with the Western countries. Malaya 
kept close relations with Britain whereas Indonesia secured independence through bloody struggle against the 
Dutch.   
10 Mohammad Hatta, ‘One Indonesian View of the Malaysia Issue’, p. 140.  
11 It was on his mind ‘for a considerable time’. See Tunku Abdul Rahman, Speech in the House of 
Representatives in Malaya, 16 October 1961, in Department of Foreign Affairs, Australia (ed.), Malaysia, 
Select Documents on International Affairs, No. 1 of 1963 (Canberra, 1963), pp. 18-28.  
12 Indonesian Intentions towards Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: The Federal Department of Information of 
Malaysia, 1964), p. 1. For the argument on Indonesian expansionism, see for example, Bernard K. Gordon, 
‘The Potential for Indonesian Expansionism’, Pacific Affairs, 36/4 (Winter 1963-64), pp. 378-393; Donald 
Hindley, ‘Indonesia’s Confrontation with Malaysia: A Search for Motives’, Asian Survey, 4/6 (June 1964), 
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As history shows, Papua and the islands adjacent to it have been inhabited by the 
Indonesian people since time immemorial…Before the war, the island of Papua was 
divided into two parts, one part being ruled by the Dutch and the other being part of 
Australian territory. What I mean by Papua in this context is that part which used to be 
ruled by the Dutch…Portuguese Timor and North Borneo, being outside the territory of 
former Dutch rule, constitute enclaves, and enclaves should not be allowed to exist in the 
territory of the State of Indonesia; so, these areas should come within the control and 
complete the unity of the State of Indonesia.
 15  
 
The matter of a federation plan was brought up for the first time by Tunku Abdul Rahman 
in a ‘purely personal conversation’ with Malcom MacDonald in December 1958.
16 
Although his idea was rudimentary, it is said that the Tunku’s promotion of the integration 
plan was also influenced by the British Ambassador in Manila.
17 In  a  communication 
between the two, the Ambassador said that the Philippines would possibly make a claim 
for dominion over Sabah.
18 The Tunku was apprehensive that the Philippines’ claim on 
Sabah would foment Indonesia’s claim over British Borneo territories. He imagined ‘the 
possibility...of Sukarno mounting a claim to northern Borneo on the lines of his bid’ for 
West Irian, in addition to the problem of Indonesian expansionism.
19 Therefore, he dreaded 
that ‘the Indonesians might someday try to subvert Malay and other opinion in Sarawak 
and Brunei in order to create a local opinion in favour of joining Indonesia’.
20 After the 
talks with MacDonald, the Tunku was keen to instigate the scheme as quickly as possible, 
so that the British territories could be independent through incorporation into Malaya.
21 
                                                 
15 Muhammad Yamin, Address at the Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Indonesia’s 
Independence, 31 May 1945, in Herbert Feith and Lance Castles (eds.), Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945-
1965 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 438-441. Sukarno expressed his complete 
agreement with Yamin’s view on 11 July 1945 in his speech. See Speech to the Investigating Committee for 
the Preparation of Indonesia’s Independence, 11 July 1945, in Background To Indonesia’s Policy Towards 
Malaysia: The Territory of The Indonesian State in 1945 (Discussion in the meeting of Investigating 
Committee for Preparation of Indonesia’s Independence) (Kuala Lumpur: The Federal Department of 
Information of Malaysia, 1964), pp. 19-22. 
16 DC 35/10019, no 12, E/3, 22 December 1958 (Note by M MacDonald of his talks with Tunku Abdul 
Rahman on 20 December). 
17 Ibid.   
18 Ibid.   
19 A J Stockwell, ‘Introduction’ in A J Stockwell (ed.), Malaysia (British Documents on the End of Empire, 
Series B, Vol. 8, London: The Stationery Office, 2004), p. xl. 
20 DC 35/10019, no 12, E/3, 22 December 1958 (Note by M MacDonald of his talks with Tunku Abdul 
Rahman on 20 December). 
21 The Tunku did not consider incorporating Singapore into the federation at this stage. 64 
 
However, the British government took a passive attitude towards quick independence of its 
colonies. Firstly, it was unconcerned about Indonesia’s ambition and was certain that 
Indonesia would not claim its Borneo territories, and subsequently took the passive 
position of ‘let sleeping dogs lie’.
22   Secondly, Britain argued that further national 
development, in particular, in the area of politics, was needed in Sabah and Sarawak before 
independence.
23 In addition, indigenous people, such as Dayaks and Susuns, still had a 
vivid memory of discriminative treatment from the Malays.
24 If these areas were to get 
incorporated in a Malay-dominant federation, such hostile attitudes against the Malay may 
become the seeds of discord.  
 
The Tunku’s lingering suspicion towards Indonesia was confirmed once again by the re-
invigorated West Irian Campaign, when in the late 1950s, Indonesia entered the era of 
Guided Democracy. It was then that he started to prepare the blueprint for the 
establishment of Malaysia.
25  The Tunku thought that if Indonesia would successfully 
incorporate West Irian, then British Borneo territories would be its next ideological 
target.
26 He thought that the British ‘must be ready for “an Indonesian move” against these 
territories [Sabah and Sarawak]’.
27 On 10 June 1960, during talks in London with Lord 
Perth, the British Minister of State in Colonial Office, Tunku Abdul Rahman proposed a 
federation plan incorporating all of the British Borneo territories into Malaya including 
Singapore.
28 According to Lord Perth’s notes, Lord Selkirk, the British Commissioner for 
Singapore and Southeast Asia, showed strong support to the Tunku.
29 Lord  Selkirk 
recognised this as an opportunity for Singapore to join the federation: a matter that the 
                                                 
22 DC 35/10019, no 42, 9 June 1960 (‘CO Memorandum for Lord Perth’). 
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24 DC 35/10019, no 42, 9 June 1960 (‘CO Memorandum for Lord Perth’). 
25 David Wurfel points out the Tunku’s main threat was Indonesia. It pushed him through the establishment 
of Malaysia. See his article, ‘A Changing Philippines’, Asian Survey, 4/2 (February 1964), p. 704.  
26 Ibid. 
27 DC 35/10019, no 42, 9 June 1960  (‘CO Memorandum for Lord Perth’). 
28 CO 1030/1126, no 10, 10 June 1960 (Memorandum by Lord Perth Recording Tunku Abdul Rahman’s 
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29 He was appointed that position in January 1960, and his main concern was to protect the region from 
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Tunku had been reluctant to discuss, and he stressed that the Tunku’s proposals should ‘be 
examined very closely and urgently’.
30 
 
In Singapore, a possibility of a separate independence emerged because of the rapid growth 
of a new left-wing, Barisan Socialis, which was ‘manipulated by the Communists’.
31 
Although Lee Kuan Yew, who later became the first Singaporean Prime Minister, had been 
advocating Singapore’s ‘independence through merger’ with Malaya since he took power 
in 1959, Malaya did not seem to consider it very thoroughly. This is because the 
‘differences in outlook’ between the two countries were quite significant.
32 In addition, the 
incorporation of Singapore into Malaya would threaten to shift the ethnic balance to 
Chinese domination.
33 Furthermore, the Chinese in Singapore were more loyal to China 
than to Malaya. Therefore, a bilateral merger was of little benefit for Malaya; rather it was 
perceived as a threat to bring a recurrence of Communist-led disturbances, like the 
Malayan Emergency (1948-1960).  
 
Lee Kuan Yew, on the other hand, saw it as an opportunity for merging Singapore with 
Malaya when Tunku Abdul Rahman was vigorously working on the federation plan. Lee 
held talks with the Tunku several times before sending the latter a proposal in May 1961. 
In that proposal, Lee expressed his apprehension regarding regional security if Singapore 
gained independence on its own and if the left-wing assumed government. In case of 
separate independence, the defence treaty with Britain would be ‘replaced by ties with the 
Chinese mainland. This would ultimately lead to a Chinese Communist base right in the 
heart of South East Asia’.
34 The Tunku showed his apprehension: ‘While Singapore [is] 
under the British there is no threat of open action by the Communists which might 
                                                 
30 PMO 11/3418, 17 June 1960 (Note by Lord Selkirk for Mr Selwyn Lloyd). Lord Selkirk thought it was 
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endanger the peace and security of the Federation, but with an independent Singapore 
anything could happen’.
35 Lee also suggested that the merger with Malaya would be the 
best, and indeed the only, way to avoid such a nightmare.
36 Furthermore, if the Federation 
incorporated the three British Borneo territories in addition to Singapore, ‘the Malays 
would constitute the largest ethnic group’ in Malaysia.
37   Indeed, the Tunku’s first 




The regional situation in a broader context 
If one took a broader perspective on the political map of Southeast Asia at this time, one 
would see that Prince Sihanouk was in power and embraced neutralism in Cambodia. Since 
the late 1950s, the government had been unstable because of recurrent abortive coups and 
assassinations.
39   Prince Sihanouk strengthened the crackdown on rebels and the 
government became increasingly autocratic.
40  In Laos, a simmering civil war between 
three groups had been continuing since the Geneva Conference of 1954, which later on 
became ‘an international hot war’,
41  adopting the bipolar structure of the international 
conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States, so foreign Communist elements 
remained present there.     
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36 CO 1030/973, no E203, 9 May 1961 (Memorandum by Lee Kuan Yew for the Government of the 
Federation of Malaya). 
37 CO 1030/973, no E203, 9 May 1961 (Memorandum by Lee Kuan Yew for the Government of the 
Federation of Malaya). The persuasion to the Tunku was also made by Tun Abdul Razak and the British 
government. For the detail, see CO 1030/986, no 959, 18 October 1961 (Letter from P B C Moore to W I J 
Wallace). 
38 ‘Singapore could be more dangerous outside the Federation than in would be inside’ (R. S. Milne, 
‘Malaysia, Confrontation and Maphilindo’, p. 405). The abrupt unease drove Tunku Abdul Rahman to seek 
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In South Vietnam, the President of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), Ngo Dinh 
Diem, having full support from the US, was oppressing the remnants of the Communist 
groups.
42 Since January 1959, the Diem regime, which did not have a strong political basis 
in South Vietnam, had suffered from anti-government riots at home. The rebels were 
supported by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), and successfully 
made bases in South Vietnam. The rebels then formed the National Liberation Front in 
December 1960, and its activities were expanded. The US interpreted the situation through 
a Cold War lens and viewed all anti-government activities as Communist plots.
43 Vice 
President Lyndon B. Johnson visited Saigon in May 1961 and decided to give military aid 
to the South Vietnamese government.
44 The precarious conditions in Indochina continued 
to be evident after the Geneva Conference in 1954. In addition, the penetration and 
expansion of Communist activities were ‘very real and pressing’.
45  In particular, the 
situation in Indochina was influenced by external powers, such as the US, the Soviet Union 
and China. The unforeseeable circumstances in the neighbouring countries were also a 
factor prompting Malaya to proceed with the Malaysia plan in order to build up its national 
strength.
46    
 
 
The reaction from potential claimants 
In the period immediately after the Tunku’s announcement of May 1961, neither Indonesia 
nor the Philippines raised any objections. Indonesia’s reaction was ‘not unfriendly’.
47 In 
August, Lord Selkirk visited Indonesia in order to exchange views on the Malaysia plan. 
Subandrio, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, purportedly said that Indonesia was ‘agreeable 
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44 Milton C. Taylor, ‘South Vietnam: Lavish Aid and Limited Progress’, Pacific Affairs, 34/3 (Autumn, 
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46 Richard Butwell, ‘Malaysia and Its Impact on the International Relations of Southeast Asia’, Asian Survey, 
4/7 (July 1964), pp. 940-941. 
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to the plan’.
48 Lord Selkirk was an ardent advocate of the ‘crash programme’ of Malaysia 
for the sake of regional security.
49 However, the British government needed to consider 
two issues. Firstly, Sabah and Sarawak needed more time to develop sufficient internal 
political consciousness to decide their own future.
50 The second, and more pressing, issue 
was that of regional security. Given the unstable conditions in Laos and Vietnam at that 
time, there was ‘an absolute necessity for Britain to maintain confidence’ in Southeast Asia 
as a vital member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO).
51  In 
communication with the British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, Malayan Prime 
Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman ‘detected the note of anxiety over Singapore bases for he is 
a little hesitant on the idea of giving up their base for SEATO purposes’.
52 Britain assured 
member states that its bases in Singapore could continue to be used for SEATO. Malaya, 
however, was not a SEATO member, and seemed unlikely to become one in the future. 
Therefore, the future of the bases after Singapore’s incorporation into Malaysia was 
uncertain at the time.
53 
 
The Malayan government needed to solve two issues in order to materialise the ‘Grand 
Design’ of the merger. Encouraged by Lord Selkirk’s statement that ‘the time has come’,
54 
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the Malaya government held a series of meetings with London. Six months after the 
Tunku’s first announcement, the two countries signed a basic agreement on the Malaysia 
scheme. They recognised that the Malaysia plan should be developed further because it 
was ‘desirable and practicable’.
55 In the Joint Statement on 23 November 1961,  
 
Before coming to any final decision it is necessary to ascertain the views of the peoples of 
North Borneo [Sabah] and Sarawak. … At the same time the views of the Sultan of Brunei 
are being sought. … In regard to defence matters, it was decided that in the event of the 
formation of the proposed Federation of Malaysia the existing defence agreement between 
Britain and Malaya should be extended to embrace the other territories concerned. It was 
however agreed that the Government of the Federation of Malaysia will afford to the 
Government of the United Kingdom the right to continue to maintain bases at Singapore 
for the purpose of assisting in the defence of Malaysia and for Commonwealth defence and 
for the preservation of peace in South East Asia.
56    
 
The British role as a SEATO member was specified in the statement, so that Britain could 
continue to use the bases in Singapore to maintain security in Southeast Asia as a whole. 
Thus the British demand for a Southeast Asian bulwark against communism was integrated 
into the Malaysia plan. 
 
Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio gave a speech at the United Nations General 
Assembly on 20 November 1961, and announced that Indonesia would not oppose the plan 
as long as the local people supported it: 
 
[W]hen Malaya told us of its intentions to merge with the three [sic] British Crown 
Colonies of Sarawak, Brunei and British North Borneo as one Federation, we told them 
that we had no objections and that we wished them success with this merger so that 
everyone might live in peace and freedom. ...[W]e had no objection to such a merger, 
based upon the will for freedom of the peoples concerned.
57  
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In early December 1961, the Indonesian Prime Minister, Raden Djuanda Kartawidjaja, said 
to the American Ambassador to Indonesia, Howard Palfrey Jones,
58 that Indonesia would 




One month after the Joint Statement between Britain and Malaya was issued, the 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) showed its disapproval. The PKI resolutions of 1961 
were ‘one of the key factors in any assessment of the motivations of Indonesian policy 
towards Malaysia’.
60 The resolution indirectly criticised that Joint Statement because of the 
threat of external intervention in regional security. The PKI also pointed out that Malaysia 
‘will grant the United Kingdom the right to continue to use its war bases in Singapore’ and 
consequently help ‘SEATO activities which are also aimed against Indonesia, a country 
that does not like SEATO’.




Britain appointed Lord Cobbold as a head of the Commission of Enquiry, and his team 
completed the fact-finding visit in Sabah and Sarawak between February and April 1962.
63 
The result was not strongly supportive of Malaysia:
64  One-third of respondents were 
strongly in favour of joining the Federation of Malaysia and another one-third was 
supportive of doing so only under certain conditions. However, up to 20 % of those polled 
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advocated independence and self-government.
65  These results nevertheless formed the 
basis of a Joint Statement delivered by the British and Malayan Ministers on 1 August 
1962, following a series of meetings in London. The statement concluded that ‘the 
Commission were [sic] unanimously agreed that a Federation of Malaysia is in the best 
interests of North Borneo and Sarawak’.
66 It was decided that the date of the establishment 
would be 31 August 1963.   
 
At that time, after a long campaign against the Netherlands, Indonesia had already 
successfully incorporated the territory of West Irian. Just after the end of the campaign, in 
September 1962, Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio voiced his country’s negative 
attitude towards Malaysia for the first time. He expressed his apprehension about foreign 
bases on Borneo Island: ‘If Malaysia should permit a military base to be established there 
[British Northern Borneo territories] we are certain to take counter-action’.
67 He  also 
indicated his concern about self-determination of the area: ‘The Malaysia scheme is not the 
business of the Indonesian Government as long as ‘everything goes on smoothly’.
68 He 
continued, ‘[b]ut if things go wrong then we must take notice to protect our own 
interests’.
69  However, the reluctant warning from Indonesia was issued only once. In 
November 1962, Mr Ruslan Abdul Gani, the Vice Chairman of the Indonesian Supreme 
Advisory Council, purportedly said that he saw both ‘positive and negative points’ in the 
Malaysia plan.
70 However, he said, ‘Personally, I welcome any new country around us that 
wants to get rid of colonial chains’.
71 
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It should be noted that, initially, an official opposition to the plan did not come from 
Indonesia, but from the Philippines. The Philippine president, Diosdado Macapagal,
72 
initiated a claim to dominion over Sabah just after he took over the office from Carlos P. 
Garcia in January 1962.
73   During his successful presidential campaign, Macapagal 
criticised the Garcia administration for not taking an independent foreign policy. In 
addition, ever since the Garcia era, the Philippines had sought to change its identity from 
an appendage of the US to a genuinely independent Asian country.
74 Macapagal utilised 
the Sabah issue for highlighting the fact that his foreign policy is significantly different 




In addition, as Gordon argues, the Sabah claim was also ‘a catalyst in Manila’s turn’ 
towards Jakarta so that the Philippines could secure amicable diplomatic relations with 
Indonesia. He continues: 
 
[N]ot only did it provide a reason for closer association with Indonesia, but it also helped 
to revive certain latent political currents in the Philippines. In the broadest sense, these 
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currents represent the widespread desire among articulate and informed Filipinos to be 
accepted in Asia as Asians rather than as an “Asian branch” of the United States.
76  
 
On 5 April 1962, the Philippine Vice-President and Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 
Emmanuel Pelaez,
77 visited Kuala Lumpur to talk with Malayan Prime Minister Tunku 
Abdul Rahman to clarify the Malayan view on the issue of Sabah. The Tunku had taken a 
passive position at this time, saying that the Philippines’ claim should be addressed to 
Britain, which had sovereignty over Sabah.
78 He also said that Malaya would incorporate 
Sabah only if the latter did not have any unsettle issues.
79 When the Filipino House of 
Representatives unanimously approved the bill for claiming dominion over Sabah on 24 
April 1962, the British Ambassador in Manila handed a formal diplomatic note to the 
Philippine government. The note cautioned that the Philippines’ claim would retard healthy 
development of politics in Sabah and that it might trigger off similar claims from other 
countries resulting in regional disturbances. The document further warned that such a 
claim would spoil the Malaysia plan. In addition, it would have ill-effects on the SEATO 
allies (Britain and the Philippines) and give rise to insecurity in Southeast Asia.
80   
 
Despite this warning, at a press conference on 22 June 1962, Macapagal formally stated 
that the Philippines did have a legal right to claim Sabah.
81 The Philippines claim was soon 
rejected by the representatives of the potential federation members of Malaysia,
82 which 
claimed it was baseless.
83  Macapagal’s next strategy was, as announced in a press 
conference on 27 July, to propose ‘a Greater Malayan Confederation’, which would 
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79 Diosdado Macapagal, Statement of President Macapagal Proposing the Formation of a Malayan 
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incorporate the Philippines into the proposed Malaysia federation.
84 However, both Malaya 
and Britain did not pay any attention to it.
85 Then the Philippine government sent a protest 
to the two governments on 2 August. Two months later, Malaya responded to the 
Philippines, saying that Malaya would proceed with developing the original Malaysia plan, 
and that it had received British confirmation that the Sabah issue was not negotiable.
86   
 
On 27 September 1962, Philippine Vice-President Emmanuel Pelaez gave a speech on the 
claim to Sabah at the United Nations General Assembly:   
 
I have in mind particularly the claim of my Government to the territory of North Borneo 
[Sabah] which was annexed by the British Crown in 1946. This is neither the time nor the 
place to go into the details of this question, but we stand on what we consider to be valid 
legal and historical grounds. Our claim has been put forward with sincere assurances of our 
desire that the issue should be settled by peaceful means, and without prejudice to the 
exercise of the right of self-determination by the inhabitants of North Borneo, preferably 
under United Nations auspices.
87 
 
However, he failed to secure support for it. Relations between the two countries worsened 
and the second Foreign Ministerial conference of the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) 
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Starting the verbal war 
The turning point in Indonesia’s attitude towards the Malaysia plan was the Brunei 
rebellion of December 1962. Directed by A. M. Azahari bin Sheikh Mahmud,
89 the revolt 
itself was trivial.
90 Azahari, who was in Manila, directed the North Borneo National Army 
(TUNK) to rebel against its incorporation into Malaysia and declared itself the independent 
Unitary State of North Borneo (NKKU).
91 Rebellions occurred sporadically all over Brunei, 
including in the border regions of Sarawak; however, they were suppressed within a week 
by the British forces. On 9 December, the Indonesian Defence Minister, General Abdul 
Haris Nasution, alerted the people to the incident in Brunei.
92 In addition, on 11 December, 
an Indonesian political Party, Partindo, sent a supportive message to the Brunei Party 
Rakyat: ‘We are at your side in the people’s revolution you lead. Mobilise all your strength. 
Once revolution blasts, let it proceed till final victory’.
93  The Indonesian government, 
however, did not provide any official view on the rebellion.
94 Indonesian  President 
Sukarno briefly referred to it, but in the context of the New Emerging Forces, in his speech 
at the State banquet in Jakarta for Yugoslav Vice President Edvard Karadelj: ‘What is 
happening in Brunei has something to do with new emerging forces and the movement will 
come out as victor’.
95 He continued, ‘This movement will change the world and make the 
people live in happiness’.
96  
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Subsequently, Malaya instigated a verbal war with Indonesia. The statement by Malayan 
Premier Tunku Abdul Rahman on 11 December is said to have been the catalyst, even 
though it was ‘extremely brief and oblique’.
97  While there was no clear evidence of 
Indonesia’s involvement in the plot,
98  the Tunku was ‘over-excited about Indonesian 
complicity’,
99 and implied that the Indonesian government had sent aid to the revolt.
100 The 
leader of the Sabah Alliance Party, Donald Stephens, was certain of Indonesia’s 
involvement in the revolt, and stated that the leaders of the rebellion had some connections 
with the PKI.
101 In addition, other ‘indiscreet statements’ about Indonesia’s involvement, 
appeared in the Malayan press.
102   
 
In response to Malaya’s accusations, on 14 December the Indonesian government officially 
denied its involvement in the Brunei revolt. Moreover, it began to rebut Malayan criticism: 
the Tunku’s allegation was ‘very provocative’.
103 Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio 
also reacted, ‘If the Tunku is determined to use any occasion and any opportunity to be 
hostile towards Indonesia, for us there is no alternative other than to accept the 
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challenge’.
104 Malaya lodged a formal protest with the Indonesian government over this 
statement. The Tunku, maintaining his position, commented, ‘So long as words are used 
against us, we will return the compliments in full measure’.
105 The Indonesian government 
responded, ‘We take side with the people who are struggling’.
106 In addition, President 
Sukarno offered Indonesian support to the Brunei rebels by saying that those who did not 
support the revolt were ‘traitors to their own souls’.
107 In early January 1963, Indonesia 
requested that Britain should consider the Bruneian objection to the Malaysian plan. The 
Indonesian delegation visited the British Embassy in Jakarta and conveyed Indonesia’s 
sympathy with the Brunei rebellion to the Ambassador, Sir Leslie Fry.
108 Furthermore, the 
Indonesian government showed its intention to send volunteers to Brunei to support its 
fight for independence.
109 This provoked the Tunku’s underlying suspiciousness towards 




On 20 January 1963, the Indonesian Foreign Minister finally declared Konfrontasi: 
Indonesia’s intention to confront Malaya:   
 
This time I will mention our neighbour, Malaya, against which, whether we like it or not, 
we have to pursue a policy of confrontation. I very much regret we have to adopt such a 
policy, because until now we have always considered Malaya as friends, as a brother. 
Because of this fact we have always taken a passive attitude against all agitations she has 
been inciting against us. But, of course, there is a limit.
111  
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Indonesia also criticised Malaya by saying that the latter had become Britain’s ‘tools of 
colonialism’.
112 Subandrio later said, ‘It is a great pity that the leaders in Malaya have not 
yet realised that they are being played with by foreign power and control’.
113  
 
From the Philippine side, the talks between the British Ambassador in Manila, John Pilcher, 
and Philippine Vice-President Emmanuel Pelaez were held in late December 1962 after the 
rebellion in Brunei, but ‘[n]o mention was made of the claim’ there.
114 Subsequently, the 
British and Philippine governments agreed that they would exchange views on the matter 
of regional security in January 1963. On 28 January 1963, a week after Subandrio’s 
declaration of Konfrontasi, Philippine President Macapagal gave a speech in the Philippine 
congress:  
 
Our claim to North Borneo [Sabah] cannot be less than the claim of Malaya to the territory 
not only on the basis of superior judicial and historic rights but in the vital interest of our 
national security. … Malaya has no valid claim or right to take over North Borneo. … It is 
vital to the security of the Philippines that North Borneo be not placed under the 
sovereignty and jurisdiction of another State [Malaya], … [T]he people of North Borneo 
should be given an opportunity to determine whether they would wish to be independent or 
whether they would wish to be a part of the Philippines or be placed under another state.
115 
 
On the same day as Macapagal’s speech, representatives of Britain and the Philippines met 
in London.
116 Following Macapagal’s statement, the Philippine representatives raised 
objection to the Malaysia plan at the conference.
117 The British forced the Philippines to 
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set aside its claim to Sabah for the sake of stability in Southeast Asia.
118 When the 
Malayan press accused the Philippine government of giving refuge to Azahari after the 
revolt, Macapagal reacted harshly, and called Malaysia ‘the new colonial power’.
119 The 
Tunku expressed his resentment by cancelling his visit to Manila.
120 However, in March, 
the Philippines took a more balanced position and tried to ease the tension between 
Indonesia and Malaya, when relations between the two countries became particularly 
strained.
121 Although the Philippines did not want to be a mediator, it nonetheless opened 
the possibility of holding a tripartite conference.
122 Its position swung between a ‘partisan 
and peacemaker’ in the course of the three-sided dispute until 1966.
123 
 
Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio objected to the federation plan of Malaysia because 
Indonesia supported the revolt.
124 He said that Indonesia would give its ‘full assistance’ to 
the Brunei revolt to defeat the Malaysia plan.
125  On 13 February 1963, one day after 
Subandrio’s statement, President Sukarno made a speech at the opening of the conference 
of National Front committees in Jakarta, saying:  
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Malaysia is a manifestation of neo-colonialism. We do not want to have neo-colonialism in 
our vicinity. We consider Malaysia an encirclement of the Indonesian Republic. Malaysia 
is the product of the brain and efforts of neo-colonialism… For this reason, we are 
determinedly opposed, without any reservation, against Malaysia.
126   
 
Although several aggressive statements were issued by Indonesia,
127 its military activity 
was limited and no major actions were undertaken toward Malaya.
128 Malaya naturally 
reciprocated Indonesia’s aggressive statements. In February, Tun Abdul Razak, the 




Tunku Abdul Rahman tried to justify Malaya’s struggle against Indonesia. He asserted that 
Malaysia would surely ‘safeguard the territories concerned from Communist domination’, 
and he accused Indonesia of attempting to defeat this plan.
130  He emphasised that the 
Malaysia plan was welcomed by Western countries: ‘The British and Australian 
governments have pledged to support us in the event of war resulting from Indonesia’s 
confrontation policy towards Malaya’.
131 Tun Abdul Razak flew over to Washington to ask 
for support from President John F. Kennedy. The Tunku stated, ‘[T]he aspirations of the 
people of Malaysia are well supported and backed by our friends in the Commonwealth 
and the free world’.
132   
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In Washington, quadripartite talks between Ambassadors were held in February 1963 in 
order to enhance western support for Malaysia. While Western powers agreed with the 
formation of Malaysia, they, with the exception of Britain, did not fully support the 
antagonistic attitude adopted by Malaya towards Indonesia.
133 The American, Australian 
and New Zealand governments indicated that they ‘could not contemplate any military 
commitment’ in the event of Indonesian infiltration.
134  These three countries told the 
British that they wished the British government to talk ‘in the first place bilaterally with 
the Indonesians’.
135  The US, Australia and New Zealand also shared the view that 
Indonesia ‘must not be pushed towards the Soviet Union’.
136 They were concerned about 
the chaotic situation emerging in Indochina
137 and tried not to complicate the Southeast 
Asian political climate by further pushing the Malaysia issue. In addition, in order to 
prevent Russian or Chinese intervention in the region, the US insisted that the West should 
‘leave Asia to the Asians’.
138 Indeed, the United States had maintained a position of ‘non-
involved cordiality’ with regard to the Malaysia issue.
139 
 
Malaya sought to reduce tension with the Philippines by saying, ‘The Philippines and 
Malaya are friends and brothers and are partners in the ASA’.
140 When Tun Abdul Razak 
came to Manila in March 1963 to attend the meeting of the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), he discussed matters of common interest 
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with the Philippine leaders, although he reiterated that the territorial issue should be solved 
between the British and the Philippine governments. He said after the talks, ‘I was very 
happy. I was received with friendship and goodwill’.
141 On the other hand, Malaya did not 
attempt to ease tension with its relations with Indonesia. Tun Razak said, ‘Why should I 
talk to him [Subandrio]? I have nothing to tell him. If he wants to talk to me, that’s a 
different matter. After all, they started … [Konfrontasi]’.
142  
 
While Malaya attempted to secure support from Western countries, Indonesia kept ‘an 
active and independent policy between the two blocs in the Cold War’.
143 Actually, it 
pretended to turn its support to the Communist side demonstrating intention to go to the 
Communist camp. This was intended to secure American support to Indonesia over the 
Malaysia issue.
144 In late March 1963, Subandrio invited the Russian Defence Minister, 
Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, and talked with him about ‘the development of Indonesian 
armed forces and the present situation in Southeast Asia’.
145 In June of the same year, the 
Soviet Union offered Indonesia $US330 million worth of modern military equipment.
146 In 
addition, the Indonesian delegation talked on economic matters with the Soviet 
representatives in the Kremlin on 3 June 1963.
147 Although bilateral relations apparently 
became closer, the Soviet backing was moderate because of the détente in Europe.
148 
Sukarno seemed to be closer to China in the ideological sphere. China praised Indonesia 
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for opposing the ‘neo-colonialist scheme of Malaysia and supporting the revolutionary 
struggle of the people of North Borneo’.
149 When the Chairman of China, Liu Shaoqi, was 
invited to Jakarta in April 1963, it was reported that Sukarno was seeking a new world 
order with China.
150 Liu said, ‘China and Indonesia always help each other in the struggle 
for freedom and world peace and we will keep doing so’.
151 
     
 
Seeking peaceful coexistence 
In Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman reportedly made a plan for talking with Philippine 
President Macapagal in late February 1963.
152 In Indonesia, on the other hand, Suwito 
Kusumowidagdo, the Indonesian Deputy Foreign Minister, visited Manila on 1 March and 
spoke with Salvador P. Lopez,
153 the Philippine Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to 
seek the possibility of tripartite Summit talks.
154 However, a friendly atmosphere among 
the three countries had yet to be created. Macapagal blamed the architects of the Malaysia 
plan for not having consulted with Indonesia and the Philippines, and he said it would plant 
the ‘seed of eternal discord’.
155 Tun Abdul Razak insisted that Indonesia should take the 
initiative for reconciliation, saying, ‘I shall not meet him [Subandrio]. I have nothing to 
say’ to him.
156 Subandrio, on the other hand, showed a conciliatory attitude: ‘I hope we can 
settle this by peaceful means’.
157  
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On 11 March, Macapagal formally announced that the Philippines would organise the 
tripartite exploratory conference. Macapagal’s proposal was approved by Tun Razak and 
Subandrio respectively on 9 March while they were staying in Manila for the Economic 
Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE).
158 The agenda of the proposed conference 
was: 
 
1.  Problems arising from the proposal to establish the Federation of Malaysia. 
2.  The promotion of fraternal and neighbourly relations among the Philippines, 
Indonesia and Malaya.  
3.  The maintenance of enduring peace and stability of South East Asia.
159  
 
On 13 March 1963, Subandrio presented two conditions for the tripartite talks: Malaya 
should clarify its relations with Indonesia (hostile or friendly), and it should guarantee that 
Malaysia would not intend to subvert Indonesia.
160 The Tunku quickly returned a positive 
reply to Indonesia: ‘This suits us fine…With the establishment of Malaysia we hope we 
will be closer neighbours’.
161  
 
The exploratory conference at the undersecretary level was supposed to be followed by a 
Ministerial conference in early April, at the same time that the ASA Meeting would be 
held in Manila. It was Indonesia that showed its desire for quick reconciliation with 
Malaya at that time. Indonesian Deputy Foreign Minister Suwito Kusumowidagdo had 
continued to stay in Manila in anticipation of the meeting of undersecretaries since the time 
when Tun Abdul Razak and Subandrio agreed to hold it on 9 March. Although Suwito 
Kusumowidagdo had stayed in Manila for more than 10 days waiting for the Malayan 
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delegation to arrive, the meeting could not take place because Malaya was still suspicious 
about the aim of the talks.
162  Eventually, Tunku Abdul Rahman came to Manila and 
exchanged views with Macapagal, when the ASA Meeting was held. The bilateral talks 
produced ‘a number of salutary results’, one of which was the Tunku’s consent to 
participate in the tripartite conference.
163 An announcement from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Philippines on 5 April said, ‘As a first step towards this end, the President 
and the Tunku confirmed a previous agreement to hold a meeting between the three 
countries at undersecretary level in Manila tomorrow’.
164 However, the conference was not 
held until 9 April because the Indonesian delegation was delayed.
165  
 
After the second session of the conference on 10 April 1963, Suwito said: ‘Prospects are 
brighter’.
166 The meeting was closed on 17 April, in an atmosphere of ‘friendship and 
cordiality’.
167   At the conference, they mainly focused on developing a fraternal 
relationship with a spirit of mutual respect and tolerance rather than highlighting the 
difference of views on Malaysia.
168 In conference’s final communiqué, ‘the representatives 
[were] aware that on them rested the responsibility of paving the way for closer fraternal 
relations among their common task in a spirit of humility’.
169  All sides behaved with 
restraint, created a friendly atmosphere and contributed to the advancement of the 
ministerial talks. The three countries agreed to hold a ministerial conference, to be 
followed by a Summit meeting.
170  
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However, the sincere desire for a peaceful settlement was not firm at this stage. There were 
ongoing sporadic skirmishes between Indonesian and British forces along the borders of 
Sabah and Sarawak, and the British military was reinforced.
171 The Malayan government 
also took a provocative position by saying that the Americans would provide military 
assistance to the British-Malayan side.
172 Indonesian President Sukarno warned, ‘If Malaya 
refuses to negotiate with Indonesia and the Philippines over the proposed merger, I will 
lead a struggle by the Indonesian people until the Malaysian plan fails to materialise’.
173 
Malayan Premier Tunku Abdul Rahman reacted against this in the following way: ‘This 
is… strange behaviour of a man who with one breath is purportedly trying to make peace 
through a get-together in Manila at a summit talk and with the other breath is threatening 
war’.
174  Indeed, ‘[s]uch talk is not conductive to peace in this region of Asia’.
175 The 
Tunku remained focused on compromising with the Philippines, rather than with Indonesia, 
and on 26 April stated that Malaya and the Philippines should work together for a peace 
plan in the region.
176 He continued to provoke Indonesia with abusive rhetoric, saying in 
early May: ‘Those who hurl threats of war are tyrants and agents and tools of the devil and 
as sure as there is a God, they will go the way of all devils’.
177   
  
While bilateral relations worsened and the ministerial talks were unpredictable, Sukarno 
invited the Tunku to Tokyo for discussions on reconciliation.
178 On his way to Tokyo, 
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Sukarno showed his willingness to make peace with Malaya by saying: ‘If the [tripartite 
Summit] meeting is held, I will certainly go’.
179 However, his underlying unpleasantness 
still remained: ‘But, if they [Malaya] are going to be nasty about things, then we have got 
to be nasty, too’.
180 On 25 May 1963, and before the high level talks took place, Subandrio 
met with the Malayan Ambassador in Tokyo, Dato Syed Sheh bin Syed Abdullah, and 
explained Indonesia’s ‘desirability of smoothing differences’.
181 Indonesia showed a more 
positive attitude towards reconciliation than Malaya at this stage.      
 
On 31 May, Tokyo talks began in a cordial atmosphere and both Sukarno and Tunku 
Abdul Rahman recognised the importance of working towards peaceful co-existence. On 
the first day of the talks, the Tunku said, ‘Obviously President Sukarno wants normal 
relations to be re-established between our two countries, and I will do everything possible 
to achieve this’.
182 The two leaders had an ‘amicable and frank exchange of views’ and the 
high level talks ‘cleared the way’ for ministerial talks to be held from 7 June.
183 In the Joint 
Communiqué issued after the talks, they agreed that:  
 
1.  The two countries should seek to settle outstanding differences with a spirit of 
neighbourliness and goodwill. 
2.  Their respective Governments would take every possible measure to refrain 
from making acrimonious attacks on and disparaging references to each other.  
3.  They would strive to achieve a closer understanding between the three countries 
in matters of common concern and mutual interest.
184   
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As the Tokyo talks were concluded successfully, the Malaysia question was expected to be 
resolved quite soon. According to Subandrio’s report to the Japanese Foreign Minister, 
Masayoshi Ohira, made just after the talks between Sukarno and the Tunku, the two 
leaders had already reached a verbal agreement:  
 
1.  They would find a mutually agreeable solution to the overseas Chinese issue in 
the region. 
2.  They would not take any further steps in the Malaysia issue before the Summit 
talks. 
3.   The Tunku would accept the change of the date of the Malaysia formation if 
the heads of the three countries agreed at the tripartite Summit meeting.
185 
 
At the conclusion of the meetings, the Tunku said, ‘I am confident that a heart to heart talk, 
in plain language, in a sincere atmosphere will clear the path for successful talks in 
Manila’.
186 When Sukarno was leaving Tokyo in the early morning on 2 June, the Tunku 
went to Haneda airport to see the Indonesian president off.
187 It was ‘further proof that the 
talks between the two statesmen, aimed at reducing tension between the two countries, had 
definitely been cordial and friendly’.
188   
 
Direct talks between the two leaders facilitated an improvement in bilateral relations and 
the end of the verbal war. As a result, the ministerial conference in Manila (7-11 June) 
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started amicably. The conference produced the Manila Accord, which included the 
following points:   
 
1.  Malaya agreed to invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his 
representative in order to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants of the British 
North Borneo territories (Sabah and Sarawak). 
2. Indonesia and the Philippines would accept the formation of Malaysia only if the 
result of the UN investigation showed that the people of the British territories 
support the Malaysia plan. 
3. The three countries share a primary responsibility for the maintenance of the 
stability and security of the area from subversion in any form of manifestation 
in order to preserve their respective national identities, and to ensure the 
peaceful development of their respective countries and of their region. 
4. The three countries agreed to attempt to form a regional cooperation organisation 
(based on Malay origin) to address common problems with the spirit of ‘working 
together in closest harmony’. 
5. The three countries will hold regular consultation at all levels to deal with 
matters of mutual interest and concern.
189 
 
After the Manila Conference, Malaya’s attitude towards the Malaysian Plan also changed. 
As opposed to its previous stance on the issue, namely: ‘We only come in after Malaysia is 
formed’ (meaning that it should be exclusively a matter of Britain’s concern), Malaya was 
now willing to become a player, rather than a mere observer.
190  
 
Malaya accepted the demand from Indonesia and the Philippines that the people of Sabah 
and Sarawak should exercise their right to self-determination through an enquiry under the 
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auspices of the UN, and that Malaysia would be realised only if the people supported it.
191 
In relation to this, the three countries agreed that their chief responsibility was to address 
regional problems, which further locked the Malaysia issue into the scope of regional 
affairs. It was at this point that Macapagal’s proposal to establish a regional cooperation 
organisation, Maphilindo, was introduced.
192 Maphilindo had two aspects. Namely, on the 
one hand, it can be said to have been a form of short-lived diplomatic ‘machinery’. On the 
other hand, it can be said to have been a prototype for a regional cooperation organisation, 




Ever since the Magsaysay administration, the Philippines had sought the opportunity to 
become a truly ‘Asian’ state, rather than a US satellite state. President Macapagal raised 
the claim over Sabah with this objective in mind. His aim was to evoke feelings of national 
unity by fostering Asian identity.
194  He also followed the Philippine foreign policy 
tradition, to take the initiative in matters of regional cooperation, started during the Quirino 
and the Garcia administrations.
195 The focus of Macapagal’s regional policy was Malay 
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identity.
196 As Emmanuel Pelaez put it, ‘The Arabs and the Hindus, the Chinese and the 
Japanese, the Spaniards and the Americans have each left their mark upon us. But 
whatever foreign influences we may have absorbed over the centuries, ours is essentially 
and basically a Malay nation’.
197  
 
According to the Manila Accord, Macapagal’s approach to the regional problem was based 
on frequent consultations and directed towards ‘lasting peace, progress and prosperity for 
themselves and for their neighbours’.
198 This style of discussion was named Musyawarah 
Maphilindo.
199 Macapagal’s approach aimed to reach consensus by holding musyawarah 
(consultations) in a friendly atmosphere to reduce tensions.
200 The reconciliatory attitude of 
Indonesia and the Philippines towards Malaya can be seen in the Manila agreements: the 
two countries agreed to support the formation of Malaysia if the UN’s investigation in 
Sabah and Sarawak was positive. Indonesia and the Philippines also agreed to respect the 




However, the harmonious relations between the three countries were fragile. In early July, 
Britain, Malaya and other potential members of Malaysia (Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah) 
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held a conference in London for the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia. They 
finally signed an agreement (the Malaysia Agreement) on 9 July.
202 It referred to the date 
of the establishment of Malaysia: 
 
The government of the Federation of Malaya will take such steps as may be appropriate 
and available to them to secure the enactment by the Parliament of the Federation of 
Malaya of an Act in the form set out in Annex A to this Agreement and that it is brought 




The agreement also stipulated that ‘[t]he Colonies of North Borneo [Sabah] and Sarawak 
and the State of Singapore shall be federated with the existing States of the Federation of 
Malaya as the States of Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore’.
204 Furthermore, the agreement 
expanded the defence coverage, based on the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement in 
1957. The latter was now applied to the whole Malaysian Federation. As such, it redefined 
its purpose: it was to provide security in Southeast Asia. The article six of the Malaysia 
Agreement says: 
 
The Agreement on External Defence and Mutual Assistance between the government of 
the United Kingdom and the government of the Federation of Malaya of 12
th October, 1957, 
and its annexes shall apply to all territories of Malaysia, and any reference in that 
Agreement to the Federation of Malaya shall be deemed to apply to Malaysia, subject to 
the proviso that the government of Malaysia will afford to the government of the United 
Kingdom the right to continue to maintain the bases and other facilities at present occupied 
by their Service authorities within the State of Singapore and will permit the government of 
the United Kingdom to make such use of these bases and facilities as that government may 
consider necessary for the purpose of assisting in the defence of Malaysia and for 
Commonwealth defence and for the preservation of peace in Southeast Asia.
205  
 
Sukarno was offended by the Tunku’s participating in the conference. He said that Tunku 
Abdul Rahman ‘failed to keep [the] promise’
206 he made in Tokyo. As mentioned above, 
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according to Subandrio’s report just after the Tokyo talks, the two leaders agreed that they 
would not take any further action relating to Malaysia before the Summit.   
In fact, Sukarno was ‘infuriated’ by the Tunku’s signing the Malaysia Agreement without 
any consultation with Indonesia and the Philippines. He argued that the Tunku’s unilateral 
action violated the agreement reached at the ministerial conference in Manila. While 
Sukarno had previously expressed his willingness to attend the Summit meeting,
207 the day 
after the Malaysia Agreement in London he said, ‘With the action of the Tunku, we 
Indonesians are doubtful about the summit conference’.
208  Subandrio also criticised the 
Tunku’s actions.  
 
It has been the basic understanding among the Philippines, Malaya and Indonesia as agreed 
in the Manila foreign ministers meeting, that we can support Malaysia only after self-
determination of the people has been implemented under an independent authority like the 
United Nations Secretary-General or his deputy.
209   
 
Sukarno tried to exert pressure on Malaya. He held a special meeting at home with 
Ministers and defence chiefs. It was unanimously decided that the Malaysia plan should be 
attacked.
210  Subandrio threatened Malaya by saying, Malaya ‘needs to be friends with 
Indonesia for their own sake, for their own security’; however, if Malaya disregarded 
Indonesia’s opinion, then ‘Indonesia c[ould] live without Malaya’.
211 Subandrio  also 
implicitly showed Indonesia’s intention to resume active military campaign if Malaya 
unilaterally continued with the Malaysia plan and ignored the right of self-determination in 
Sabah and Sarawak.
212  The possibility of military action was suggested on various 
occasions. The Indonesian Navy announced that it had formed an attack fleet of light, fast 
crafts for its anti-Malaysia policy. It also announced that it had successfully launched a 
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surface-to-surface guided missile.
213 Indonesia  was  reportedly  preparing for combined 
naval and air force exercises.
214  
 
Malaya responded defensively. It took the position that the London agreement did not spoil 
the harmonious mood from Tokyo and Manila.
215 Tunku Abdul Rahman said, ‘I have done 
nothing to the best of my knowledge to break any word or promise I have given to 
President Sukarno [in Tokyo] in connection with Malaysia’.
216 According to an official 
publication issued by the Malaysian government in late 1963, Sukarno ‘did not express an 
objection after that and appeared to have appreciated the Malayan view point’ when the 
Tunku explained to him in Tokyo in late May 1963 that he would go to London to sign an 
Agreement to fix the date for the establishment of Malaysia on 31
st August, 1963.
217 Tun 
Abdul Razak explained the need of the agreement for Malaysia: ‘The Malaysia agreement 
that the Tunku signed in London was another step in a series of legal and constitutional 
procedures in preparation for the establishment of Malaysia and does not in any way 
conflict with the understanding reached by the foreign ministers in Manila’.
218  Malaya, 
according to him, did not break the Manila agreements. The Tunku reacted against 
Indonesia’s provocation, saying that the new Malaysia would use arms to defend itself if 
Indonesia violated its sovereignty.
219 
 
Towards the start of the summit meeting, Malaya softened its attitude and the Malayan 
Ambassador to Jakarta, Dato Haji Kamaruddin, indicated that Malaya wanted to restore 
friendly relations with Indonesia.
220 The Tunku expressed his willingness to compromise at 
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the coming Summit meeting: ‘I am prepared to beg for peace’.
221  In addition, he 
specifically showed Malaya’s concession on a central issue: ‘It is up to the United Nations 
Secretary-General, U Thant, to decide on this [whether he will recommend a plebiscite to 
ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants in Sabah and Sarawak]’.
222 In return, when he was 
asked by the press whether there was room for concession, Subandrio showed Indonesia’s 
restrained attitude: ‘We believe in the spirit of friendly discussion’.
223 It seemed that both 
sides had realised the necessity of restoring the friendly atmosphere of the ministerial talks. 
 
On 31 July 1963, Tunku Abdul Rahman visited Sukarno at his hotel.
224 The two conversed 
for half an hour before the commencement of the formal talks. The conversation was 
marked by its friendly tone, which ‘certainly broke the ice’ between the two countries.
225 
The two leaders apparently enjoyed a very amicable conversation, because when the 
Tunku was about to leave the room, Sukarno purportedly said, ‘What’s the hurry?’
226 Just 
after this, the Tunku told the press that he went to see Sukarno ‘[a]ccording to the Malay 
adat [custom]’. With this, younger people should express respect toward older ones.
227 
The Tunku’s visit proved to be an important stepping-stone to the success of the 
Summit.
228  
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The mood of the Summit was ‘exuberant and expansive’
229 and concessions from both 
sides created a ‘formula capable of saving the face’.
230  The three countries concerned 
produced various concessive agreements, which displayed a spirit of regional initiative for 
regional matters.
231 Most notably, they agreed that there would be an investigation into the 
wishes of the people in Sabah and Sarawak by the UN before the establishment of 
Malaysia.
232 Indonesia and the Philippines were to accept the establishment of Malaysia if 
the UN investigation supported it. Concessive Malaya, on the other hand, was to postpone 
the establishment of Malaysia if the UN investigation was not completed before 31 August, 
the date which Britain and Malaya had already set.
233 Malaya also allowed Indonesia and 
the Philippines to send officials to observe the UN’s activities. Furthermore, Malaya 




The next concession was between Indonesia and the two other countries over foreign bases. 
In the Joint Statement, ‘the three countries will abstain from the use of arrangements of 
collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers’.
235 The British 
intervention in the Malaysia issue reminded the Indonesians of the alleged British 
involvement in the PRRI (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) 
rebellion in 1958.
236 Sukarno referred to the revolt in his Indonesian Independence Day 
address of 17 August 1963: 
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Still fresh in our minds are the subversions from outside at the time of the P.R.R.I. and 
PERMESTA rebellions. They operated from bases abroad, around us! Some operated from 
Malaya, some operated from Singapore, ...all the foreign bases around Indonesia were used 
as bases of subversion against Indonesia.
237 
 
Subandrio expressed his displeasure by saying that ‘the British influences [will] have a 
land border with Indonesia’ when Malaysia is established.
238 Indonesia’s fear of subversion 
was heightened by article 6 of the Malaysia Agreement, the so-called Anglo-Malaysian 
Defence Agreement.
239   Indonesia suspected that foreign bases might be used for 
subversive activities towards Indonesia. Malaya and the Philippines, both of which had 
defence cooperation agreements with the West, accepted that foreign bases were 
‘temporary in nature’.
240 Indonesia, in return, did not insist on the immediate withdrawal of 
British bases in new Malaysia. 
  
 
The beginnings of discord  
While during this period the three countries successfully made agreements matching their 
own interests, Indonesia’s hostility towards Britain significantly intensified.
241 This  is 
because the British exerted pressure on Tunku Abdul Rahman, trying to keep him under 
British influence.
242  On 1 August 1963, The British Cabinet decided that they should 
‘impress on the Prime Minister of Malaya the importance of adhering to 31 August as the 
date for the formation of Malaysia and warn him of the dangers implicit in any further 
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243 On 2 August, Duncan Sandys, the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations, and Lord Home, the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, gave their messages to 
Tunku Abdul Rahman in Manila.
244 The messages stressed that the British government was 
worried about the postponement of Malaysia Day.
245 The British thought that the delay 
could ‘create doubts and uncertainty throughout the area’.
246 The messages also conveyed 
that the result of the UN investigation would not change Sukarno’s opposition to the 
Malaysia plan.
247 Furthermore, Sandys’ message asserted that, with British backing, the 
Tunku could resist Indonesia in the Summit talks: ‘If as a result of your stand, your 
relations with Indonesia become more difficult you know you can count on us to back 
you’.
248 The Tunku sent a reply to Sandys the next day. However, what should have been a 
decisive reply turned out to be a relatively weak one: ‘I am just trying to manoeuvre in the 
hope of reaching a compromise.…You can rest assured that Malaysia will be announced 
on the 31st of August as scheduled’.
249 
 
Ganis Harsono, a senior official in the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said that the 
agreement about the self-determination of the Borneo regions was ruined by the two notes 
Sandys and Lord Home sent to the Summit.
250 He continued that Britain had attempted to 
disrupt the meeting by sticking to the Malaysia Day of 31 August as ‘an unalterable date 
for the formation of Malaysia’, whereas the Malayan government had agreed to a 
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postponement.
251 Sukarno, at the closing ceremony of the Summit, implicitly accused the 
British of interfering with the conference.
252 
 
On the other hand, the British were obviously unhappy with a series of Manila 
agreements,
253 and Sandys himself was described as being ‘furious’.
254 They viewed the 
agreements as ‘most unsatisfactory’ because Tunku Abdul Rahman did not protect the 
Malaysia Agreement made in London.
255   In addition, ‘[i]n Britain’s absence, the 
conferences had…discussed the disposition of British territories’.
256 Britain  complained 
that there was no stipulation in the Manila agreements that Indonesia would abandon its 
confrontation policy towards Malaya, and there was no mention of the date of establishing 
Malaysia in the agreement. Furthermore, the British government strongly opposed an 
eventual re-investigation of its Borneo territories because such a process might nullify 
Britain’s decision to establish Malaysia.
257 Britain also refused to change the date of the 
establishment of Malaysia. American President John F. Kennedy sent a message to British 
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan on 4 August. Kennedy was ‘quite concerned that 
hopefully successful Manila summit will be torpedoed unless 31 August date for Malaysia 
can be postponed briefly to give Sukarno a fig leaf. If in fact the Tunku is willing..., we 
would urge you give this an urgent look. I well realise that kowtowing to Sukarno is a risky 
enterprise, but a little give now may be worth the risk’.
258 However, Macmillan sent a 
negative reply, saying ‘what is postponed is lost’.
259 
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Sir G. Tory, the British High Commissioner in Malaya, met Tunku Abdul Rahman after 
the Manila Summit on the morning of 9 August, and accused him of not producing 
desirable results in Manila. The Tunku was forced to affirm to Sir G. Tory that he would 
‘go ahead with Malaysia on whatever later date may now be agreed between the 
signatories.... [H]e would [he added] like this date to be 16th September irrespective of 
nature of the Secretary-General report’.
260 The Tunku was also compelled to accept his 
responsibility if the UN report was unfavourable: ‘any further ascertainment of Bornean 
wishes would then be his responsibility and would not take place until after establishment 
of Malaysia’.
261 To prevent the Tunku’s deviation from the terms of the verbal contract, 
Sandys sent him a letter of confirmation, stating that the British government would give 
him its ‘full support in the implementation of this policy’ if Malaya would act in 
accordance with British interests.
262 The Tunku became nervous. On 24 August, Sandys 
came to Kuala Lumpur and met the Tunku. Sandys protested that the British government 
‘had not been properly consulted’ over the Manila agreements, and that ‘this was the cause 
of most of the subsequent difficulties’.
263  The Tunku stated that although it was no 
question that he wanted to establish Malaysia on 31 August 1963 as scheduled, it was more 
important that Malaysia could coexist peacefully with neighbouring countries by saying: ‘I, 
too, want it [the declaration of the creation of Malaysia] to be [on] August 31, but for the 
sake of peace and for the well-being of the nation and for the good of Malaysia, let us see 
what the United Nations has to say’.
264 
  
Nine UN officials, headed by Laurence Michaelmore, the UN Deputy Director of 
Personnel, flew to Singapore on 15 August, at which point a conflict blew up. At first, the 
British government permitted four observers to each territory.
265 However,  Indonesia 
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demanded 30 observers for each.
266 The British government disapproved of this and said: 
‘This could create the absurd situation in which ninety persons would be engaged in 
watching the work of nine representatives of the United Nations Secretary General’.
267 It 
continued, ‘This was obviously absurd’.
268 Subandrio protested the British refusal on the 
grounds that it was against the spirit of the Manila conference.
269 He said that Indonesia 
was not able to accept the result of the UN investigation if Indonesia’s request was not 
accommodated.
270 Although the UN team was going to begin its investigation from 22 
August, Indonesia and the Philippines asked U Thant, the United Nations Secretary 
General, to postpone it until their demand was accepted in accordance to the Manila 
agreement.
271 U Thant eventually mediated, proposing the despatch of four assistants in 
addition to four observers.
272   Both sides accepted this, with Indonesia reluctantly 
acquiescing.
273 The UN team began its work on 26 August.
274  
 
Indonesian observers in the British Borneo territories were surely ‘vexatious’ for the 
British, in addition to the UN’s investigation itself.
275 Britain’s displeasure was revealed by 
its reluctance to issue visas for the Indonesians. The British Embassy officials in Jakarta 
said they were not able to issue visas because they had not received a request from 
Indonesia.
276 Subandrio said in this connection that ‘[i]t is regrettable that up to today [27 
August] Britain had not issued the visas or a landing permit for our plane. This certainly 
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cannot go on unresolved. I shall have to take action some time’.
277 Subandrio concluded in 
this regard that, ‘[w]e regret this British attitude because in the long run… it will not be 
beneficial for the British themselves’.
278 He continued, ‘If the British intend to leave this 
area as a good coloniser they should undertake to create a harmonious atmosphere among 
the people here, and not leave behind explosive tensions’.
279  The antagonism between 
Britain and Indonesia became stronger.      
 
U Thant later criticised the British government for its insincere treatment of Indonesia and 
the Philippines:   
 
It is a matter for regret that this understanding could not have been reached earlier, so that 
all observers could have been present in the territories for the entire period of the inquiries 
and that questions of detail pertaining to the status of the observers unnecessarily delayed 
even further their arrival. A more congenial atmosphere would have been achieved if the 
necessary facilities had been granted more promptly by the Administering Authority.
280 
 
Indonesian and Philippine observers and assistants finally arrived at Kuching in Sarawak 
on 1 September. They were able to attend the investigation for only three days out of six.
281 
 
There was an additional source of outrage for the Indonesians. On 29 August 1963, Tunku 
Abdul Rahman declared that Malaysia would be established on 16 September. His 
announcement destroyed the cooperative attitude created during the Manila agreements 
because the announcement was made unilaterally. When Sandys came to Kuala Lumpur on 
24 August, the Tunku was compelled by his ‘heavy pressure’
282 to change the Malaysia 
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day to 16 September without consulting Indonesia or the Philippines, or even waiting for 
the result of the UN investigation.
283  The new date was approved by Britain and the 
Federation members of Malaysia (Duncan Sandys, Tunku Abdul Rahman, Donald 
Stephens, Lee Kuan Yew and Ningkan) on 26 August, although the Tunku wanted to keep 
harmony with Indonesia and the Philippines.  
Subandrio was invited to Singapore for talks with Tun Abdul Razak over ‘any 
misunderstanding that may have arisen over the question of observers and Malaya’s stand 
in connection with this matter’.
284 The invitation was sent with a time limit of no later than 
28 August, so that Subandrio could get to know the new Malaysia date, before its official 
proclamation. However, Subandrio declined the invitation because of ‘a slight 
indisposition’, but he said that he would ‘welcome very much’ seeing Tun Abdul Razak in 
Jakarta.
285 The Tunku replied that Ghazali Shafie, the Malayan Permanent Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs, would visit Jakarta.
286 Ghazali Shafie arrived at Jakarta on the very day 
the new federation date was proclaimed. He quickly informed Subandrio of Malaya’s 
intention. It was 8 am on 29 August, a couple of hours before the proclamation. Subandrio 
said to him that the Indonesian government would reserve ‘its position until after the 
announcement of the United Nations Secretary-General’s findings in the Borneo 
territories’.
287   Then, the King of Malaysia, Yang di-Pertuan Agong, signed the 
proclamation: ‘Malaysia shall come into being’ on 16 September.
288 
 
Malaya’s unilateral declaration of the new date for the establishment of Malaysia initiated 
the deterioration of relations among Maphilindo member states. The new date was 
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announced without consulting Indonesia or the Philippines. On 4 September, the 
Indonesian Ambassador in Kuala Lumpur, Lt-Gen. Gusti Djatikusumo, formally sent a 
strong protest to the Malayan government against the latter’s unilateral declaration of the 
new date which, as he pointed out, violated the Manila agreement.
289 The  Philippine 
Foreign Secretary, Salvador Lopez, said: ‘Our position is that it does not appear to be in 
conformity with the spirit of the Manila agreements to have set a new date for the 
establishment of Malaysia in advance of the completion of the United Nations survey’.
290 
He added that ‘[in] accordance with this view, Malaya’s notification which was sent to the 
Philippine Government must be considered as premature’.
291 The Malaysia government 
later tried to justify its one-way decision in an official statement:  
 
It was pointed out to the Indonesian government that in view of the Federation’s 
constitutional obligations and the United Nations Secretary-General’s indication to the 
three parties that the task of ascertainment was expected to be completed and the findings 
made known by the 14th September, 1963 the Federation government’s decision to 
announce 16th September as the new date for Malaysia was fully consistent with both the 
spirit and the letter of the Manila Accord.
292  
 
Tunku Abdul Rahman also explained the reason why Malaya unilaterally set and 
announced a new date by saying, ‘We had to fix a date. You cannot make up your mind 
one day and celebrate the next. So long as we are confident over the results, things will go 
on all right’.
293  However, Malaya’s action was surely against the spirit of the Manila 
agreements, which required that the three governments ‘hold regular consultations...to deal 
with matters of mutual interest and concern’.
294 As Lopez later protested, ‘setting a definite 
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date presupposes an affirmative finding and we presume nobody knows at this time that the 
United Nations finding will be favourable’.
295 
 
To make matters worse, on 29 August, Donald Stephens, the Chief Minister-designate of 
Sarawak, gave a defiant statement in Jesselton
296 that disregarded the Manila agreements.  
When he came back from Kuala Lumpur, he said, ‘If the United Nations report confirms 
the wishes of the peoples for Malaysia, then we will have Malaysia with the blessings of 
Indonesia and the Philippines’.
297 He continued, ‘If, in the unlikely event the report says 
the majority don’t want Malaysia, we will still go ahead with Malaysia, but without the 
blessings of Indonesia and the Philippines’.
298 His statement further insulted Sukarno and 
Macapagal, who by endorsing the Manila agreements were trying to ‘climb down 
gracefully from their extreme positions’ over Malaysia.
299   
 
U Thant’s reaction was to accuse Malaya of dissonant behaviour towards the proclamation 
of the new Malaysia day. His final report expressed sorrow at the unilateral action of the 
British and Malayan governments:  
 
During the course of the inquiry, the date of 16 September 1963 was announced by the 
government of the Federation of Malaya with the concurrence of the British government, 
the Singapore government and the government of Sabah and Sarawak, for the 
establishment of the Federation of Malaysia. This has led to misunderstanding, confusion, 
and even resentment among other parties to the Manila Agreement, which could have been 




The result of the United Nations investigation was that:  
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[T]he majority of the peoples of the two territories, having taken them into account, wish to 
engage, with the peoples of the Federation of Malaya and Singapore, in an enlarged 
Federation of Malaysia through which they can strive together to realise the fulfilment of 
their destiny.
301   
 
After U Thant’s report, Indonesia and the Philippines announced that they did not 
recognise Malaysia; and in response to this Tunku Abdul Rahman recalled all staff 
members from the Malayan Embassy in Indonesia.
302 He said, ‘We asked Indonesia to 
think twice before taking any drastic action. They should consider the matter in the spirit of 
Maphilindo so that we can be as we once were’.
303 When Malaysia was finally born on 16 
September, thousands of anti-Malaysia demonstrators gathered outside the Malaysian and 
British Embassies in Jakarta.
304  In Kuala Lumpur, more than a thousand Malaysian 
demonstrators threw stones at the Indonesian Embassy. The Malaysian government asked 
both Indonesia and the Philippines to clarify the reason for their reluctance to recognise 
Malaysia. The Tunku said, ‘In view of the fact that the Indonesian government has broken 
off diplomatic relations with Malaysia without any apparent reason, we have no choice but 
to do likewise and to recall our Ambassador and the Embassy staff, and at the same time to 
close down our consulate in Medan’.
305 
 
After 16 September 1963 Indonesia’s attitude towards Malaysia became increasingly 
militant.
306 Malaysia’s defence committee decided to increase the strength of the armed 
forces, especially in Sabah and Sarawak.
307 The Tunku seriously considered the possibility 
of defending Malaysia by force from Indonesia’s attack. He relied heavily on British 
military support. The friendly atmosphere and the cooperative spirit had completely 
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vanished. Consequently, the Manila agreements collapsed.
308 ‘The open breach between 
Indonesia and Malaysia ... constituted a major turning-point in the development of 
confrontation’
309  and led to the end of regional harmonisation. However, this episode 
provided some important glimmers of insight for future exploration of the matters of 
regional communication, cooperation, and accommodation.
310   
 
 
The significance of the Manila agreements and Maphilindo 
The period between April and August 1963 was characterised by the creation of a 
‘mutually acceptable formula’ through the series of Manila conferences, made possible 
with concessions from both sides.
311  An intention to harmonise their relations can be 
recognised since as early as the talks at under-secretary level in April 1963. The Manila 
conferences exemplified closer fraternal relations, mutual concessions, and the 
maintenance of moderate attitudes. In addition, throughout the Manila conferences they 
realised that the countries within the region ought to solve regional problems without 
external assistance. The desire to settle the dispute was most noticeable during the Tokyo 
talks (the end of May 1963) and the Manila Summit (early August 1963). Although it did 
not last, the emergence of a cooperative mood during this period was a notable staging post 
on the road towards cooperation for regional security in the form of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This is because the countries concerned held the talks 
by themselves when the tension developed. The examples here are the informal bilateral 
talks between Indonesian President Sukarno and Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul 
Rahman in Tokyo on 31 May 1963, and at the hotel in Manila on 31 July 1963. It is 
noteworthy that Indonesia and Malaya preferred the informal negotiation style for their 
reconciliation, and did so over the more formal one dictated by international diplomacy. 
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By using informal and frank conversation, they for a time successfully created regional 
harmony. 
 
Although the Manila agreements (and Maphilindo) collapsed about one month after their 
signing, their influence on ASEAN, which was established in 1967, was considerable. The 
concept of ‘regional primary responsibility’, articulated in the Manila agreements (more 
specifically, the Manila Accord and the Manila Declaration), was brought into the ASEAN 
Declaration, which was the foundational document of ASEAN.
312  The idea of ‘the 
temporality of foreign bases in the region’ was also stipulated in the ASEAN 
Declaration.
313 In addition, the spirit of ‘working together beyond difference’ from the 
Manila Accord took firm root in ASEAN, and the promise of ‘frequent consultation’ from 
the Manila Joint Statement was established as a key practice in the Association. 
 
The phrase ‘working together’ appeared in the Manila Accord for the first time in an 
official document in Southeast Asia. Malaya had previously ascribed responsibility for the 
Malaysia project to the British because the proposed federation involved some former 
British colonies. Therefore, Malaya did take a passive attitude towards objections from 
Indonesia and the Philippines until talks at the under-secretary level were held. Malaya was 
reluctant to take the initiative in settling the dispute, awaiting the Indonesians to take the 
first step.
314  As described above, although Indonesian Deputy Foreign Minister Suwito 
Kusumowidagdo had waited for Malaya’s delegation for 10 days in Manila in March 1963, 
the tripartite talks were postponed and Suwito left Manila saying, ‘I don’t think Malaya is 
serious’.
315   
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However, the series of tripartite talks clearly encouraged the three countries concerned (in 
particular Malaya) to realise that they should tackle the Malaysia question within their own 
circle.
316 Especially significant in this regard was Malaya’s realisation that it should not 
leave the Malaysia issue as an exclusive British responsibility. The face-to-face talks with 
Sukarno in Tokyo were the starting point, after which Tunku Abdul Rahman recognised 
that he should address the Malaysia issue actively.
317 The Tunku softened his inflexible 
attitude towards Sukarno, when the latter showed his intention to peacefully settle the 
dispute in Tokyo.
318 After the first session of the talks, the Tunku felt Sukarno’s humanity, 
saying Sukarno wanted to ‘open his heart’.
319  Indeed, a consultation, and personal 
connection, between the two leaders was necessary. Just before the bilateral Summit 
meeting, at the talks with Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira, Subandrio expressed 
Indonesia’s displeasure: ‘Malaya should have consulted with Indonesia before it 
announced the Malaysia plan’.
320  
 
Face-to-face communication also occurred in the hotel where Sukarno stayed for the 
Manila Summit. He was impressed by the Tunku’s courteous behaviour and they became 
friendly.
321 They met again two months after the Tokyo talks. The Tunku’s courtesy visit 
was inspired by the sense of closeness towards Sukarno. This sense of closeness had 
emerged in Tokyo. These two episodes reveal the significance of informal and heart-to-
heart talks between Sukarno and Tunku Abdul Rahman, especially after the long history of 
antagonism between the two countries since the end of the Second World War. In addition, 
their behaviour was one of the key elements of the Manila agreements: ‘frequent 
consultations’ to create regional cooperation. At the same time, Sukarno was able to nudge 
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the Tunku to reach a compromise with Indonesia for the sake of regional peace. They 
successfully therefore achieved face-saving agreements in Manila.   
 
The sense of ‘regional responsibility’ can be seen in the Tunku’s attitude at the Summit. 
The British government was displeased to see that the Tunku respected regional relations 
more than colonial relations and it seemed to the British that the Malayan Prime Minister 
would concede too much in Manila.
322 During the summit, Duncan Sandys pushed him to 
follow the British policy of Malaysia. Although the Tunku appeared to acquiesce to 
Sandys’ demands, his real intention was to pay more attention to the regional grouping for 
the future of Malaysia.
323 The frequent consultations in Maphilindo created a harmonious 
mood, which culminated in the Manila Summit. Even after verbal and written attempts 
from the British to intimidate Tunku Abdul Rahman, his desire for harmonisation of 
regional relations (and especially his sympathy with Sukarno) had not disappeared.  
 
When Sandys came to Kuala Lumpur to remonstrate with the Malayan Premier about his 
actions during the Manila Summit, the Tunku simply replied that he wanted ‘peace with 
his neighbours’.
324  Sandys forced the Tunku to ignore the Manila agreements and to 
announce the new date of the Malaysia formation without consulting Sukarno and 
Macapagal. The Tunku tried to consult with Subandrio about his decision before the public 
announcement, and to do so on the basis of the fraternal relationship established with 
Sukarno in Tokyo (as well as the Treaty of Friendship in 1959 between Indonesia and 
Malaya).
325 However, at this time his wish was not realised because of Sandys’ strong 
objection.
326 Divided between Britain and Maphilindo, he came to say to Sandys: ‘I have 
reached the end of my tether and I do not want to discuss anything further with 
anybody’.
327  
                                                 
322 Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 399. 
323 The Straits Times, 24 August 1963. 
324 DC 169/216, no 176, 27 August 1963 (Inward Telegram SOSLON 62 from Mr Sandys to CRO), 
paragraph 3. 
325 Ibid., paragraph 10.  
326 Ibid., paragraph 17.  
327 Ibid., paragraph 19. 111 
 
The Tunku had become increasingly cooperative in the course of the frequent consultation 
at the Manila conference, in contrast to his initial position of non-involvement in the 
dispute over the formation of Malaysia (because he re-described it as a British matter). 
While the Tunku’s sympathy for the regional bond resulted in failure, this episode reveals 
his underlying adherence to the objective of regional harmonisation. Indeed, he was the 
one who believed frequent consultation was most important between neighbouring 
countries in Southeast Asia when he took the initiative of the establishment of the ASA. 
This episode can be interpreted as the Tunku’s desire for frequent consultations with 
Indonesia and the Philippines, with the aim of transcending their differences. 
 
Indonesia’s attitude towards regional cooperation resulted in the disintegration of 
cooperation. The harmonious atmosphere in the Manila agreements was a by-product of 
Sukarno’s attempt to eliminate British (colonial) influence from the regional affair. Most 
countries in Southeast Asia felt a sense of inferiority to Western countries and were 
sensitive to political interference from them. Therefore, when Sukarno advocated anti-
colonialism during a series of the Manila conferences, Malaya sympathised with him. This 
atmosphere fashioned a common, if fragile, bond among them. However, anti-colonial 
sentiment was a double-edged sword. Sukarno’s overtly aggressive attitude towards the 
British also broke the harmonious and cooperative mood because his antagonism against 
Britain was also often directed to Malaya. Indeed, Subandrio said at the declaration of 
Confrontation on 20 January 1963: ‘We have always been pursuing a confrontation policy 
against colonialism… It is unfortunate that Malaya, too, has lent itself to become tools of 
colonialism’.
328   In this way, Indonesia regarded confronting Malaya as being the 
equivalent of confronting Britain and, to some extent, fighting colonialism in general.
329  
  
                                                 
328 Subandrio, Speech to Mahakarta Regiment in Jogjyakarta, 20 January 1963, in Peter Boyce (ed.), 
Malaysia and Singapore in International Diplomacy, pp. 69-70. 
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In addition, the failure of the Manila agreements can be attributed to British pressure on the 
Tunku and his indecisive attitude towards the Malaysia issue.
330 Sukarno thought that he 
was able to turn the Tunku’s allegiance to the region, away from its former coloniser 
through their talks in Tokyo. On the other hand, the British government resented the Tunku 
for giving way to the counter party in Manila and forced him to neglect the agreements. 
The Tunku was not able to reject British pressure completely and became torn between 
Britain and Maphilindo countries. He was not able to trust completely Sukarno’s Indonesia 
as a partner in the region. Therefore, in the interests of Malayan security, he could not 
sever the colonial connection with Britain.
331 As a result, he could not act consistently and 
failed to consult the other Maphilindo members about the new matters relating to the 
Malaysia issue. Signing the Malaysia Agreement of 9 July 1963 was the Tunku’s first 
blunder. The second was unilaterally announcing the new date for the federation of 
Malaysia upon the advice of Sandys. Neglecting the consultative process violated the 
fragile trust which was growing up among the three countries, and resulted in a setback to 
ongoing regional cooperation. 
 
It should be noted that Indonesia significantly influenced the Manila conferences. It has 
been observed that the Manila agreements ‘clearly represented a diplomatic victory for 
Sukarno’,
332 as they were heavily influenced by Indonesian ideology. Modelski points out 
that external powers had ‘exerted predominant influence in the making of regional 
decisions’
333 in the post-war era of Southeast Asia; therefore, the formation of Malaysia 
was one of Indonesia’s attempts ‘to reduce the share of outside Powers’.
334       
 
As Indonesian Vice-President Mohammad Hatta explained in 1949, it seemed to Indonesia 
that the blueprint of Malaysia was a British-made plan rather than a Southeast Asian one. 
                                                 
330 Ott points out that his background made him move ‘easily between two cultures’. The Tunku came from 
aristocratic Malay and was Western-educated. He was an English gentleman, at the same time, ‘the 
quintessential Malay’. (Marvin C. Ott, ‘Foreign Policy Formation in Malaysia’, p. 225.) 
331 ‘Inward Telegram OCULAR 593 from T Peters to Lord Home’, 3 August 1963, FO 371/169724, no 26. 
332 Howard Palfrey Jones, Indonesia, p. 284. The same view is seen in Gerald Sussman, ‘Macapagal, the 
Sabah Claim and Maphilindo’, p. 217.  
333 George Modelski, ‘Indonesia and the Malaysia Issue’, p. 129.  
334 Ibid, p. 130.  113 
 
Indonesia had been sensitive to the use of terms such as sovereignty and self-determination, 
as it had itself secured its independence the hard way: through bloody struggle. For 
Indonesia, Malaysia did not appear to be built on the basis of the wishes of the 
inhabitants.
335 The formation of a seemingly British-influenced country was undesirable 
for Indonesia, as it would challenge Indonesian revolutionary ideology. In addition to this, 
Indonesia suspected that the PRRI rebellion in 1958 was supported, or even operated, 
through the use of British and American bases within Asia. With the formation of Malaysia, 
Indonesia would be adjacent to the land upon which British-controlled bases could be built. 
This would have the effect of intensifying domestic unrest and directly threaten national 
security.   
 
Sukarno, together with Philippine President Macapagal, tried to bring together the three 
Maphilindo countries by invoking their racial and cultural affinity and their shared colonial 
experience. In other words, they attempted to forge a regional identity by making a 
distinction between Maphilindo countries (Asian countries) and former colonisers 
(Western countries). Invoking regional and national identity worked to unite the region and 
assist nation-building. Sukarno successfully united the people against the Dutch in the 
independence struggle and the West Irian campaign. He tried to apply this method to the 
international arena; namely, he tried to unite Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines by 
making a clear distinction between them and the West. However, he ultimately failed to do 
so as he over-emphasised Indonesian antagonism against Western countries.   
 
The cultural affinities between the three countries, all being of ethnic Malay origin, should 
also be noted.
336   These affinities were useful to strengthen the bond. Maphilindo 
emphasised the fraternity of ethnic Malays and employed the traditional conflict settlement 
                                                 
335 Sukarno, Speech at the Opening of the Conference of National Front Committees in Jakarta, 13 February 
1963, in George Modelski (ed.), The New Emerging Forces: Documents on the Ideology of Indonesian 
Foreign Policy, Documents and Data Paper No. 2 (Canberra: Department of International Relations, 
Research School of Pacific Studies, Institute of Advanced Studies, The Australian National University, 1963), 
pp. 74-77. 
336 Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman later stated that he opposed to Maphilindo because ‘we are not 
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process, musyawarah. Further traditional practice, that the younger people respects the 
older one, for example, can be seen between Tunku Abdul Rahman and Sukarno. In one 
such instance, the Tunku went to Haneda Tokyo airport to see Sukarno off after the Tokyo 
talks in June 1963. Another example is that the Tunku visited Sukarno’s hotel room in 
Manila at the first day of the Summit in August. Sukarno welcomed the visit and they had 
an amicable conversation. After the conversation, the Tunku told the press that he went to 
see Sukarno ‘[a]ccording to the Malay adat (custom)’ in which the younger people should 
respect the older one.
337  The Tunku’s behaviour was accepted by Sukarno because of 




Relations between Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines during this period displayed the 
impetus to see regional cooperation as a serious regional strategy. The three Maphilindo 
countries emphasised their own responsibility for regional matters, and for regional 
security in particular. In addition, they recognised the importance of ‘working together’ for 
the sake of the region. That is to say, this period reinforced their recognition of Southeast 
Asia as a region. Furthermore, three specific techniques to harmonise the Maphilindo 
countries were identified: ‘consultations’, ‘face-saving’ and ‘informality’. Through the 
process of making the Manila agreements, Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines 
developed the idea of regional cooperation, which was originally initiated in the formation 
process of the ASA. Although Maphilindo collapsed one month after the Manila Summit 
meeting, the desire to create a successful regional organisation became stronger in this 
period. 
                                                 
337 The Straits Times, 1 August 1963. The Tunku was two years younger than Sukarno.  
 
Chapter Four   
 
THE SETTLEMENT OF THE REGIONAL PROBLEM AND THE 
FORMATION OF ASEAN 
 
 
The three-way dispute over the formation of Malaysia continued for more than two years. 
Although Sukarno, Tunku Abdul Rahman and Macapagal made certain attempts to fix 
their deteriorated relations, these attempts were neither earnest, nor persevering. In line 
with the drastic changes in Indonesian politics from 1966,
1 the new Indonesian government 
quickly turned its policy direction towards a peaceful settlement with Malaysia.
2 In parallel 
with the political change in Indonesia, the Philippine government was also actively seeking 
normalisation of diplomatic relations with Malaysia.
3 By mid-1966, the three countries had 
resumed official relations.
4 With the new atmosphere of peace in the region, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand began to discuss new ways for regional 
cooperation.
5 After a year discussion, a new organisation, ASEAN, was launched in 1967.
6 
                                                 
1 The political change resulted from the abortive coup of 30 September 1966, the so-called Gestapu (Gerakan 
September Tigahpuluh). As a result of the coup, Sukarno was eventually forced to step down from 
Indonesian politics. For the details of the abortive coup, see, for example, Arnold C. Brackman, Indonesia, 
the Gestapu affair (New York: American-Asian Educational Exchange, 1969); Donald E. Weatherbee, 
Approaches to the Interpretation of Gestapu: the Indonesian Coup Attempt of 1 October, 1965 (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina, 1968); and Harold Crouch, ‘Another Look at the Indonesian “Coup”’, 
Indonesia, 15 (April 1973), pp. 1-20.    
2 Adam Malik, ‘Promise of Indonesia’, Foreign Affairs, 46/2 (January 1968), p. 301. 
3 Lela Garner Noble, ‘The National Interest and the National Image’, p. 566. 
4 The diplomatic relations between Malaysia and the Philippines resumed on 3 June 1966 (Joint Statement 
between Malaysia and the Philippines on 3 June 1966, in Peter Boyce (ed.), Malaysia and Singapore in 
International Diplomacy: Documents and Commentaries (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1968), p. 128.), 
and between Indonesia and Malaysia on 11 August 1966 (The Agreement to Normalize Relations between 
the Republic of Indonesia and Malaysia, 11 August 1966, in Peter Boyce (ed.), Malaysia and Singapore in 
International Diplomacy, pp. 108-109.). 
5 Rudimentary discussions about a new form of regional cooperation, which was to include Indonesia, were 
held in early 1966. See Franklin B. Weinstein, Indonesia Abandons Confrontation, p. 88; and ‘Tounan Ajia 
Syokoku Rengou (ASEAN) no Sousetsu ni Tsuite [The Establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations, ASEAN]’, Nansei Ajia-ka [Department of Southwest Asia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan], 
18 August 1967, GSK File B’-200. 
6 Yoneji Kuroyanagi, ASEAN 35 Nen no Kiseki, pp. 25-27. 116 
 
This chapter identifies the specific elements for regional cooperation by describing a 
regional transition from ‘antagonising each other’ to ‘working together.’     
 
 
The Malaysia issue after the establishment of Malaysia  
After the establishment of Malaysia, Indonesian mobs damaged the British and Malaysian 
embassies.
7  In Kuala Lumpur, Malaysians attacked the Indonesian Embassy. Indonesia 
banned trade with Malaysia and refused Colombo plan aid from Britain and Australia. 
Although they were still sporadic, Indonesian military threats against Malaysia had 
intensified. Indonesian Naval gunboats fired on Malaysian vessels and the Indonesian 
Army deployed guerrilla forces in Sabah and Sarawak.
8 
 
The Philippines attempted to resume the tripartite conference within Maphilindo.
9 Just 
after the establishment of Malaysia, the Philippine acting Foreign Secretary, Librado 
Cayco, said, ‘I do not think Maphilindo is (sic) collapsed’.
10 The Philippine government 
stated that it would recognise Malaysia if recognition would suit its national interest.
11 
Then, in late October, the Philippines proposed two conditions for its recognition of 
Malaysia: Malaysia should observe the Manila agreements
12 and agree with the peaceful 
settlement of the Sabah territorial dispute. However, these conditions were flatly rejected 
by Malaysia. As Indonesia’s militant actions intensified, the Philippines stated that it 
would try to solve the Sabah issue and recognise Malaysia without Indonesia,
13 whereas 
Sukarno tried to persuade Macapagal to cooperate with him.
14 
                                                 
7 The Straits Times, 17 September 1963. 
8 The Straits Times, 2 October 1963. 
9 Philippine President Diosdado Macapagal had proposed Maphilindo in 1963. See Chapter 3. 
10 Asahi Shimbun, 17 September 1963. Author’s translation.  
11 The Straits Times, 25 September 1963. 
12 It had been reiterated until the end of the dispute in 1966 by Indonesia and the Philippines.  
13 Asahi Shimbun, 1 November 1963. The Philippine government resumed the consular relations in mid-1964. 
14 The Philippines did not oppose having Malaysia as a member of the Second Afro-Asia conference in 
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 While Indonesian President Sukarno strongly advocated crushing Malaysia, on 16 January 
1964, he entered into discussions with US Attorney General Robert Kennedy in Tokyo.
15 
Sukarno showed his willingness for Kennedy’s proposition of a peaceful settlement of the 
conflict over Malaysia.
16 Although the tripartite ministerial conference between Indonesia, 
Malaysia and the Philippines was going to be held in Bangkok early in February, this 
meeting was postponed because Indonesia and Malaysia could not reach a cease-fire 
agreement regarding the battles on the Indonesian-Malaysian border in Sarawak.
17 
 
In March 1964, Philippine Foreign Secretary Salvador Lopez held several separate bilateral 
sessions with Malaysia and Indonesia in Bangkok, and he succeeded in organising foreign 
ministerial talks between the three countries concerned.
18   However, Indonesia and 
Malaysia once again failed to agree to a cease-fire. Lopez also played a mediator’s role 
between Indonesia and Malaysia during the Tokyo tripartite Summit meeting on 20 June.
19 
However, the negotiations were broken off on the same day.
20  The King of Malaysia, 
Sayyid Putra, was wary of the Tunku’s inflexible attitude in the run-up to the latter’s 
discussions with Sukarno in Tokyo in June 1964: ‘I hope Malaysia can go along with 
Indonesia and other countries in the world peacefully’.
21   
 
After the Tokyo talks broke off, Indonesia resumed military activities. The Philippines no 
longer attempted to mediate the conflict after the Indonesian guerrillas landed in Johor 
state (Malaysia) on the Malay Peninsula in August 1964, and as a consequence the dispute 
                                                 
15 Asahi Shimbun, 17 January 1964. Robert Kennedy had a favourable impression from the Indonesian 
government. See Asahi Shimbun, Evening Edition, 14 January 1964. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Asahi Shimbun, 27 February 1964.  
18 Susumu Yamakage, ASEAN, p. 78. 
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20 Asahi Shimbun, 21 June 1964. 
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became more focused on Indonesia and Malaysia.
22 Under the circumstances, Britain was 
going to resist Indonesia’s military action until Sukarno abandoned his aggressive policy.
23 
The issue was debated in the United Nations Security Council in September although the 
Soviet Union vetoed the proposed resolution that condemned Indonesia’s military action. 
 
In October 1964, Sukarno secretly proposed a meeting with Tunku Abdul Rahman, but 
Malaysia declined this.
24  In the meantime, Indonesia, pursuing closer relations with 
China,
25  left the United Nations in January 1965.
26  By withdrawing from the UN and 
allying itself with China, Indonesia renounced ‘“peaceful coexistence” with the West’ and 
began to call the US the leader of imperialism.
27 The Japanese government had actively 
played the role of mediator, proposing and organising Tokyo talks between Sukarno and 
the Tunku for May 1965. However, these talks were cancelled because of opposition from 
the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).
28 Indonesia’s approach to China was also related 
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26 The real reason for this is unknown: Sukarno’s protest against the UN where Malaysia was going to be a 
member of the Security Council in 1965; or the pressure from China. (J. A. C. Mackie, Konfrontasi, p. 282.) 
27 John O. Sutter, ‘Two Faces of Konfrontasi: “Crush Malaysia” and the GESTAPU’, Asian Survey, 6/10 
(October 1966), p. 533. 
28 ‘Shiina Gaisyou to Sir Paul Gore-Booth tono Kaidan ni Tsuite [The report of the talks between Foreign 
Minister, Shiina, and Sir Paul Gore-Booth], Ouei 246 Gou, Oua-kyoku, Eirennpou-ka [Department of the 
Commonwealth of Nations, Bureau of Eurasia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan], 18 March 1965, GSK 
File A’-410. 119 
 
to the PKI’s growing influence on Indonesian politics.
29 Subandrio,  the  PKI-backed 
Indonesian Foreign Minister, who was an emerging power in Indonesian politics,
30 upset 
the balance between the Army and the PKI; a balance which had been maintained by 
Sukarno for some years,
31 thus intensifying the power struggle between the Army and the 
PKI. When Sukarno was hospitalised in August 1965, there was a rumour that he had 
retired. The rumour caused the abortive coup of 30 September 1965. 
 
Just after the establishment of Malaysia in 1963, the issue of the government’s disparate 
treatment of the ethnic Chinese emerged in the country.
32 The adoption of Malay as the 
official national language and government favouritism had led some to argue that ethnic 
Malays were accorded a ‘special position’.
33   In March 1965, Lee Kuan Yew, the 
Singaporean Prime Minister, warned that Malaysia could not survive an ethnic conflict:  
 
[L]et me admit that in this plural society of Malaysia also lies the danger of her own 
destruction. If under the external pressure of Indonesian confrontation, the leaders of the 
various communities in Malaysia respond not as Malaysians, but as so many Malays, 
Chinese, Indians and others, then the end must be disintegration.
34 
 
In reply, the Malaysian Prime Minister tersely rebuked Lee: 
 
The state of Singapore is under the control of another opposition group, the People’s 
Action Party, led by its Premier, Mr Lee Kuan Yew. Singapore has had no previous 
experience of working in a federal nation, and due to the fact of being the “New York” of 
Malaysia it probably feels that its position is far more important than that of the rest of 
Malaysia.
35 
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Singapore finally left Malaysia on 9 August 1965. After Singapore’s secession, bilateral 
relations did not improve. Sukarno pointed to this in a speech he gave at the time:    
 
The weakness of the ‘Malaysia’ project has been obvious from the very beginning. I have 
said this hundreds of times! As the whole world knows, Brunei, which was where the 
North Kalimantan revolution first broke out under the leadership of Mahmud Azahari 
rejected ‘Malaysia’ and has never been federated in ‘Malaysia’. … [I]t is a fact that 
Singapore has separated itself from ‘Malaysia’. Yes, ‘Malaysia’ is beginning to fall apart 




Suharto’s rise to power 
In Indonesia, the abortive coup of 30 September ignited social unrest.
37 In addition, the 
economy was deteriorating. On 2 October, Sukarno announced that Major General 
Mohamed Suharto had ‘responsibility for the restoration of security and order’.
38 Sukarno 
gave Suharto important posts, such as Minister of the Army. However, the former still had 
the strong support of the people and of one of the major political groupings in Indonesia.
39 
Suharto ascribed the 9.30 coup to the PKI’s plot to subvert the Sukarno government and 
said that his primary duty was ‘to destroy the PKI’.
40 Sukarno, however, objected to a ban 
on the PKI. 
 
The political disturbances had still not calmed down in early 1966. In fact, civil 
demonstrations were becoming prevalent. The demonstrators demanded the elimination of 
the communists and the restoration of the Indonesian economy.
41 In addition, the people 
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began to criticise the Sukarno government.
42  By March 1966 the situation was out of 
control. In the so-called ‘Letter of 11 March’, General Suharto seized full power from 
Sukarno in order to take ‘all necessary steps to guarantee security and calm and the 
stability of the running of the government’.
43   
 
Suharto proclaimed as his top priority the rebuilding of the Indonesian economy in order to 
secure domestic stability.
44  The day after he came into power, Suharto also dissolved 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and banned communist activities throughout the 
country.
45 He also concluded that Konfrontasi ‘had only been a PKI tactic to drag the 
country into as many confrontations as possible so that the communists could mobilise 
their forces and finally revolt and seize power’.
46 He arrested 15 members of the Cabinet 




Suharto declared that the new government would not indulge in ‘right or left’ rhetoric, but 
would instead maintain a balanced approach.
48 He also advocated social harmonisation
49 
and appointed new ministers from various groups. Suharto nominated Adam Malik
50 as a 
Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, and Sultan Hamengku Buwono of Jogjakarta 
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49 Suharto advocated returning to the spirit of Pancasila. For the details of Pancasila, see Chapter 1. 
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as the Minister of Economic Affairs. The three of them, in effect, formed a triumvirate. 
Malik, in line with Suharto, declared that he would keep a balance in foreign policy.
51 He 
announced that Indonesia would return to an ‘independent and active foreign policy’.
52 In 
fact, Malik took a pragmatic line with ‘the realities existing in the outside world’.
53 Indeed, 
the new Indonesian government ‘leaned heavily towards the West’
54 because  Suharto 
expected foreign aid mainly from the United States and Japan.  
 
 
Indonesia’s new foreign policy 
Indonesia needed to coexist with the international community, especially the Western 
countries, in order to secure foreign aid for its economic recovery. Adam Malik spurned 
autarky, stating that, ‘We believe that no nation in this age of rapid technological progress 
and scientific advances can live in isolated self-sufficiency’.
55 He also showed his intention 
to return to international organisations, such as the United Nations, as quickly as 
possible.
56 Malik suggested that he would also improve diplomatic relations with the US, 
the country’s largest potential benefactor. At the same time, Indonesia distanced itself from 
China and other Sukarno-era communist allies in Asia.
57 The US was still apprehensive 
about communist infiltration into Southeast Asia at that time and hoped that Indonesia 
would not be driven to the communist side.
58 In addition, the tension between the US and 
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War. See ‘Ikeda Souri, Nikuson Zen Beikoku Fuku Daitouryou Kaiken Roku [The Proceedings of the talks 
between the Japanese Prime Minister, Ikeda and the former US Vice-President, Nixon]’, Amerika-kyoku, 123 
 
China became stronger over the deepening of the Vietnam War.
59 Maintaining a political 
distance from China was therefore essential in securing financial aid from the US.
60 
 
Furthermore, Indonesia softened its aggressive policy towards Malaysia and was anxious 
to appear cooperative, and change its image of aggressor in the eyes of the international 
community.
61 Konfrontasi was also harmful to the Indonesian economy because it was 
consuming manpower and resources which should be allocated to economic recovery. The 




As Weinstein puts it, this period was ‘a time of the most significant change in the political 
climate in Indonesia’.
63 Particularly unclear was the direction of Indonesia’s foreign 
policy.
64 Sukarno, who was still a very influential figure in Indonesian politics, continued 
to pay attention to Indonesia’s prestige, especially its leading position in the Afro-Asian 
world.
65  He was confident that Indonesia had, during the Manila conference in 1963, 
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63 Franklin B. Weinstein, Indonesia Abandons Confrontation, p. 40. 
64  The international community, and in particular, Malaysia, were sceptical about Indonesia’s desire for 
ending  Konfrontasi because Indonesian foreign policy was sometimes inconsistent, reflecting confused 
domestic situation. (Franklin B. Weinstein, Indonesia Abandons Confrontation, p. 34.) 
65 This is based on the victorious West Irian Campaign of 1962 against the Netherlands. 124 
 
maintained its reputation as a leader of the third world.
66 He insisted that Indonesia should 
continue Konfrontasi until Malaysia conformed to the Manila agreements of 1963.
67 As 
British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart pointed out, ‘Sukarno had no choice but to 
depend on his past glory in order to maintain support from the people’.
68  
 
Adam Malik, on the other hand, took a pragmatic approach to Indonesia’s future. As 
opposed to Sukarno, he considered food, clothing and shelter as more important for 
Indonesia than its international prestige. Rather, a belligerent attitude towards Malaysia 
would degrade Indonesia’s reputation and jeopardise its foreign aid agreements. He 
insisted, instead, that foreign policy should be formed in accordance with the national 
interest and that economic recovery should be the new government’s top priority.
69 In this 
context, Malik argued that Indonesia should take a flexible attitude towards the Malaysia 
issue so that it could be settled quickly. He implied that at this stage Indonesia should not 
argue strongly over the detailed positions in the Manila agreements of 1963.
70  
 
The Indonesian Army’s position was more complicated. The Army was keen to restore the 
country’s economy as quickly as possible, because many of its officials were involved in 
commerce.
71 However, it was reluctant to end Konfrontasi if Indonesia’s concessions were 
not reciprocated by Malaysia.
72 In this regard, the position of Suharto, who was also the 
supreme leader of the Army, was rather ambiguous as he was trying to balance between 
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different interest groups at home.
73 In order to bring peace and stability to the Indonesian 
politics, he had to create political consensus between three groups: Sukarno, who was the 
father of Indonesia and still an ideological leader of the people, Malik, who was the 
intellectual driving force behind the New Order government, and the Army, the most 
dominant political force in Indonesia. Therefore, Suharto took ‘a more realistic and 
pragmatic way of thinking without sacrificing the ideals of the national struggle’.
74 
 
In an interview with Asahi Shimbun in April 1966, Suharto clarified the Army’s two main 
objectives: the implementation of Indonesian revolution and the maintenance of national 
defence.
75 These two points were consistent with the two claims, which Sukarno had been 
insisting on: firstly, self-determination of the people in Sabah and Sarawak should be 
observed from the view point of Indonesian revolutionary ideology; and, secondly, foreign 
military bases in the region were perceived as threats to Indonesia’s national security.
76 
Suharto was reluctant to abandon the confrontation policy quickly without any concession 
from the Malaysian side whereas Malaysia expressed its desire to end the conflict with 
Indonesia by saying, ‘We would like to have peace...with Indonesia’.
77  
 
Furthermore, Suharto hoped that Konfrontasi would finish without loss of face for Sukarno, 
the Indonesian Army, or Indonesia as a whole.
78  He recognised that the revolutionary 
identity, which was formed through a dogged struggle for independence during the 
Sukarno era, was strong among the people in Indonesia.
79 Suharto paid regard to Sukarno 
because the latter was still ‘the great leader of revolution’ for many of Indonesians.
80 In 
addition, Suharto needed to be patient in order that the Army would adjust itself to the new 
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political leadership in Indonesia.
81  Therefore, he initially repeated the views, already 
prevailing in Indonesia, by saying that the establishment of Malaysia posed a threat to 
Indonesian revolution and that it was a deviation from the Manila agreements.
82 The next 
step for Suharto was to reduce military confrontation to a political form instead.  
 
In this regard, it was difficult to make a coherent foreign policy with such strongly 
competing political perspectives. In early April 1966, Adam Malik announced that 
Indonesia would soon recognise Singapore.
83   He had apparently realised that the 
recognition of Singapore was ‘“the first step” toward ending the policy of confrontation’.
84 
Malik wanted to stimulate the Indonesian economy by resuming trade with Singapore, 
since Indonesia ‘had been relying almost 100 per cent on Singapore’ for its trade before 
entering Konfrontasi.
85 However, the importance of Malik’s announcement was belittled 
by Sukarno’s troublesome statement that Indonesia intended to intensify the Crush 
Malaysia Campaign by opening diplomatic relations with Singapore.
86 In  addition,  the 
Indonesian Herald reported that the government aimed to break the neo-colonialists’ 
encirclement of Malaysia by giving recognition to Singapore.
87 Malik himself issued a 
statement, but it only provoked the Malaysian government and contradicted his previous 
statement: 
 
With regard to confrontation of Malaysia, it will continue. But I hope that our recognition 
of Singapore will contribute to show clearly that confrontation does not necessarily mean 
use of physical force. The recognition of Singapore could extend the opportunity to 
Malaysia to reconsider its policies towards Indonesia.
88  
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The intricate political agenda towards Singapore irritated the Malaysian government.
89 
Malaysia was particularly sensitive with regard to Singapore because its secession from the 
Federation was recognised as a severe vulnerability. Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku 
Abdul Rahman remained hostile and sharply criticised Indonesia’s position: ‘Offering to 
recognise Singapore, at the same time expressing determination to crush Malaysia, shows 
the belligerent and spiteful attitude of Indonesia towards us’.
90  His government also 
warned that Singapore must choose friendship with either Malaysia or Indonesia, not with 
both.  
 
In the Philippines, President Diosdado Macapagal could not break the jinx of being ‘never 
re-elected’.
 91 In the 1965 Presidential elections, he was beaten by Ferdinand Marcos. After 
the Philippines abandoned its mediator’s role, when the Indonesian Army landed on the 
Malay Peninsula in August 1964, Macapagal’s foreign policy became unpopular because 
many Filipinos had been ‘proud of the country’s role as peacemakers’ in the Malaysia 
issue.
92 Ferdinand Marcos pledged himself to resume diplomatic relations with Malaysia 
during his election campaign in 1965.
93 The policy of the Marcos administration was more 
focused on economic development than on the creation of an Asian identity.
94 He began 
negotiations with Malaysia soon after he came into office. The two countries reached an 
agreement of normalisation in mid-February 1966 and resumed diplomatic relations.
95 
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Both countries agreed to the rapprochement in early February. Marcos said, ‘I am certain 
that our recognition of Malaysia will be accepted by Indonesia in this light’.
96  
 
A month before the agreement, Marcos released a statement, emphasising the importance 
of economic development by saying, ‘it is our solemn obligation to strive as best we can 
towards...economic wellbeing of the peoples within the region’.
97 He believed that peace 
and stability would be essential for economic development and rapprochement with 
Malaysia should be made in this context. However, Indonesia opposed his policy at that 
time. Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio said that the Philippines’ recognition of 
Malaysia would not help the reconciliation between Indonesia and Malaysia.
98 He added 
that recognition of Malaysia would only exacerbate Southeast Asia’s already volatile 
political climate.






Fresh progress in bilateral relations between Indonesia and Malaysia appeared in early 
April 1966, a month after Suharto came to office. Indonesia sent an observer to the first 
Ministerial Conference on Economic Development in Southeast Asia (MCEDSEA)
101 in 
Tokyo on 6 April, which was attended by Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand and South Vietnam. It was regarded as ‘epoch-making’ that the new Indonesian 
government showed its willingness to sit with the Malaysian government at the same table 
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during the conference.
102 On the same day, when Indonesia showed its softened attitude, 
Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman put forward the following conditions for 
resuming peace talks with Sukarno: (1) Philippine President Marcos must talk with 
Sukarno and confirm his genuine desire for a peaceful settlement; (2) The Tunku would be 
willing to meet with Sukarno even before Indonesian hostilities ceased if his first condition 
were met.
103 On 12 April, in response to the Tunku’s statement, the Philippine official, 
Consul Juan Dionisio, informed the Tunku of Indonesia’s willingness to talk about 
bringing an end of Konfrontasi.
104  On the same day, Marcos called for a tripartite 
ministerial conference.
105   However, at this stage Malaysia still seemed to doubt 
Indonesia’s willingness to resume diplomatic relations with Malaysia,
106 which probably 
stemmed from Indonesia’s inconsistent statements about the recognition of Singapore. It 
was reported that Malaysia declined the Philippines’ proposal at this stage.
107 A week after 
the Tunku issued his conditions for the bilateral talks with Sukarno, it was reported that 
Indonesia was going to drop its pre-condition for the talks with Malaysia.
108  
 
The external powers, such as the United States and Britain, were indirectly helping the new 
Indonesia. They realised that this was a chance to encourage Indonesia to return to the 
international community. The two countries were quick in showing favourable attitudes 
and willingness to offer aid to the Indonesian government. On 18 April, the US 
government announced it would send emergency food supplies to the country.
109 On 25 
April, British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart expressed Britain’s intention to end its 
antagonism towards Indonesia, and he said, ‘[W]e are in touch with the Indonesian 
government to that end’.
110  The British government offered one million pounds in 
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economic aid to Indonesia on the condition that Indonesia would cease military incursions 
into Malaysia.
111    
 
The talks between Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik and Philippine Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs Narciso Ramos were held in Bangkok between 30 April and 1 May 
1966.
112 They seemed to be in accord with the Tunku’s requirements of 6 April.
113 In the 
Joint Statement after the talks, Malik expressed Indonesia’s desire ‘to find a peaceful 
solution’ for the Malaysia issue.
114  It should be noted that it was the first time that 
Indonesia officially expressed its intention to end Konfrontasi.
115  Ramos  said  with 
confidence, ‘I think I can say the differences between Indonesia and Malaysia will be 
solved by peaceful means’.
116   He also disclosed to the press that the Indonesian 
government had ordered the troops, which had deployed to the Rhio Islands near Singapore, 
to cease firing on Malaysian aircraft.
117 Malik seemed eager for a rapid settlement, saying 
that he wanted to ‘find a short cut’.
118 
 
The Malaysian attitude towards Indonesia softened after the talks between Malik and 
Ramos. Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak said, ‘I am happy to note 
from press reports that Dr Malik wishes a speedy settlement of his country’s dispute with 
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Malaysia by peaceful means and that chances for such a peaceful settlement are better now 
than they were before the September 30 coup attempt’.
119 He added the comment about the 
recognition of Singapore by saying, ‘We are also relieved to note that the Indonesian 
decision to recognise Singapore is not with the intention of intensifying confrontation 
against Malaysia’.
120  Malaysia finally expressed its willingness to abandon the pre-
conditions for the talks with Indonesia.
121 
 
However, Malik’s intention to quickly end Konfrontasi was not shared by all the interest 
groups in Indonesia. Sukarno, for example, denounced Malik’s approach to the Bangkok 
talks as cowardly due to the failure of the latter to properly address the Malaysian issue.
122 
In addition, the Army was also not happy with Malik’s policy on the Malaysia issue. The 
Indonesian military spokesman, Brigadier General Ibnu Subroto, argued that the campaign 
should be continued as long as British troops continued to be stationed in Malaysia.
123 
General Abdul Haris Nasution, the Deputy Chief of Crush Malaysia Command 
(KOGAM),
124 said that Konfrontasi would end only when both countries strictly abided by 
the Manila agreements, and particularly the two conditions Indonesia had reiterated.
125 
Sukarno brought up the Singapore issue again by saying that Indonesia regarded the 
recognition of Singapore as a confrontational political tactic against Malaysia.
126 A 
consensus about the end of Konfrontasi was yet to be formed. Suharto emphasised 
harmony in domestic politics and said, ‘National unity is important’.
127 In an interview 
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with the Straits Times, Suharto again underlined his support to the two oft-reiterated 
reasons for Indonesia’s confrontation against Malaysia.
128 
 
Adam Malik was forced to tone down his vociferous support for a rapid settlement, so that 
Indonesians could reach a consensus. He said, ‘It takes time for us to prepare them to 
accept the new situation’, and he added that, ‘[t]here must be mental preparation of our 
people to accept the fact that we have settled our problems’.
129   This period was 
characterised by adjustments in domestic politics, and even Malik sometimes had to 
reverse statements made previously in support of the peace process. That, however, was 
merely ‘a reflection of a still existing, though diminishing, need to protect themselves 
against allegations of rightism’.
130 
 
Malik stated that Indonesia would be willing to meet Malaysia without any pre-conditions. 
On 18 May in an interview with the Australian Broadcasting Commission, he declared that 
Indonesia would not insist on another referendum in Sabah and Sarawak.
131 With  this 
concession, Indonesia substantially dropped demands concerning its two oft-iterated 
issues
132 from the preconditions of the talks.
133 The Malaysian government recognised this 
opportunity as a significant one and asked Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak to ‘use 
the present favourable and hopeful atmosphere’.
134  Tun Razak offered to talk with 
Malik.
135   Malik mentioned the question of self-determination again by saying that 
Malaysia would not need to hold a new referendum in Sabah and Sarawak, but instead it 
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had only to convince Indonesia that the UN investigation of 1963 had revealed the genuine 
will of the people there.
136 In addition, he stated that British troops would pull out from 
Southeast Asia if countries in the region could gain British confidence.
137  In reply to 
Malik’s concession, Malaysia also showed the positive initiative by suggesting the 
possibility of reviewing the result of the UN investigation of 1963 in Sabah and Sarawak 
under the auspices of Thailand and Japan.
138   Meanwhile, Indonesia and Malaysia 
successfully opened up avenues for direct communication, aimed at securing a peaceful 
settlement, and began to prepare for bilateral talks.
139  
 
On 27 May 1966, just before the ministerial talks between Indonesia and Malaysia, 
Suharto sent eight heads of the Indonesian army in Crush Malaysia Command (KOGAM) 
to Kuala Lumpur.
140   Their visit was enthusiastically welcomed by the Malaysian 
government. Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak stated that KOGAM’s 
visit showed ‘the military government’s desire to establish peace’.
 141 He also compared 
their visit with the Malay traditional custom kenduri, which is a feast held before an 
important meeting aimed at wishing its success by overcoming differences.
142 Indeed, 
KOGAM’s visit had, in effect, ‘paved the way’ for the bilateral talks.
143 
 
The ministerial talks between Malik and Tun Razak were held in Bangkok from 29 May to 
1 June.
144 Indonesia and Malaysia agreed ‘to restore friendly relations’ and to maintain 
‘direct and continuous contact’.
145 After the talks, Malik emphasised Indonesia’s desire for 
peaceful coexistence in the region: ‘We want to make peace with all countries, especially 
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our neighbours.…We want peace, friendly relations and cooperation’.
146 Tun  Razak 
underlined the importance of maintaining a peaceful and friendly atmosphere at the talks 
and said that the agreement in Bangkok was ‘for the love of peace and in the spirit of 
coexistence’.
147   However, the ministerial talks were ‘the beginning of the end of 
Confrontation [Konfrontasi] rather than the end itself’
148 as they did not find any solution 
to Indonesia’s concerns over the self-determination in Sabah and Sarawak and the 
existence of British bases in Malaysia. 
 
Immediately following the success of the Ministerial talks between Indonesia and Malaysia, 
the Philippine government recognised Malaysia and, on 3 June 1966, formally opened full 
diplomatic relations.
149   The Joint Statement of the two countries stated that: ‘The 
strengthening of relations between the two countries will pave the way for closer 
cooperation between them, making it possible for both nations to pursue even greater 





The Army, to say nothing of Sukarno, was not satisfied with the results of the Bangkok 
talks, because Adam Malik could not draw any concessions from Malaysia regarding the 
two issues reiterated by Indonesia.
151  On 8 June, Suharto made a statement after the 
meeting in Crush Malaysia Command (KOGAM), in which he suggested that the Bangkok 
talks were ‘only the first stage’ of the ending process of Konfrontasi and the results still 
included ‘some problems needing clarification and solution’.
152 Indonesia’s  Provisional 
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People’s Consultative Assembly (MPRS)
153 was also dissatisfied with the outcome of the 
negotiations.
154 KOGAM required that the two countries should hold further talks in order 
to bridge their differences and continued to insist on adherence to the 1963 Manila 
agreements.
155 KOGAM also suggested that Suharto should replace Malik and take full 
responsibility for further negotiation with the Malaysian government.
156 The Indonesian 
government authorised Suharto to exercise power for the furtherance of the peace process, 
and announced that it should take more time to ensure that the people of Indonesia would 
approve of the result of the Bangkok talks.
157 Although the government did not clarify the 




Soon after he was appointed, Suharto began negotiations with his counterpart in Kuala 
Lumpur, in order to bridge the gap between KOGAM and the Malaysian government. 
Inche Ghazali bin Shafie, the Malaysian permanent Secretary of the Ministry of External 
Affairs, visited Suharto and the Army leaders
159  about the treatment of 50,000 British 
troops in Malaysia, many of whom were stationed in Sabah and Sarawak.
160 When he 
returned to Kuala Lumpur on 14 June, Ghazali Shafie said, ‘They all agree that 
confrontation should be settled peacefully and in a friendly fashion’.
161 He also implied 
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that there would be room for compromise on the Malaysian side and said, ‘I think we have 
found a formula to end confrontation’.
162   
 
Just after the talks between Suharto and Ghazali Shafie, Suharto directed his staff to set up 
a temporary office of the Indonesian government at a hotel in Kuala Lumpur, so that the 
two countries could accelerate the negotiation for a peaceful settlement.
163 Indonesian 
representatives had discussions with Tun Abdul Razak on 19 June and predicted that a 
rapprochement would not take long.
164   Tun Razak announced that the Malaysian 
government would, in the near future, discuss the withdrawal of the troops with the 
governments of Britain, Australia and New Zealand.
165 In reply to Tun Razak’s request, the 
British Secretary of Defence, Denis Healey, said that the British military staff would arrive 
in Malaysia within a couple of months in order to negotiate the gradual withdrawal of 
British troops from Sabah and Sarawak.
166 Suharto was successful in achieving mutual 
compromise with Malaysia over the question of British bases, whereas Malik had 
attempted to make a one-sided concession, in order to achieve quick settlement.
167 
 
Malik implied that the issue of self-determination would also be resolved by saying, 
‘[W]ith the holding of general elections in Sabah and Sarawak later, the Malaysian issue 
would be definitely settled’.
168 However, KOGAM had yet to find an entirely satisfactory 
agreement on this issue. In addition, Sukarno was still advocating confrontation with 
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Malaysia: ‘Yet Kuala Lumpur says confrontation has stopped. No, confrontation 
continues’.
169 After the high-level secret meeting, Suharto sent a special courier to Kuala 
Lumpur on 31 July together with a new formula.
170 Suharto ‘proposed to postpone formal 
recognition until the General Elections were held in Sabah and Sarawak’.
171 His proposal 
was accepted by the Malaysian government.
172 In addition, it ‘did help tone down criticism 
at home’.
173   Eventually, the question of self-determination was accommodated and 
stipulated in the final draft of the Peace Agreement between the two countries: Malaysia 
‘agrees to afford the people of Sabah and Sarawak…an opportunity to reaffirm…their 
previous decision about their status in Malaysia’ by general elections.
174 On 11 August 
1966, Malik and Tun Razak signed the Peace Agreement in Jakarta and the longstanding 




Towards regional cooperation 
When the ministerial talks between Indonesia and the Philippines were held (30 April to 1 
May 1966), Adam Malik and Narciso Ramos also discussed matters of regional 
cooperation with Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman.
176 A month later, Thanat talked 
with Malik and Tun Abdul Razak about economic and cultural cooperation including 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand during the bilateral ministerial talks 
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between Malik and Tun Razak (29 May to 1 June 1966).
177 After the Peace Agreement 
between Indonesia and Malaysia was reached on 11 August 1966, the idea of new regional 
cooperation began to crystallise.
178 
 
There was rivalry between Indonesia and Malaysia over how to formalise cooperation. In 
Malaysia, Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman maintained that no new organisation was 
needed because the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), which was established by the 
initiative of Malaya, had already existed.
179 The Tunku said, ‘I am confident that in time 
the membership of [the] ASA will grow and with it, its viability and its aims of promoting 
the economic and social well-being of the people of this region’.
180 Indeed,  Malaysia 
recognised itself as taking a leading role in regional cooperation, because it had achieved 
high economic growth and earned a reputation from the World Bank and the latter’s view 
of the value of its economic development model in the third world.
181 In this context, the 
Tunku encouraged Indonesia to join the ASA.
182  
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Indonesia was willing to collaborate with the countries in the region. In this regard, Adam 
Malik observed that ‘[he] fully agree[d] with the idea of regional cooperation’.
183 However, 
at the same time, Indonesia expressed the opinion that the ASA could not deal with the 
interests of all the countries in Southeast Asia.
184 Indonesia’s opposition to the expansion 
of the ASA stemmed from domestic need: ‘The strongly pro-Western image of the ASA 
could not be reconciled with the ideas of an independent and neutral foreign policy’ of 
Indonesia.
185  Therefore, Indonesia wanted to establish a new regional institution and 
sought to secure a leading role there: ‘We intend to set up a Southeast Asia union for 
economic, cultural, and technical cooperation’.
186  Indeed, Indonesia was proud of its 
leadership role in the third world through the hosting of the Asian-African Conference 
(1955) and achieving a victory in the West Irian Campaign (1962). Therefore, it could not 
afford to appear as a late-comer in an already existing regional organisation. With these 
factors in the background, Indonesia began to develop a new scheme with Thailand.
187 
 
The Philippines had traditionally taken a leading role in regional cooperation. As Onofre D. 
Corpuz, the then Under Secretary of Education of the Philippines and Professor at the 
University of the Philippines, put it:  
 
Soon after independence, many of us [Filipinos] had hoped that the Philippines could make 
a constructive contribution toward understanding in a troubled world by undertaking the 
combined roles of representative of Asia to the West, and the interpreter of the West to 
Asia.
188  
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Elpidio Quirino, the former Philippine President, had hosted the Baguio Conference in 
April 1950, which was the Philippines’ initiative for Asian regional cooperation, composed 
of the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, India, Ceylon, Pakistan and Australia.
189 In 
addition, Philippine President Carlos P. Garcia had been actively involved in the process of 
forming the ASA in 1961 by working with Tunku Abdul Rahman.
190 Furthermore, his own 
successor, Diosdado Macapagal, had proposed Maphilindo in 1963.
191 These  initiatives 
helped the Philippines to establish its place as a leading Asian country, and shake off the 
image of its being an American outpost in Asia.
192 Working towards creating regional 
cooperation was a significant element in Ferdinand Marcos’s presidency as well, although 




In early 1966, the Philippines first propounded the importance of national development and 
peace and stability in the region.
194 In this context, the Philippines declared the possibility 
of reconciliation with Malaysia. President Marcos said, ‘I am certain that our recognition 
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of Malaysia will be accepted by Indonesia in this light’.
195 He also stressed the importance 
of regional harmonisation for the sake of regional prosperity: ‘economic wellbeing of the 
people within the region’ is vital; and to do so, we ‘shall strive to bring together those at 
variance and reconcile their conflicting views in a spirit of mutual accommodation’.
196 
Referring in late May 1966 to the devastating situation in Vietnam, the Philippine 
Ambassador to Kuala Lumpur, Narciso G. Reyes, stated that Southeast Asia should work 
through their differences together for the sake of regional peace and stability.
197 The idea 
of ‘working together beyond difference’ can be seen in these Philippine statements, and it 
came to provide the basis of the philosophy of ASEAN. 
 
The Philippines encouraged Indonesia to join the ASA. In August 1966, Philippine Foreign 
Secretary Narciso Ramos expressed the hope that Burma, Laos, Cambodia and Singapore, 
in addition to Indonesia, would participate in the ASA.
198 However, after the Indonesian 
special envoy, Director-General for Political Affairs of Foreign Office, C. Anwar Sani, 
visited Manila in late March 1967, Ramos began to help to form new regional cooperation, 
so that Indonesia and Malaysia could coexist peacefully.
199 He suggested that Indonesia’s 




Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman also recognised that regional peace was essential to 
promote socio-economic development.
201  He advocated regional solidarity in order to 
protect infiltration from neighbouring Communist countries, such as North Vietnam, Laos, 
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Cambodia and China, saying, ‘some enemy nations are afraid that if we can work together, 
schemes of aggression against us cannot be fulfilled’.
202   At the beginning of the 
discussions on regional cooperation, in May 1966, during the talks between Malik and Tun 
Razak, Thanat Khoman actually encouraged Malik to insist upon Indonesian membership 
in the association.
203   However, Malik declined his suggestion because Indonesia had 
opposed the ASA since its formation and, instead, wanted to establish a new 
organisation.
204 Thanat accepted Indonesia’s position and started to work on forming a new 
organisation with Indonesia.
205 Malik and Thanat met in Bangkok at the end of August 
1966, and issued a Joint statement to this end. They agreed that,  
 
close and mutually beneficial cooperation amongst the countries of the region would be the 
best means to ensure the continued progress and prosperity of their peoples, and at the 
same time it would contribute significantly towards the effects to preserve peace and 
security in the area. They, therefore, agreed on the necessity of taking practical steps in 




A draft of new regional cooperation was completed in late 1966. Its authors then sought 
consent to the plan from other countries in the region.  
 
The movement towards regional cooperation was also facilitated in the context of external 
relations of Southeast Asia. The Vietnam War was intensified by US military action in the 
Gulf of Tonkin in 1964.
207 The West, however, was not a homogenous force at the time; 
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there was disagreement between the US and France over activities towards Vietnam in 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO).
208 Indeed, SEATO was required to reassess 
itself because members’ interests increasingly diverged.
209  
 
Under these circumstances, Thailand, a member of SEATO, felt threatened by a possible 
Communist infiltration from neighbouring countries in Indochina.
210  Furthermore, 
Thailand was suspicious about SEATO’s solidarity against the Communists, because of the 
Organisation’s previous ineffectiveness in addressing Communist power in Laos and 
Vietnam.
211  It advocated regional solidarity in Southeast Asia, rather than relying on 
external military power to prevent Communist infiltration. Thanat Khoman concluded in 
this respect that the Southeast Asian countries ‘…should get together and join hands 




The Philippines also felt threatened by the Communists, but less so than Thailand.
213 The 
former’s view on SEATO was an ambiguous one. On the one hand, Philippine Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs Narciso Ramos hoped that other countries in Southeast Asia would join 
SEATO.
214 On the other hand, he said that because of ‘a grave danger to their security and 
independence’ Asian countries should get together.
215 Ramos stated that the Vietnam War 
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China undertook a successful nuclear test in 1964, and it also developed the hydrogen 
bomb in May 1966.
217 A nuclear-armed China increased the possibility of a Third World 
War with the West, this potentially being triggered by contest over the region. As the 
Malaysian Premier said, ‘China’s emergence as a powerful military force, expressing the 
most militant form of Communism, has made the problem of survival for all the countries 
of Southeast Asia extremely acute’.
218 Speculation was rife among countries in the region 
that the deterioration of the Vietnam War would give rise to a World War III.  This was 
vividly expressed by Tunku Abdul Rahman: 
 
If affairs continue to deteriorate as at present we face the spectre of another world war. … 
We in Malaysia see our role as one of contributing to the stability of Southeast Asia 
through social and economic progress, by carrying out a policy of good will and 




The British announcement of the withdrawal from the ‘East of Suez’ in July 1967 was also 
a large concern for countries in the region.
220  
 
Uncertainty about regional security in Southeast Asia became sharply heightened because, 
as Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman said, countries in the region ‘have relied on 
outside power to save us...and we seem to have abdicated our responsibility for peace 
keeping’.
221 The Philippines and Thailand advocated the idea that the region should work 
together for a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam War.
222 Philippine President Ferdinand 
                                                 
216 The Philippine government sought its new regional leadership in lieu of Maphilindo by advocating the 
Asian solution in the Vietnam War. South China Morning Post, 20 August 1966. 
217 South China Morning Post, 10 May 1966. 
218 Tunku Abdul Rahman, ‘Malaysia’, p. 670.  
219 Ibid.  
220 Yoneji Kuroyanagi, ASEAN 35 Nen no Kiseki, p. 41. 
221 The Bangkok Post, 4 August 1966. 
222 South China Morning Post, 4 August 1966; and South China Morning Post, 20 August 1966. 145 
 
Marcos struck a cooperative tone in arguing that Asians should work together ‘as brothers, 
not at cross purposes but for each other’s prosperity and happiness’.
223 In the course of the 
discussion on an Asian initiative for the Vietnam peace process, a desire for peace and 
harmony was spread among countries in the region. Thanat Khoman said that this desire 
for peace and freedom ‘has driven us to exert efforts to seek a more harmonious 
relationship among our neighbours in Southeast Asia’.
224  
 
While jointly addressing the deteriorated situation in Indochina, the countries in Southeast 
Asia were also gradually recognising the importance of regional harmonisation.
225 In the 
course of developing the regional cooperation plan, which Indonesia and Thailand were 
dealing with,
226 Indonesia showed its restrained and amicable attitude in order to invite 
Malaysia to take part in the proposed plan. Suharto tried to ease the rivalry with Malaysia 
over the plan. He said on the radio at the end of 1966: ‘We must get rid especially of 
arrogance…to make room for a more proper approach based on equality and mutual 
respect’.
227 Indonesia tried to bridge the gap between the proposed organisation and the 
existing ASA by stating that the proposed organisation was the enlarged model of the 
ASA.
228 This comment was intended to be a face-saver for Malaysia, so that Malaysia 
could participate in the new grouping without losing face. Another friendly message was 
conveyed to Malaysia in April by the Indonesian Ambassador to Thailand, Major General 
Achmad Yusuf: ‘We are not opposing any groups that now exist so long as they are 
contributing to the development of the region’.
229  
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However, the Malaysian Premier, Tunku Abdul Rahman, still stuck to the ASA, saying in 
April that: ‘[w]e already have our regional organisation…I don’t see any need for setting 
up another. We have got to make the ASA a success and make it serve our needs before 
embarking on another organisation.... [Indonesia] can come in any time and make it a 
success’.
230 In addition, he did not entirely trust the new Indonesia, and said on his visit to 
Tokyo in October 1966: ‘I trust Malik and Suharto’s words, but it is another matter 
whether or not they can control Indonesia’.
231 Suharto’s power had not yet completely 
eclipsed that of Sukarno at that stage.
232  Furthermore, Suharto’s sluggish reform of 
Indonesia’s polity and economy had been criticised at this time by members of his 
government, such as Adam Malik and General Abdul Haris Nasution. The latter considered 
that this sluggishness might allow Sukarno to seize power afresh.
233 Finally, in February 
1967, Sukarno was forced to hand over all of his presidential power to Suharto. In addition, 
in mid-May of the same year, Sukarno was finally deprived of all of his titles, including the 
Chief of the Army and was expelled from the Presidential palace in Jakarta.
234  
 
The ruthless attitude of the Indonesian government towards Sukarno eased the Tunku’s 
suspicion against Indonesia. Tunku Abdul Rahman soon softened his negative stance on 
new regional cooperation.
235 On 20-21 May 1967, Thanat Khoman held discussions with 
the Tunku in Tokyo regarding the new organisation and finally secured his participation.
236 
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Thanat explained the plan
237 to the Tunku first, among the all leaders in the region, thereby 
placing his status above that of other potential member countries. Thanat said to the Tunku 
that if the latter gave him the green light, then he would talk to other members.
238 The low-
key behaviour of Malik and Thanat, and, in particular Thanat’s actions, satisfied the Tunku, 
who had been proud of holding the leader’s role in the formation of the ASA.
239 The 
Tunku said, ‘Thanat was kind enough to sound us [out] first about this proposal’.
240 The 
Tunku further said, ‘We agree in principle to such an association if it serves the interest of 
the countries in this region’.
241 In reply to the Tunku’s statements, Thanat provided him 
with a face-saving comment at the airport in the following day, ‘[the] new organisation 
will be the expansion and succession of [the] ASA’.
242 On 23 May, Malik and the Tunku 
held a short discussion on the matter at Bangkok airport, in the presence of Thanat.
243 
Malik was on his way to Burma and Cambodia, while the Tunku was going to Tokyo. The 
two had a casual conversation in Malay.
244 During this informal meeting, the Tunku stated 
once again that he approved of the idea of the new organisation and the plan to promote 
regional cooperation for economic well-being.
245 Indeed, as Hoang Anh Tuan describes, 
‘[t]he very formation of ASEAN was…an indication of self-restraint by its members’.
246  
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After the discussion with the Tunku in the airport setting, Malik flew on to Burma and 
Cambodia to invite them to join the proposed organisation.
247 Although Malik got their 
broad support for his plan, he nonetheless failed to persuade them to participate directly.
248 
On 30 May 1967, Malik stopped in Manila on his way back to Indonesia. He and 
Philippine Foreign Secretary announced together that they would call a Foreign Ministerial 
Meeting for new regional cooperation in August.
249 Malik repeated at that time that the 
new organisation would broaden the membership of the ASA.
250 The foreign Ministers of 
five countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, gathered in 
Bangkok on 5 August, and began working on the final draft of the declaration. This 





From ‘antagonising each other’ to ‘working together’ 
The sense of hostility between Indonesia and Malaysia (Malaya) originated in the differing 
views held on nation-building by Sukarno and Tunku Abdul Rahman, and over the 
independence process after World War II.
252 As Sukarno said, Indonesia was unlike other 
nations ‘…which obtained their independence as a gift from imperialists’.
253 The Tunku, 
on the other hand, believed that the Western (British) model of modernisation was the only 
way to stimulate national development.
254  Sukarno remained more sceptical about the 
Western style of development in this regard, and introduced the Indonesian notion 
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democracy (Guided Democracy), based as it was on consultation and consensus.
255 The 
two countries’ entirely different views on nation-building had encouraged bilateral hostility. 
Indeed, ‘Indonesian scepticism about the reality of Malaysia’s independence was grounded 




However, the disparity of the views between the two countries reduced when Suharto came 
to power. The Suharto government shifted Indonesia’s attitude towards world politics 
(anti-Communist and pro-West) and towards the affiliated countries: from aggression 
position to amicability. In addition, it set economic development as its top priority. It 
decided that Indonesia would use foreign aid from Western countries for its economic 
reconstruction.  In this regard, Indonesia, which was isolated from the international 
community during the Sukarno era,
257  quickly needed to return to the international 
community.
258 As a first step for this, Indonesia changed its attitude towards Malaysia and 
abandoned its aggressive confrontation policy. Suharto’s Indonesia took an anti-
Communist stance, and, consequently, its policy direction became closer to that of 
Malaysia. This change enabled the two countries to coexist peacefully in the region for the 
first time in their history. In addition, Foreign Minister Adam Malik advocated that he 
would return to Indonesia’s original foreign policy; an independent and active policy, 
which had been adopted before Indonesia entered the Guided Democracy period.
259 Indeed, 
Suharto’s Indonesia re-embraced Indonesian traditional foreign policy with the spirit of 
tolerance and mutual respect.
260 
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Indonesia and Malaysia worked well together in finally ending their long-standing conflict. 
The bilateral ministerial talks of May 1966 marked the beginning of frequent consultations 
and face-saving behaviour. Their frequent consultations and the successful settlement of 
two controversial issues
261   displayed a spirit of mutual concession and face-saving 
behaviour. Some writers criticised these ministerial talks as a ‘failure’ because they could 
only produce an incomplete agreement after the three-day talks.
262 However, considering 
that the Malaysian government was dissatisfied with Suharto’s unwillingness to take a 
drastic action for the settlement of Konfrontasi since it first began in March 1966,
263 it was 
fruitful for Malaysian leaders to hear the real intentions of the new Indonesian government 
towards the end of the dispute, and to do so in constructive talks with the Indonesian 
Foreign Minister himself.
264 In addition, the visit of the army leaders of Crush Malaysia 
Command (KOGAM) before the bilateral talks also softened Malaysia’s attitude towards a 
peaceful settlement of Konfrontasi: The Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister said after the 
KOGAM’s courtesy visit, ‘Although confrontation is still officially on, the visit of the 
Indonesian Army team shows that it has unofficially ended’.
265  He further said, ‘I am 
confident that talks in Bangkok will be a success’.
266 The Malaysian Prime Minister also 
pointed out, ‘a great demonstration of the Indonesian government’s sincerity to end 
confrontation’.
267   If KOGAM’s visit had not been realised, Malaysia would have 
maintained its unfavourable attitude; consequently, the following ministerial talks would 
have been less productive. KOGAM’s visit and the following ministerial talks surely paved 
the way for rapprochement between the parties concerned. 
 
The new atmosphere of peace and constructiveness between Indonesia and Malaysia 
encouraged other countries in the region to begin to build harmonious relations too. In 
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parallel to the settlement process of Konfrontasi, Malaysia and the Philippines utilised this 
opportunity to achieve a reconciliation, and this, in turn, led to the successful resumption 
of full diplomatic relations on 3 June 1966. Malaysia and the Philippines effectively 
shelved the Sabah issue by agreeing to hold talks in the near future.
268 In late March 1966, 
Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew expressed his intention to reconcile with 
Malaysia, after Singapore’s secession from Malaysia in August 1965 had led to mutual 
hostility:
269 ‘I shall be happy to see the Tunku [Malaysian Prime Minister] for discussions 
to establish sound and good relations and find areas for cooperation’.
270 
 
Indonesia’s refusal to join the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), along with its 
proposal for a new regional organisation, was a sign of recurring antagonism towards 
Malaysia. However, these two countries managed to keep the harmony in the region by 
offering mutual concession. Firstly, there was Malaysia’s strong opposition to Indonesia’s 
leadership in the region. This stemmed from Malaysia’s bitter experience with Konfrontasi. 
In addition, Malaysia had always been apprehensive of the overwhelming size of Indonesia, 
such as the latter’s expansive territory and large population. If Suharto’s Indonesia did not 
leave from the Sukarno era, it would have remained a large threat to Malaysia. Secondly, 
Malaysia’s opposition also stemmed from its pride as a leading player in regional 
cooperation and a founding father of the ASA. Thus, the new organisation, which 
Indonesia was proposing, appeared as a threat to its reputation. 
 
To ameliorate Malaysia’s two main concerns, Suharto demonstrated a low-key attitude. He 
stated that Indonesia should abandon its arrogance and become more restrained in its 
manner. To relieve the Tunku’s doubts about Sukarno’s enduring influence in Indonesian 
politics and in the Indonesian Army, Suharto finally ejected Sukarno from the Presidential 
palace and stripped him of all titles. This publicly affirmed the new attitude towards 
Malaysia. In addition, Indonesia stated that the new organisation would be an enlargement 
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of the ASA and the two organisations could coexist separately. In return, to mirror 
Indonesia’s accommodating attitude, Malaysia acknowledged Indonesia’s sensitivities by 
saying that it would join the new organisation. During the short meeting in Bangkok 
airport just after this, Adam Malik received confirmation from Tun Abdul Razak for 
joining the new organisation.  
 
In the course of the formation process of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), all member states recognised that peace and stability were the only means to 
achieve their goal of socio-economic development.
271  The main purpose of regional 
cooperation therefore became clear, and ASEAN seemed a natural vehicle to provide the 
region with a peaceful environment. As Lyon puts it, development is ‘seen as the twin of 
security, the two together travelling hand in hand’.
272  The position of ASEAN was 
expressed in the ASEAN Declaration.  
 
To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region 
through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the 
foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of South-East Asian Nations.
273 
 
The ASEAN Declaration states that member countries will tolerate different views, so that 
they could work together in the region.
274 In this respect, the establishment of ASEAN was 
the ‘landmark’ of regional political achievement.
275 The ASEAN Declaration can ‘be said 
to represent a more sophisticated view of international affairs which subordinates dogmatic 
theories to practical issues’.
276 In July 1967, a month before the establishment of ASEAN, 
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Mohamed Khir Johani, the Malaysian delegate, expressed his idea about regional 
cooperation at the Second Ministerial Meeting of Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC):
277  
 
States must learn to live not merely in passive co-existence but in active co-operation with 
one another, fully respecting the rights of each to its own independent existence and to its 
own form of political and economic organisation without any external interference.
278 
 
The ASEAN declaration was also a proclamation that its member countries would manage 
regional problems by themselves. It emphasises that they will take the initiative of 
addressing problems in the region rather than relying on their external relations.
279 
Furthermore, the declaration stipulates that each country should strive towards socio-
economic improvement as its ‘primary responsibility’. In addition, the declaration 
underlines each country’s political independence by saying that foreign bases ‘are not 
intended to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom 
of States’. The declaration can be said to represent the desire for self-reliance in the region; 
as Macapagal put it when he launched Maphilindo, ‘Asian declaration of independence’.
280  
 
There had been Western-made organisations in Southeast Asia, such as Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organisation (SEATO) or the Colombo Plan. In addition, more or less all countries 
in ASEAN, except for Indonesia, had relied on external defence ties with the US or Britain. 
Nevertheless, Indonesia and Malaysia were able to settle their conflict without external 
help.
281  In early May 1966, when the Japanese government offered to accommodate 
Konfrontasi, the Indonesian Foreign Minister said that Indonesia and Malaysia were able 
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to solve it without any mediator.
282  Two weeks later, just before the ministerial talks 
between Indonesia and Malaysia in Bangkok, American Secretary of State Dean Rusk also 
said, ‘[Indonesia and Malaysia] are likely to be able to resolve these matters better without 
us than with us, and we are perfectly prepared to cheer from the sidelines on something 
like this and wish them well’.
283   The success of peaceful settlement encouraged 
neighbouring countries to solve other pending regional problems by themselves, which is 
represented by the oft-repeated slogan in the region: ‘Asian solutions for Asian problems’ 
which Adam Malik also advocated when he signed the peace agreement with Malaysia.
284 
Indeed, as Thanat Khoman put it,  
 
The main motivation which has promoted Asian nations to strengthen regional co-
operation lies in their common desire to assume greater responsibility in regard to Asian 




Another element of the backdrop to regional initiative stemmed from the reaction to the 
frustrating standstill in Vietnam. The Philippines and Thailand sought a mediator’s role to 
peacefully settle the Vietnam War in 1966. Philippine Foreign Secretary Narciso Ramos 
proposed a regional solution, according to the reiterated rally cry, ‘Asian solutions by 
Asians’ and said: ‘We will now approach only Asian countries with a view of trying to find 
a peaceful settlement to the Vietnam War... Maybe we will create a better impression if 
fellow Asians approach Hanoi’.
286  Singaporean Premier Lee Kuan Yew proposed that 
countries in Southeast Asia should guide China to cooperate with neighbouring countries 
rather than sharply antagonising it; and this was supported by Malaysia and Thailand.
287 
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The idea of regional solutions for regional problems was inspired not only by the 




Suharto’s rise to power brought drastic change to Indonesia. His government drew 
Indonesia back to the international community by ending its confrontational attitude 
towards Malaysia and Britain. It also showed its willingness to work together with 
neighbouring countries for the sake of peace and prosperity. The Philippines, on the other 
hand, arrived at rapprochement with Malaysia without making any decision about the 
treatment of Sabah. These changes encouraged countries in Southeast Asia to form a new 
regional organisation, ASEAN. In this period, ASEAN countries’ policies were subsumed 
into one: socio-economic well-being was the major objective, and peace and stability 
seemed essential to achieve that objective. Another major development of this period was 
the maintenance of a sense of regional responsibility for regional affairs, after 1963, when 
Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines signed the Manila agreements. These two major 
issues were officially recognised and enshrined in the foundation document of ASEAN 
(The ASEAN Declaration) as its major objectives. 
 
A specific form of behaviour was observed during this period: In the first half of this 
period, when Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines proceeded in the reconciliatory 
process, Indonesia and Malaysia had negotiations in a face-saving manner. In addition, 
Malaysia and the Philippines shelved the Sabah territorial issue; the latter half includes the 
formation process of ASEAN, consultations in a face-saving fashion, and mutual 
concession. The potential member states of ASEAN were encouraged to draw closer 




THE CORREGIDOR AFFAIR 
 
  
The so-called Corregidor affair occurred in March 1968, just seven months after the 
establishment of ASEAN. Contrary to the harmonious and amicable mood at the 
inauguration of ASEAN, Malaysia and the Philippines again plunged into a state of 
antagonism over the dominion of Sabah. To make matters worse, this bilateral dispute 
drove the Association into a dysfunctional state. However, other ASEAN member 
countries took a conciliatory approach and successfully prevented the disintegration of the 
organisation. The antagonism between the two countries was substantially soothed when 
Malaysia and the Philippines sat at the same table at the ASEAN ministerial dinner in 
Thailand in December 1968. This chapter argues that the Corregidor affair is the most 
significant event for the early stages of ASEAN’s existence, especially because of the 
distinctive settlement style used to resolve the dispute. From this point of view, it 
elaborates on the mediation process and identifies the specific ideas and practices of 
ASEAN members which exemplify the ‘ASEAN Way’.  
 
 
The killings in the Corregidor Island 
The Corregidor affair was the recurrence of the territorial dispute between Malaysia and 
the Philippines over Sabah, the northern part of the Island of Borneo.
1  When the two 
countries agreed to rapprochement in June 1966, they, in fact, shelved the dispute over the 
dominion of Sabah, instead of seeking a complete solution. The recurrence of the territorial 
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dispute was triggered by killings on Corregidor, a small island in the Philippines, located at 
the entrance of the Manila Bay.
2  The account of the killing was published in local 
newspapers on 21 March 1968. Although there were no clear details of the incident,
3 at 
least several recruits were killed during a training of the Special Forces, according to these 
articles.
4 The Special Forces were formed in 1967 in order to infiltrate Sabah and were 
composed of Muslim recruits.
5  They were trained on the Corregidor Island, where the 
killings occurred. 
 
The Liberal Party, the party in opposition to the Philippine President, Ferdinand Marcos, 
used this issue to attack the Marcos administration. It cross-examined Marcos in Congress 
regarding the background of the killing and the aim of the Muslim’s military training on 
the island.
6 What actually happened, however, was controversial, as the source of 
information for it was a recruit who had escaped and was provided with a safe haven by 
the opposition Liberals. The government changed its explanation repeatedly and eventually 
recognised the existence of Special Forces whose purpose was to infiltrate Sabah.
7 
 
In addition, the Liberals were able to attract attention to the issue of the Sabah dominion. 
The opposition criticised Marcos for not clarifying the future of Sabah when his office had 
reached a rapprochement with Malaysia in June 1966.
8 At the beginning of his tenure in 
early 1966, President Marcos advocated the good-neighbour policy and undertook 
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reconciliation with Malaysia.
9  He placed national development as a top priority and 
recognised that regional peace was essential for the country to focus its development 
policies.
10 In this context, he stated in February 1966 his intention to settle differences with 
Malaysia: ‘We have, therefore, taken the first steps leading to the normalisation of our 
relations with Malaysia’.
11   
 
Marcos’s new policy had been welcomed by the Malaysian government and prompted 
Malaysia and the Philippines to resume full diplomatic relations on 3 June 1966.
12
 They did 
not clarify the future of Sabah in the Joint Statement at that time. Instead, they stated ‘the 
need of sitting down together, as soon as possible, for the purpose of clarifying the claim 
and discussing means of settling it to the satisfaction of both parties’.
13 In the domestic 
realm, the Sabah claim was important for Marcos, as it was for the former President 
Diosdado Macapagal, because it helped the development of the Philippine identity, with an 
attendant symbolic and ‘self-assertive Philippine nationalism’.
14 At that time, the Sabah 
dispute was also the significant factor influencing the result of the presidential election in 
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Reaction from Kuala Lumpur  
The government in Kuala Lumpur was extremely sensitive to the Philippines’ claim to 
Sabah because Sabah was not politically stable due to smouldering dissatisfaction, mainly 
from Muslim groups advocating independence.
16 The Malaysian government did not want 
a resurfacing of the Philippines’ claim to Sabah. In addition, Malaysia’s general election 
was scheduled for the following year, and therefore the Malaysian government needed to 
avoid the political disturbance at home as well as with the Philippines. Nevertheless, once 
the issue was raised in the mass media, the Malaysian government was forced to take a 
strong position. It quickly sent a formal protest to Manila just two days after the news, 
despite the fact that the incident was not clearly identified. Malaysia’s protest re-ignited the 
territorial dispute.  
 
The Malaysian government maintained that the territorial dispute over Sabah had already 
been solved in September 1963 by the United Nations investigation, which was performed 
according to the Manila agreements of 1963.
17 United Nations Secretary-General U Thant 
had, after all, announced on 14 September 1963 that the people in Sabah were in favour of 
joining the Federation of Malaysia. Therefore, Malaysia said that there was no room for 
negotiation over the matter; and it emphasised keeping harmony in the region by quoting 
the Manila Accord of 1963: 
 
[T]he Ministers agreed that in the event of North Borneo [Sabah] joining the proposed 
Federation of Malaysia the government of the latter and the government of the Philippines 
should maintain and promote the harmony and the friendly relations subsisting in their 
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Tempering an international dispute 
The Philippine government, on the other hand, insisted that the issue of Sabah should be 
solved legally because the issue had merely been ‘shelved’ in 1966 for the sake of regional 
peace and stability. It quoted paragraph 8 of the Manila Joint Statement of 1963. 
 
The three Heads of government take cognisance of the position regarding the Philippine 
claim to Sabah (North Borneo), after the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia as 
provided under paragraph 12 of the Manila Accord that is, that the inclusion of Sabah 
(North Borneo) in the Federation of Malaysia, does not prejudice either the claim or any 
right thereunder.
19    
 
Philippine Foreign Secretary Narciso Ramos said, ‘We still hope that the dispute can be 
settled by peaceful means in accordance with the agreement reached between our two 
countries’.
20  According to the agreement of 3 June 1966, both governments agreed to 
‘abide by the Manila Accord…and with the Joint Statement accompanying it, for the 
peaceful settlement of the Philippines’ claim to Sabah’.
21  The Philippine government 
proposed that the issue should be resolved in the International Court or the United 
Nations,
22 as directed by the Manila Joint Statement of 1963: that the Sabah claim should 
be solved ‘by means of negotiations, conciliation and arbitration, judicial settlement, or 
other peaceful means of the Parties’ own choice in conformity with the Charter of the 
United Nations’.
23   
 
Two months after the incident, Malaysia sought mediation through ASEAN.
24 However, as 
the Singaporean Foreign Minister, S. Rajaratnam, stated in opposition to this: ‘[I]t is 
important that issues not relevant to the Association are not brought in’.
25 The  other 
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ASEAN countries were reluctant to get involved in a bilateral issue for fear that the dispute 
might plunge the Association into crisis. When Thai Prime Minister Thanom Kttikachorn 
talked with Malaysian Premier Tunku Abdul Rahman on 8 June 1968,
26 Thanom promised 





Thailand organised bilateral talks in Bangkok, and these began on 17 June 1968. In the 
opening address, Ghazali Shafie, the Permanent Secretary of External Affairs of Malaysia, 
proposed a political conciliation for the sake of the development of ASEAN by saying, 
‘[W]hatever the temporary and limited difficulties, we…are firmly resolved that larger 
interests and deeper ties which united our two peoples will always prevail’.
28 On the other 
hand, Gauttier Bisnar, the Philippine representative, stated that the Philippines would seek 
a definite settlement by legal means: ‘We are not in this Conference Hall to find the best 
means of settling the Philippines’ claim over Sabah. The Philippine government believes 
that of all the modes of settlement enumerated in the Manila Accord of 1963, judicial 
settlement, i.e., submittal of the case to the World Court is the most just and expeditious’.
29   
 
Thailand and Indonesia stressed the importance of working together in ASEAN despite 
their differences, and did so in the First Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Civil 
Aviation of ASEAN, which was held during the bilateral talks between Malaysia and the 
Philippines. Thanat Khoman, the Thai Foreign Minister, stated in this connection that:  
 
[The Ad Hoc Committee on Civil Aviation] is only one aspect of regional cooperation. It is 
but one of the multidimensions in which we of ASEAN countries have yet to learn to live 
together, to work together and to prosper together. But if we put our heads together, 
notwithstanding the minor differences that may exist among us, we would ultimately be 
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able to reap the benefits of our joint endeavours and to harvest and enjoy together the fruits 
of our common labour.
30 
 
The representative of the Indonesian delegation responded in the following way: ‘[I]nternal 
differences among ourselves can equally be detrimental to the future of ASEAN. It is our 
ardent hope and wish, that such differences, if any, could and should be solved in the 
ASEAN spirit as members of the same family’.
31  
 
However, the Bangkok talks failed to bring agreement because neither side was willing to 
make any significant concession to the other in the course of the month-long talks. 
Malaysia was in a stronger position than the Philippines because their mutual agreement 
was required for the dispute if the issue would be filed in the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ).
32 The Philippine government was irritated by the Malaysian government’s obstinate 
questioning of the basis for its claim to Sabah.
33 Eventually, it stopped answering these 
questions. Consequently, on 16 July the Malaysian representatives walked out of the 
conference room saying that Malaysia rejected the Philippine claim to Sabah. The 
Philippine government was offended by Malaysia’s arrogant behaviour.
34 It announced the 
withdrawal of all but one official from its embassy in Kuala Lumpur. The relationship 
between the two countries became worse than it had been before the talks.  
 
 
The Jakarta agreement 
The second ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) was held in early August 1968 in Jakarta. 
In his opening address, Tun Abdul Razak, the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister, stressed 
                                                 
30 Thanat Khoman, Opening address of The First Meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on Civil Aviation of 
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31 The representative of the Indonesian delegation (The name is unknown), Statement at the Opening 
Ceremony of The First Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Civil Aviation of ASEAN, 25 June 1968, in 
Foreign Affairs Bulletin, 7/6 (June-July 1968), pp. 542-543.  
32 Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 July 1968, p. 103. 
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the importance of shelving differences for the sake of ASEAN’s solidarity by saying: 
‘[L]et us not allow any differences between any of us to detract us from the more important 
responsibility of ensuring the peace and progress of our region’.
35 Singapore’s Rajaratnam 
argued that ‘[w]e were convinced that the only alternative to regional cooperation was 
economic stagnation and political disaster that we decided to support the concept of 
ASEAN’.
36 Adam Malik, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, said, ‘It is my sincere hope that 
by continuing this close cooperation we have started, we will attain the prosperity as well 
as stability in this region’.
37   While the ministers expressed their fear of possible 
dysfunction, or perhaps even the collapse, of ASEAN, Philippine Foreign Secretary 
Narciso Ramos continued to push the claim for Sabah in hope of ASEAN’s mediation by 
arguing: 
 
[This meeting] provides us with the opportunity to reiterate our solidarity, our persistence 
and determination to make ASEAN the effective and articulate vehicle for the pursuit of 
our common objectives. But…we cannot and dare not ignore the fact that at the present 




In his closing remarks, Ramos reiterated his expectation of ASEAN’s active engagement in 
the bilateral dispute: ‘[T]he stresses and strains between us should not be left unattended in 
the expectation that they will just disappear’.
39  
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36 S. Rajaratnam, Opening Statement at the Second ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Jakarta, 6 August 1968, in 
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While the AMM was in progress, Tun Razak and Ramos had informal talks in Jakarta on 
the evening of 6 August 1968.
40 After the failure of the Bangkok talks, Indonesia secretly 
began to work for the initiation of bilateral talks without making any official 
announcement.
41 Although the talks were reportedly arranged by Adam Malik, it is not 
clear whether he himself attended.
42 After just one hour of these talks, the two countries 
had already reached a modest agreement.
43 Firstly, they would behave in a restrained way 
towards each other and maintain a diplomatically quiet relationship (the so-called ‘cooling-
off’ period).
44  Then, after a certain period of quiet, they would begin negotiations for 
reconciliation.
45   Details of the negotiation process were not publicised – and no 
information on the negotiation process was published; not even regarding who proposed 




The Annexation Law and the further deterioration of relations 
The Jakarta agreement was soon jeopardised by the so-called Annexation Law of the 
Philippines. The Philippine government began to re-examine its existing Base Line Act of 
1961, prompted to do so by a notification from the United Nations,
47 according to which, 
all waters between the islands of the Philippine archipelago were to be recognised as 
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41 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN, p. 169. 
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43 Suharto was said to arrange the bilateral talks and proposed the agreement, i.e. behaving restrainedly with 
each other and establishing the cooling-off period. See Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN, p. 169.   
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international waters in the existing Base Line Act.
48 Philippine Senator Arturo Tolontino, 
who had drawn up the draft of the Act of 1961, tabled the new bill in the upper house so 
that future delineation would not be prejudiced in case the Philippines should acquire 
Sabah.
49 The Philippines believed that it had the right ‘… to continue to pursue [the claim 
to Sabah] in accordance with international law…’ even after the formation of Malaysia in 
1963.
50   However, the House of Representatives amended the new bill in a more 
provocative fashion: Sabah was marked as a part of the Philippines. The Malaysian 
government warned that the amendment ‘…cannot but be regarded as a provocation and a 
hostile act and as a violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Malaysia’.
51 
Nevertheless, the amended bill was passed in the lower house on 26 August 1968. 
President Marcos finally signed it, and the Annexation Law was issued on 18 September.  
 
On 20 September, Malaysia broke off diplomatic relations with the Philippines with the 
support of the United States, which announced that it would recognise Sabah as a part of 
Malaysia.
52 In addition, all other ASEAN members – Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore – 
also announced their support for Malaysia.
53 Although President Marcos strongly protested 
against the US’s announcement, the Philippine government softened its attitude and 
notified several countries such as Japan, Australia and New Zealand that it did not intend 
to begin a war with Malaysia.
54  
 
                                                 
48 Ibid.  
49 Ibid, p. 179.  
50 The Manila Accord, 11 June 1963, in Department of Foreign Affairs, Australia (ed.), Malaysia, pp. 140-
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51 Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 October 1968, p. 116. 
52 Asahi Shimbun, Evening edition, 20 September 1968. 
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While he had signed the Annexation law, Marcos nonetheless proposed Summit talks with 
Malaysia.
55 The Philippines sought a mediator, such as Japan or the United Nations itself, 
from outside of ASEAN because it could not secure sympathy from its ASEAN 
colleagues.
56  On 24 September 1968, the Philippine government asked the Japanese 
Foreign Minister, Takeo Miki, to hold bilateral talks with Malaysia in Tokyo in October.
57 
Malaysia agreed to the Philippines’ proposal.
58 The ministerial talks were scheduled for 22 
October in Tokyo, and were to be followed by a bilateral Summit meeting. In the 
meantime, President Marcos requested that his Foreign Secretary Ramos would ask U 
Thant, the Secretary-General of the UN, to mediate in the issue.
59   
 
The Philippines put the issue forward for a Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General 
Assembly.
60 In his speech of 15 October, Ramos raised the claim for Sabah and insisted on 
filing it with the ICJ declaring: 
 
I hereby make the reservation and put it on record that the Philippine government cannot 
and does not recognise the power, competence or authority of the government of the 
Federation of Malaysia to represent or speak for the people of the Territory of Sabah or to 
make any commitment for them before the United Nations or any of its organs, 
organisations, committees, agencies or conferences.
61 
 
Malaysia was outraged by this statement.
62  The following day, Radakrishna Ramani, 
Malaysia’s permanent representative to the UN, responded to Ramos’s speech: ‘Both in 
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fact and in law the Philippine claim to Sabah does not exist, is unsustainable and is…a 
composite of fantasy, fallacy and fiction’.
63 The Philippine government resented Ramani’s 
statement. The heated exchange continued until 25 October in the General Assembly.  
 
The scheduled ministerial talks in Tokyo were unilaterally cancelled by Malaysia.
64 Tun 
Abdul Razak said, ‘If I go to Tokyo I will go as the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia of 
which Sabah is a constituent part. This is my position and my position must be recognised 
as such’.
65  Malaysia declared that it could not work together with the Philippines in 
ASEAN. It notified the Philippines on 2 November 1968 that a proposed ASEAN 
conference on mass media was to be suspended indefinitely.
66 This was the first case in 
which the integrity of the Association was jeopardised by the bilateral conflict between its 
member countries. Malaysia stated once again at the beginning of December that it could 
not work together with the Philippines in ASEAN, and it would not attend any conference 
in the Association because the latter did not recognise Malaysia’s sovereignty in Sabah.
67 
The Malaysian Premier said that ASEAN’s future depended on the progress of the Sabah 
issue.    
 
 
Towards re-establishing the Jakarta agreement 
With the bilateral issue being linked to the Association, Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam 
Malik on 1 November formally offered to mediate the conflict between Malaysia and the 
Philippines. It is noteworthy that this was the first time ASEAN member countries publicly 
expressed their willingness to mediate an internal dispute. He suggested that it should be 
dealt within ASEAN by saying, ‘[W]e do not want to monopolise the role of mediator. We 
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give other ASEAN members the opportunity to’.
68 However, Thailand was still reluctant to 
deal with the Sabah issue in the Association: ‘We do not want to be involved in any way 
with Sabah. We do not gain anything from it’.
69 
 
General Ali Murtopo, a personal assistant of Indonesian President Suharto, spent one day 
in Manila in late October 1968, after which he visited Tokyo, where the Philippine Foreign 
Secretary was visiting.
70 Thus, Indonesia presumably secured the Philippines’ consent to 
shelve the claim to Sabah, on the condition of ‘Manila’s right to continue to pursue the 
claim’.
71  Two pieces of evidence support this assumption. First, on 30 October, the 
Philippine Foreign Minister informally told the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister that the 
Philippines’ claim to Sabah was a ‘non-starter’ and would be partitioned in the negotiation 
for rapprochement.
72 Second, on the following day Philippine President Marcos ordered 
the changing of the colour of the area of Sabah on the relief map in Luneta Park in 
Manila
73 so that Sabah could be shown not as Philippine territory, but as a neutral area.
74   
 
In late November 1968, Imron Rosjadi, the chairman of the Indonesian Parliamentary 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security, visited the ASEAN countries to ask 
the view on the restoration of the Jakarta agreement. He said, ‘A cooling-off period is not 
impossible and I am not pessimistic. But of course there must be goodwill on both sides 
and the other three ASEAN countries must help’.
75 Imron Rosjadi also went to Manila and 
encouraged Ramos to withdraw the claim so that Malaysia and the Philippines could work 
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together in ASEAN.
76 On 6 December, the Philippine government formally announced that 
a ‘moratorium’ would be placed on its claim over Sabah, until the general election in 
Malaysia in the following May.
77 
 
A series of concessions by the Philippines eased Malaysia’s inflexible attitude, and 
facilitated the restoration of the Jakarta agreement. The Thai government, although it had 
earlier stated that it did not want ASEAN to be involved in the bilateral dispute, organised 
an informal dinner among ASEAN foreign ministers on 13 December in Bangsen, 
Thailand, to coincide with the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) 
that was being held at the same location. Both countries agreed to the restoration of the 
agreement in Jakarta. As such, they would behave with restraint towards each other and re-
establish the ‘cooling-off’ period. In addition, the Philippine Foreign Secretary said that he 
recognised Malaysia’s de facto sovereignty over Sabah.
78  At the end of the informal 
meeting, Tun Abdul Razak read a statement:  
 
An understanding has been reached among the ministers in regard to the differences 
between the Philippines and Malaysia which is being submitted for approval to the two 
governments concerned…Before the commencement of the talks, His Excellency Mr. 
Narciso Ramos, the Foreign Secretary of the Philippines, assured us in the presence of the 




With the Philippines temporarily dropping its claim, the agreement was kept until the 
Presidential election in the Philippines in November 1969. In the meantime, in late May 
1969, the meeting of ASEAN Secretaries General in Bogor, Indonesia was held 
successfully, with the presence of all ASEAN countries. Malaysia and the Philippines 
resumed diplomatic relations just after the Presidential election in November, and they 
finally announced rapprochement on 13 December 1969 in the third ASEAN Ministerial 
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Meeting in the Cameron Highlands, Malaysia; one year after the Bangsen talks. Ministers 
in ASEAN member countries reaffirmed the importance of ASEAN cooperation for peace 
and economic well-being in the region in its Joint Communiqué: 
 
[In] the course of deliberation[s], an atmosphere of cordial friendship and understanding 
prevailed and, cognisant of the common interests and common goal of member countries, 
the Ministers reaffirmed their determination to fulfil and to realise the laudable aims and 
purposes of the ASEAN Declaration in order to ensure peace and prosperity for all the 
peoples in the region. Renewed determination was expressed to strengthen further the 
Organisation, and to take vigorous action to implement the projects which have been 




The significance of the Corregidor affair 
Acharya argues that the Corregidor affair was formative to the emergence of the ASEAN 
Way. In his book, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, he writes that 
‘the Sabah dispute is an important milestone in ASEAN’s early approach to conflict 
avoidance and was indicative of what was to be known later as the ASEAN Way of 
conflict management’.
81 Although he refers to the ministerial dinner in Bangsen, his focus 
is more on the ASEAN committee in May 1969. He says, ‘It was an ASEAN committee 
meeting in Indonesia in May 1969 which brought the two countries together for the first 
time in eight months with the exception of an ad hoc foreign ministers meeting in 
December 1968’.
82  He attributes the reconciliation to the agreements reached at the 
ASEAN committee meeting, rather than the informal meeting in Bangsen in December 
1968. 
 
However, it should be noted that Indonesia’s secret mediation, which formally re-
established the Jakarta agreement at the meeting in Bangsen in December 1968,
83 
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contributed to easing the bilateral tension between Malaysia and the Philippines. Although 
the Philippine government did not formally state anything, at that stage it had substantially 
dropped the claim to Sabah. Furthermore, in the course of setting up the meeting in 
Bangsen, and also during the meeting itself, none of the ASEAN leaders did refer to the 
Sabah issue. This also helped the two states involved to shelve the problem. Although 
ASEAN’s formal activity resumed on 29 May 1969, when the meeting of the Head of the 
ASEAN National Secretariats in Bogor of Indonesia was held,
84 the meeting in Bangsen in 
December 1968 did pave the way for the restoration of diplomatic relations between the 
two countries.  
 
During the meeting at Bangsen, Malaysia’s representatives sat at the same table as those 
from the Philippines, even though the former had insisted in October 1968 that it would 
never attend any meeting with the Philippines if the latter would keep sticking to the Sabah 
claim.
85   The meeting over dinner was successful because the conflict had been 
substantially settled beforehand through Indonesia’s informal accommodation.
 86  
 
At first, the ASEAN states did not publicly show their willingness to be involved in the 
bilateral dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines. They feared that such a dispute 
would become a stumbling block to ASEAN’s activities.
87 Thailand, the organiser of the 
Bangkok talks, was engaged neither in the negotiation process, nor in the talks per se. In 
the opening address of the talks, Chitti Sucharitkul, the Thai Under-Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, seemed to suggest that the Thai government would remain uninvolved in 
the talks: ‘I have the honour and pleasure…to offer you this house, Pisanuloke House, as 
the venue of your meeting. There will be some Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials here. If 
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you would want the facility, it will be offered to you’.
88 In contrast to this example, after 
the failure of the Bangkok talks in July 1968, Indonesia started secret involvement in the 
bilateral issue, and provided the two countries concerned with a place for more informal 
discussions in Jakarta in the following month. Furthermore, Indonesia laboured secretly to 
persuade the Philippines to drop the claim to Sabah before the meeting in Bangsen in 
December 1968.  
 
It should be noted that informality appeared as a characteristic of the process of the Jakarta 
agreement in August 1968, when Indonesia became secretly involved in the informal talks 
between the two countries.
89 Details of the formation process of the agreement as well as 
the bilateral talks were not published. However, considering the fact that the Jakarta 
agreement was reached in the course of a one-hour talk, it is wise to assume that the draft 
of the agreement had been negotiated before the meeting between Malaysia and the 
Philippines through secret negotiations.  
 
Informality was also a characteristic of the negotiation process leading up to the meeting in 
Bangsen in December 1968, where Malaysia and the Philippines re-established the Jakarta 
agreement. Just after Indonesian emissary Ali Murtopo secretly contacted the Philippine 
government in the late October of 1968,
90 the latter indirectly showed a more 
accommodating attitude; an example of this being the earlier-mentioned recolouring of the 
relief map in Luneta Park, Manila.
91 Another of such an approach was the informal 
statement issued by Philippine Foreign Secretary Narciso Ramos that the claim to Sabah 
was ‘non-starter’.
92 The Philippines’ concessive actions were informal ones, releasing the 
tensions that had grown between the two countries, and providing Malaysia with a face-
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saving measure in order to allow it to return to the negotiating table with the Philippines at 
the meeting in Bangsen. The informal actions also helped the Philippines itself to 
substantially drop the claim to Sabah without losing face. 
 
The Philippines’ decision of one-sided concession was, as Collins points out, ‘[ASEAN] 
members [being] prepared to defer their own interests to the interests of the association’.
93 
As a reward for the Philippines’ act of generosity, ASEAN made no reference to the 
treatment of Sabah at the dinner in Bangsen.
94 There was also no reference to the future of 
Sabah in the statement issued at the third ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in 
December 1969, which marked the formal end of the Corregidor affair: ‘[I]t was agreed 
that diplomatic relations between Malaysia and the Philippines would be normalised 
forthwith and that the ambassadors of their respective countries would be appointed. The 
Meeting warmly welcomed this happy development’.
95 Indeed, as Thanat Khoman said 
just before the dinner, ‘Diplomatic moves have to be made without Press publicity’.
96  
 
ASEAN strengthened its solidarity through the mediation process of the Corregidor affair.  
During the dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines, other member countries 
advocated ‘working together in ASEAN’.
97 As Tunku Abdul Rahman put it, the member 
countries’ concern to ‘save ASEAN from landing on the rock’.
98  
 
The Association was established with the agreement that peace and stability in the region 
should be maintained so that member countries could focus socio-economic development 
at home. When the summit talks between Malaysia and Thailand were held on 8 June 1968, 
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the two leaders emphasised ‘the need for the maintenance of friendship between member 
countries of ASEAN, and for the peace and well-being of the countries of this region’.
99 
Malaysian Permanent Secretary of External Affairs Ghazali Shafie warned ASEAN not to 
indulge in differences by saying, ‘To allow ourselves to be distracted from our tasks 
[nation-building and economic development] is a moral abdication of our responsibilities 
and will only be to the benefit of destructive and negative elements’.
100ASEAN states were 
worried about the association’s future throughout the Corregidor affairs, and this 
apprehension made them realise afresh the importance of harmonisation for the sake of 
their common aim. Therefore, they recognised that they should ignore small differences 
and work together. Indeed, Malaysia and the Philippines restored diplomatic relations 
‘because of the great value Malaysia and the Philippines placed on ASEAN’.
101   
 
It is noteworthy that ASEAN was able to manage to settle the Sabah dispute through its 
own actions. This dispute had been the most sensitive issue between the two countries and, 
to some extent, between all ASEAN countries.
102 As Acharya puts it, ‘The avoidance of 
any further escalation of the Sabah dispute was all the more significant’.
103 Thus, ASEAN 
‘has served as a modest vehicle for the reduction of tension among its members. The 
dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines has not had the same debilitating effect on 
ASEAN as it had on [the] ASA.’
104 In the settlement process, member countries would 
recognise again the philosophy of ASEAN that they should do their best to keep peace and 
harmony in the Association for the sake of their own socio-economic development. 
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Concluding remarks 
The Corregidor affair turned out to be a most significant event in the history of the ASEAN 
Way. It resulted in the production of a number of statements from several ASEAN 
members; statements which advocated the use of the now-familiar idea of ‘working 
together beyond difference’. During the dispute, other ASEAN members emphasised the 
importance of ‘working together in ASEAN’ for the sake of peace and prosperity in the 
region as a whole. Considering peace and prosperity were, and remain, the major 
objectives of ASEAN cooperation, it became clear that the idea of ‘working together’ 
results in the promotion of regional cooperation, and it can be identified as the essence of 
the ASEAN Way.
105 To go on working together constructively, specific practices therefore 
became characteristic features of ASEAN.  ‘Informality’ and ‘consultations’, and ‘face-
saving’ were often employed in the course of making and re-establishing the Jakarta 
agreement. Finally, the Sabah issue, for which there was no compromise between Malaysia 
and the Philippines, was shelved without the announcement of an official solution.
                                                 




THE NATURE OF THE ASEAN WAY 
 
 
This chapter explores the nature of the ASEAN way, based on the interactions between the 
countries in the region, discussed in the previous chapters. The chapter begins by dealing 
with two points: (1) whether or not traditional culture in the region is a major element in 
the ASEAN Way, and (2) whether or not the universal principle of non-interference is a 
component in it. The chapter argues that the custom of consultation was influenced by 
traditional cultural precepts in the region, and the cultural factor has regularly helped to 
alleviate tensions between member countries. The chapter also argues that the principle of 
non-interference does not directly form the characteristics of the ASEAN Way. Rather, it 
facilitated ASEAN cooperation. The chapter then goes on to argue that the ASEAN Way 
as a concept forged four conventions. Finally, it clarifies the relationship between the 
ASEAN Way and ASEAN cooperation.   
         
 
The ASEAN Way and traditional culture  
As reviewed in Chapter 1, the answer to the question of whether or not the ASEAN Way is 
strongly rooted in traditional culture remains unclear in the existing literature. Through 
case studies discussed in the previous chapters, here we conclude that cultural affinity 
helped to reduce tensions between countries in Southeast Asia. In particular, cultural 
commonality between the so-called Malay countries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia and the 
Philippines, was emphasised. In the Manila Accord in 1963, the three countries announced 
their willingness to work together based on ‘Malay origin[s]’.
1 Malayan Prime Minister 
Tunku Abdul Rahman paid an informal call on Indonesian President Sukarno in the latter’s 
hotel room just before the opening of the Manila Summit meeting (31 July 1963). The 
                                                 
1 The Manila Accord, 11 June 1963, in Department of Foreign Affairs, Australia (ed.), Malaysia, pp. 140-142. 177 
 
Tunku’s gesture, based on Malay culture, was accepted by Sukarno and it obviously 
reduced the hostility between the two leaders.
2 Similar behaviour, based on the same 
Malay custom, could be seen in May of the same year, when the Tunku saw Sukarno off at 
Haneda airport in Tokyo after the two had conducted a heart-to-heart informal meeting.
3  
 
In the course of the settlement of the regional dispute over Malaysia in 1966, the 
Indonesian Army leaders of Crush Malaysia Command (KOGAM) paid a courtesy visit to 
the Malaysian government just before the Indonesia-Malaysia ministerial conference on 
reconciliation in June. Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak said, ‘We can 
look confidently to the ending of confrontation [Konfrontasi] and building of peace and 
friendship with Indonesia’,




On 23 May 1967, when the Indonesian Foreign Minister and the Malayan Deputy Prime 
Minister held a short meeting at the airport in Bangkok in the course of the formation of 
ASEAN, they first had a chat in Malay.
6 The meeting was held just after Malaysia had 
accepted the Indonesian plan for the new regional organisation (later taking shape as 
ASEAN), which Malaysia had consistently refused until then. Therefore, this informal 
meeting can be interpreted as a confirmation of the two countries’ willingness to work 
together in regional cooperation. The aim of the conversation was unpublished, but it 
marked the end of the rivalry over the initiative to form a regional organisation. A 
language in common helped the reconciliation process.   
 
                                                 
2 See Chapter 3. 
3 See Chapter 3. 
4 The Straits Times, 28 May 1966. 
5 See Chapter 4. 
6 The Straits Times, 24 May 1967. 178 
 
Musyawarah (consultation) and mufakat (consensus) in Malay custom had been 
particularly highlighted as being the tools of conflict management.
7 The three countries of 
Maphilindo employed the traditional style of accommodation and named it ‘Musyawarah 
Maphilindo’.
8 In the Joint Statement between Indonesia and the Philippines in March 1966, 
issued towards the end of the three-way conflict between Indonesia, Malaysia and the 
Philippines,
9 the two ministers agreed to address problems by ‘more frequent exchanges of 
visits by Indonesians and Filipinos representing all fields of activity, and of consultations 
on common problems in the spirit of musyawarah and good neighbourliness’.
10 
 
Just after the collapse of the reconciliation talks in Bangkok on the Sabah issue in July 
1968,
11 Indonesia, as argued earlier,
12 succeeded in arranging the Jakarta agreement 
between Malaysia and the Philippines. Considering that their talks in Jakarta were 
concluded successfully in just an hour, whereas the month-long talks in Bangkok had 
failed to reach any agreement, it can be inferred that Indonesia, as a mediator, had 
informally developed the agreement plan in advance by contacting the two countries 
separately and secretly.
13 This mediation process reminds us of musyawarah and mufakat, 
which are characterised by behind-the-scenes negotiations, caring, sensitive handling of 
situations, and face-saving.
14 The traditional Malay custom of mediation was seen more 
clearly in late 1968 in the mediation process towards the talks in Bangsen: The Indonesian 
government, and in particular Ali Murtopo, played a significant role in this. It is highly 
                                                 
7 For details on musyawarah and mufakat, see Chapter 1. 
8 The Manila Joint Statement, 5 August 1963, in Department of Foreign Affairs, Australia (ed.), Malaysia, pp. 
196-198. For details on Maphilindo, see Chapter 3. 
9 For a more detailed discussion of the reconciliation process of the three-way dispute, see Chapter 4. 
10 Joint Statement between Indonesia and the Philippines, 1 May 1966, in The Bangkok Post, 2 May 1966. 
11 The reason for the failure of the Bangkok talks can be found in the Philippines’ loss of face after Malaysia 
withdrew from the conference. In addition, Thailand, the organiser of the conference, did not make any 
informal arrangements between the two countries during (or before) the talks.  
12 For the details of the Corregidor affair, see Chapter 5. 
13 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN, p. 169. 
14 The background of Indonesia’s using this type of mediation can be seen in the fact that Suharto often 
employed Javanese culture in Indonesian politics. See Lucian W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The 
Cultural Dimensions of Authority (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press, 1985), p. 115. 179 
 
probable that he had contacted the Philippines and had given a strong advice to its Foreign 
Secretary to drop the claim to Sabah, so that the bilateral issue would not affect ASEAN 
cooperation.
15  In order to protect the image of the Philippines, and as a way of 
compensation for the Philippines’ concession, Indonesia did not make the result of the 
Sabah dispute public.
16 According to Koentjaraningrat, in the negotiation process by 
musyawarah and mufakat: 
 
Efforts are made behind the scenes to reduce the differences between conflicting 
viewpoints, during the discussions and gossip in the guardhouses or coffee shops. The 
village head, who actively participates in these operations, knows every development; at 
the official meeting his announcements are nothing but the final resolution of preliminary 
discussions, and as such are naturally acceptable to a majority of the assembled people. 
This system of conducting meetings is probably derived from a corresponding element in 
Javanese social behaviour, in which public controversy must be avoided at all costs.
 17 
 
According to the above description, a dispute should be settled by the leader’s decision, 
namely the village head. However, there was no official leader in ASEAN, which meant 
that the organisation did not have coercive powers over member countries, unlike the 
village head, who is able to force the people in a community to conform with his final 
decision.
18 Instead of a clear decision by the equivalent of a village head, ASEAN worked 







                                                 
15 The Straits Times, 29 and 30 October 1968. 
16 Other ASEAN states also did not referred to anything about Sabah during that time. Even at the time of the 
third ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in December 1969 when the two countries formally resumed their 
diplomatic relations, nothing about Sabah was mentioned. 
17 Koentjaraningrat, ‘Tjelapar: A Village in South Central Java’, in Koentjaraningrat (ed.), Villages in 
Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967), p. 274. 
18 In other words, the solidarity of ASEAN was fragile particularly in the formative period, whereas there is a 
strong sense of bond in the village having community relationship among members. 
19 It has been pointed out that reaching unanimity was difficult in ASEAN. See Hoang Anh Tuan, ‘ASEAN 
Dispute Management’, p. 77. 180 
 
The ASEAN Way and the principle of non-interference 
As reviewed in Chapter 1, there is no unified view on the question of whether or not the 
universal principle of non-interference is a major component of the ASEAN Way. 
Countries in Southeast Asia were indifferent to each other before the formation of the 
Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) in 1961.
20 Indonesia, which was not a member of the 
ASA, from 1963 aggressively intervened in the other country’s business, the establishment 
of Malaysia, by advocating Konfrontasi.
21 In early September 1968, during the Corregidor 
affair,
22 Indonesian Foreign Minister warned the Philippines not to pass the Annexation 
Law, by which the Philippines could incorporate Sabah into its territory.
23 Former 
Indonesian Vice-President Mohammad Hatta also stated that there was no basis for the 
Philippines’ claim. Furthermore, the Singaporean government sent its own perspective to 
Malaysia; namely, that it recognised Sabah as Malaysian territory.
24 In addition to these 
statements, Indonesia was involved in this bilateral dispute behind the scene, through the 
mediation between the two countries in Jakarta in August and in Bangsen in December 
1968.  
 
On the other hand, the term ‘non-interference’ has been used widely in ASEAN’s official 
documents, such as in the Treaty of Amity of Cooperation (TAC) in 1976, the Declaration 
of ASEAN Concord in 1976, and the Hanoi Declaration of 1998.
25 How should this 
principle be interpreted in the context of ASEAN’s activities? It can be said that ASEAN 
                                                 
20 Tunku Abdul Rahman, Letter from Tunku Abdul Rahman to President Garcia of the Philippines (Malayan 
Proposal for Regional Co-operation), 28 October 1959, in Peter Boyce (ed.), Malaysia and Singapore in 
International Diplomacy: Documents and Commentaries (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1968), pp. 234-
235. 
21 Subandrio, Speech to Mahakarta Regiment in Jogjyakarta, 20 January 1963, in Peter Boyce (ed.), Malaysia 
and Singapore in International Diplomacy, pp. 69-70. 
22 For details, see Chapter 5. 
23 Asian Almanac, 7/2 (11 January 1969), p. 3121.  
24 Ibid, p. 3122.  
25 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, 24 February 1976, <http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm>, accessed 18 
November 2008; Declaration of ASEAN Concord, 24 February 1976, <http://www.aseansec.org/1216.htm>, 
accessed 18 November 2008; and Hanoi Declaration, 16 December 1998, 
<http://www.aseansec.org/2018.htm>, accessed 5 December 2008.  181 
 
advocated the principle of non-interference beyond its intrinsic meaning.
26 As Kraft’s 
interpretation suggests, ASEAN has advocated the principle of non-interference in order 
that the member states could exclude interference from powers outside the region.
27 Indeed, 
in the process of ending the three-way dispute in 1966,
28 Indonesia, Malaysia and the 
Philippines restored their diplomatic relations without the need for external mediation to 
take place.
29 The Corregidor affair was also settled within the region. ASEAN countries 
were able to manage regional matters with little, if any, involvement from external powers. 
This is a manifestation of their willingness to solve regional issues within the region and be 
free from external interference.   
 
As Busse argues:  
 
[T]he governments of the region had not forgotten the experience of colonialism and 
imperialism which had been their first encounters with modern international politics. The 
idea of sovereignty served as the legal framework for overcoming these dependency 
relationships and gaining equal status in the system.
30  
 
ASEAN countries had been troubled by external interference since the colonial period, 
long before the establishment of the Association. Anti-colonial sentiment merged with the 
threat perception of external intervention during the Cold War period. Namely, they feared 
intervention by big powers, such as the US, China and the Soviet Union in the region.
31 
Two differing political perspectives on the formation of Malaysia show how the people in 
the region were worried about interference from external powers. The then Malayan Prime 
Minister said in the Lower House of parliament in 1961: 
                                                 
26 Simon S. C. Tay, ‘Institutions and Process’, p. 251. 
27 Herman Joseph S. Kraft, ‘ASEAN and Intra-ASEAN relations’, p. 463. 
28 The dispute was over the formation of Malaysia in 1963. For details, see Chapters 3 and 4. 
29 Although the Japanese government offered to mediate in early May 1966, the three countries concerned 
did not ask the former to organise any reconciliatory meetings. The Straits Times, 9 May 1966. 
30 Nikolas Busse, ‘Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security’, The Pacific Review, 12/1 (1999), p. 46. 
Schubert argues that ‘The legacy of colonialism was the most important factor behind the emergence of 
regionalist sentiment in Asia’. See James N. Schubert, ‘Toward a “Working Peace System” in Asia: 
Organizational Growth and State Participation in Asian Regionalism’, International Organization, 32/2 
(Spring 1978), p. 447. 
31 See Chapter 2. 182 
 
If such an eventuality [grave economic unrest] should come to pass, Malayans would be 
fighting among themselves, goaded on and helped by forces from without. There would be 
bloodshed and destruction, and the country would be torn by strife and suffering, from 
which it would be very difficult to return to normal, if we ever get a chance to return. The 
same situation would develop as we have seen in the past in divided Korea, in divided 
Vietnam and in Laos.
32 
 
On the other hand, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) declared in the same year that: 
 
From their own experiences, the Indonesian people know only too well the meaning of the 
words “preservation of peace in Southeast Asia”, the meaning of the words “international 
responsibilities”, the word “responsibilities” towards the Commonwealth and other such 
words used by imperialists. Colonial practices, acts of intervention and aggression by the 
imperialists in South Vietnam, Laos, the Congo, as well as the plans for the landing of U.S. 
troops in Pakan Baru (Sumatra) [during the PRRI rebellion in 1958] which were foiled by 
Indonesia, and the occupation of West Irian, etc., speak clearly of this.
33    
 
Although the two perspectives on the formation of Malaysia were completely different, the 
then Malayan Prime Minister and the PKI shared the same underlying threat perception. 
 
The bipolar rivalry in the world represented a threat for the small country’s destiny under 
the control of large external powers. In particular, the deterioration of the situation in 
Indochina was the most serious concern for countries in Southeast Asia.
34 Looking at it, the 
                                                 
32 Tunku Abdul Rahman, Speech in the House of Representatives in Malaya, 16 October 1961, in 
Department of Foreign Affairs, Australia (ed.), Malaysia, pp. 18-28.  
33 Resolutions of the Indonesian Communist Party, December 1961, in Peter Boyce (ed.), Malaysia and 
Singapore in International Diplomacy, pp. 68-69.  
34 The fear was also encapsulated in the ten principles of the Asian-African Conference of 1955 in Bandung. 
These are: 
     1. Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations.  
     2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.  
     3. Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small.  
     4. Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country.  
     5. Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the 
Charter of the United Nations.  
     6. (a) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any 
of the big powers.  
         (b) Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries.  
     7. Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any country.  
     8 Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration 
or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties’ own choice, in conformity with the 
Charter of the United Nations. 183 
 
countries in Southeast Asia realised that the big external powers would promote their own 
national interests rather than those of countries in the region. Therefore, they recognised 
that they should ‘rely more on neighbourly mutual support than on stronger states’.
35 The 
sense of regionalism in Southeast Asia was created partly because of unreliability of extra-
regional powers, and it produced the idea of ‘standing on their own feet’. From this point 
of view, ‘ASEAN members value their autonomy’,
36 and their ultimate goal is to be ‘free 
from external interference’.
37   
 
The fear of the external military intervention was repeatedly stipulated in official 
documents in Southeast Asia. In the Manila Joint Statement of 1963 (Maphilindo): ‘foreign 
bases…should not be allowed to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national 
independence of any of the three countries’.
38 Furthermore, Malaysian Deputy Prime 
Minister Tun Abdul Razak said at the First ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 1967,  
 
For many centuries, most of us have been dominated by colonial powers either directly or 
indirectly and even today we are not entirely free from being exposed to the struggle for 
domination by outside powers. … we are all conscious of our responsibility to shape our 
common destiny and to prevent external intervention and interference.
39 
 
Indeed, as the former Thai Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman, later said, ‘ASEAN was 
created to prevent intervention from outside powers’.
40   
 
                                                                                                                                                    
     9. Promotion of mutual interests and cooperation. 
    10. Respect for justice and international obligations. See Final Communiqué of the Asian-African 
Conference, 24 April 1955, in George McT. Kahin, Asian-African Conference, pp. 76-85. 
35 Thanat Khoman, ‘ASEAN Conception and Evolution’, 1 September 1992, 
<http://www.aseansec.org/thanat.htm>, accessed 4 October 2008. 
36 Richard Stubbs, ‘ASEAN’, p. 223. 
37 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, 24 February 1976, <http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm>, accessed 18 
November 2008. 
38 The Manila Joint Statement, 5 August 1963, in Department of Foreign Affairs, Australia (ed.), Malaysia, 
pp. 196-198.  
39 Tun Abdul Razak, Opening Statement of the First ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Bangkok, 8 August 1967, 
in ASEAN Secretariat (ed.), Statements by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers at ASEAN Ministerial Meetings 
1967-1987, pp. 36-37. 
40 Asiaweek, 28 July 1998. 184 
 
The fear of being involved in the Cold War rivalry drove ASEAN countries to become 
more sensitive to external interference.
41 From such a context, they advocated the principle 
of non-interference. At the same time, they also recognised regional responsibility for 
regional problems and decided to address the problems by regional cooperation. In a sense, 
therefore, ASEAN cooperation is maintained to protect the member states from external 




What is the ASEAN Way? 
The thesis embraces Ahmad’s statement that: ‘a spirit of “working together” forms an 
important feature of [ASEAN]’.
42 Then, it has examined cooperative behaviour in 
Southeast Asia through case studies and defines the concept of the ASEAN Way as 
‘working together beyond differences’. The term ‘working together’ has encouraged 
ASEAN countries to create solidarity by overcoming differences. For example, different 
perspectives on regional security between Indonesia and the other members: Indonesia had 
insisted on the non-aligned position in regional security, whereas the other four countries 
had defence pacts with Western countries. In addition, the territorial dispute over Sabah 
between Malaysia and the Philippines remained outstanding business.
43 Furthermore, the 
underlying ethnic/cultural antagonism between Malaysia and Singapore was still strong.
44 
On 8 August 1967, when the ASEAN Declaration was signed, Indonesian Foreign Minister 
                                                 
41 The ASEAN Declaration of 1967 stated, ‘[ASEAN countries] are determined to ensure their stability and 
security from external interference’. In addition, it declared: ‘all foreign bases … are not intended to be used 
directly or indirectly to subvert national independence and freedom of States in the area or prejudice the 
orderly processes of their national development’.  See The ASEAN Declaration, 8 August 1967, 
<http://www.aseansec.org/1629.htm>, accessed 5 December 2008. 
42 Zakaria Haji Ahmad, ‘The World of ASEAN Decision-makers’, p. 203. 
43 The Sabah issue is still formally unresolved. 
44 Kuroyanagi puts it, ‘just ideological antagonism was solved when ASEAN was established’. See Yoneji 
Kuroyanagi, ASEAN 35 Nen no Kiseki, p. 33. Author’s translation. 185 
 
Adam Malik said, ‘I realise that differences in outlook do exist among our nations but I am 
convinced that we will be able to overcome those differences’.
45  
 
‘Working together’ has been iterated because countries in Southeast Asia saw that the 
chronic sense of crisis present in the region could be turned into a system of regional 
cooperation instead. As Yamakage puts it, the ASEAN Way is ‘the diligent fruit of their 
understanding that the basis of regional cooperation was weak and mutual suspicion was 
deep’.
46 ASEAN members believe that if they cause the Association to break down, then 
the region will become insecure, and such a fear is reasonably based on historical 
experience. Such sentiment encourages member countries to cooperate for the sake of their 
prosperity. Indeed, ASEAN countries believe that working together is the most important 
way to overcome any rift between them.
47 They emphasise their solidarity when they 
cannot find the solution.
48 Indeed, ASEAN members get together at meetings ‘with a 
disposition to agree and not to [enter into] dispute[s]’.
49 In other words, they seek 
‘agreement and harmony’ in the talks rather than arguments.
50 The behind-the-scenes 
                                                 
45 Adam Malik, Statement at the First ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Bangkok, 8 August 1967, in ASEAN 
Secretariat (ed.), Statements by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers at ASEAN Ministerial Meetings 1967-1987, p. 
35. 
46 Susumu Yamakage, ‘Tenkanki no ASEAN’, p. 8. Author’s translation. 
47 The ‘ASEAN spirit’ is another oft-iterated term representing the ASEAN’s solidarity. The term has been in 
use since the early stage of ASEAN. One of the earliest usages can be traced back to the statements at the 
First Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Civil Aviation of ASEAN in June 1968. The leader of the Thai 
delegation, Wing Commander Sanan Sangkachand said, ‘I am happy and confident that with our ASEAN 
spirit, our common goals will be jointly accomplished and meet our mutual interests’. (Foreign Affairs 
Bulletin, 7/6 (June-July 1968), p. 549. Italics added.) At the same meeting, the representative of the 
Indonesian delegation also referred to the term: ‘It is our ardent hope and wish, that such differences, if any, 
could and should be solved in the ASEAN spirit as members of the same family’. (Foreign Affairs Bulletin, 
7/6 (June-July 1968), p. 543. Italic added.) Although there is no academic contribution to its historical 
argument, the term can be seen regularly in the official documents. According to the Joint Communiqué of 
the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 1971, the ASEAN spirit is based on ‘cordiality and mutual 
understanding’. (Joint Communiqué of the Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Manila, 13 March 1971, 
<http://www.aseansec.org/1234.htm>, accessed 10 December 2008.) However, the term has been used 
variously. For example, ‘solidarity’ was stipulated in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord in 1976 whereas 
‘friendship and cordiality’ have appeared in its Joint Communiqué. (Declaration of ASEAN Concord, 24 
February 1976, <http://www.aseansec.org/1216.htm>, accessed 18 November 2008; and Joint Communiqué 
of the First ASEAN Heads of Government Meeting Bali, 24 February 1976, 
<http://www.aseansec.org/1223.htm>, accessed 10 December 2008.)   
48 Michael Antolik, ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation, p. 129. 
49 Estrella D. Solidum, ‘The Role of Certain Sectors in Shaping and Articulating the ASEAN Way’, p. 139. 
50 Gillian Goh, ‘The “ASEAN Way”’, p. 114. 186 
 
negotiation and face-saving behaviour in the process of musyawarah and mufakat have 
been useful in dealing with sensitive matters in member countries with a weak political 
basis. 
 
The concept of ‘working together’ is actively demonstrated in the regional community, 
while the idea of ‘peaceful coexistence’ is also present in encouraging a soundly-based 
neighbourhood for ASEAN’s member states. Namely, the former shows the dynamic 
interactions between member countries, whereas the latter shows propensity towards the 
maintenance of predictably positive relationship. As Thanat Khoman said in September 
1966, when there was a discussion about the new regional organisation,
51 ‘[W]e have 
sought to ensure long-lasting peace in Asia by arousing the consciousness on the part of 
the Asian countries not only to coexist together but also to co-operate closely for mutual 
benefits’.
52 The concept of ‘working together’ brings with it an understanding that 
countries in Southeast Asia would actively engage in dealing with regional matters, and in 
so doing maintain cooperation in a harmonious political atmosphere. Considering such 
behaviour, harmonisation is another word which can express the idea of countries in 
ASEAN.
53 They choose to collaborate with each other for the sake of their common 
objective, national development, despite the fact that there may be differences between 
member countries. Countries in Southeast Asia recognised that they had to be tolerant of 
each other in order to harmonise their different views.
54  
 
Actually, Indonesia had historically been willing to accommodate differing views. In June 
1945, Sukarno introduced Pancasila
55 to domestic politics, so that Indonesia could survive 
                                                 
51 Later it was materialised as ASEAN. 
52 Thanat Khoman, Speech at the United Nations General Assembly, 27 September 1966, in The United 
Nations General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Official Records, 1418th Plenary Meeting, 27 September 
1966 (New York: The United Nations), pp. 3-9. 
53 In other words, ‘“harmonisation” of different national interests’. (Zakaria Haji Ahmad, ‘The World of 
ASEAN Decision-makers’, p. 207.) 
54 See, for example, Thanat Khoman, Opening address of The First Meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on 
Civil Aviation of ASEAN, 25 June 1968, in Foreign Affairs Bulletin, 7/6 (June-July 1968), pp. 540-541. 
55 For details on Pancasila, see Chapter 1. 187 
 
in its ethnic and religious diversity. In the early 1950s, the then Indonesian Vice-President 
Mohammad Hatta applied this idea to Indonesia’s foreign policy: ‘The desire to put 
political relations with other nations on a footing of mutual respect, despite differences in 
the governmental structure and ideology’.
56  
 
Malaysia also embraced the idea of tolerance in its foreign policy. When Malayan Prime 
Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman was elaborating the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA, 
he held that peaceful coexistence among different ideologies should be realised so that 
countries in Southeast Asia could focus on nation-building.
57 Malaysian Deputy Prime 
Minister Tun Abdul Razak mentioned his view of regional cooperation at the speech in the 
United Nations in September 1966: ‘[W]e believe that the nations of the world, of 
whatever ideological convictions, can live together, not merely in passive coexistence but 
in active co-operation for the common pursuit of peace and economic and social well-
being of the peoples of the world’.
58 In this context, the Tunku proposed that the People’s 
Republic of China should be recognised and coexist with the international community 
rather than being politically contained: ‘Communist China must be recognised as an 
independent sovereign nation, and as China. It is unrealistic to ignore the Peking regime’.
59 
Tun Ismail bin Dato Abdul Rahman, the Malaysian Minister for Home Affairs and Acting 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, said in 1966, ‘[W]e call upon the People’s Republic of China 
to keep its hands off our region and to adopt a policy of peaceful coexistence towards its 
fellow-Asians in South-East Asia’.
60 He continued, ‘We do not oppose the communist 
system in Mainland China, so long as it confines itself within its own borders’.
61 Arguably, 
                                                 
56 Mohammad Hatta, ‘Indonesia’s Foreign Policy’, p. 445. 
57 Tunku Abdul Rahman, Interview by Kayser Sung, Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 July 1960, pp. 162-
163. 
58 Tun Abdul Razak, Speech in the 1416th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, 26 
September 1966, in Official Records of the United Nations General Assembly, Twenty-First Session, 1416th 
Plenary Meeting, 26 September 1966 (New York: The United Nations), pp. 12-16.  
59 Tunku Abdul Rahman, Interview by Kayser Sung, Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 July 1960, pp. 162-
163. 
60 Tun Ismail bin Dato Abdul Rahman, Address to the Foreign Correspondents Association, Johore Bahru, 23 
June 1966, in Peter Boyce (ed.), Malaysia and Singapore in International Diplomacy, pp. 236-237. 
61 Ibid. 188 
 
the acceptance of different views, rather than intolerance towards such, helped the idea of a 





Four conventions for ‘working together beyond difference’ 
The concept of ‘working together beyond difference’ forged four specific conventions 
through the process of regional cooperation (Fig. 1). These are: (1) holding consultations 
among member countries, (2) saving face, (3) shelving unresolvable issues and (4) 
emphasising informal procedure in conflict resolution. It should be noted that these four 
specific conventions can be a set of practices which one central concept controls.
63 
However, they have not necessarily, or in practice, always been used in every specific 
event or crisis, but selectively so as to achieve, and maintain, an overarching regional 













                                                 
62 Indeed, during Konfrontasi, Indonesia and Malaya sat at the same table and agreed with the formation of 
the loose cooperation plan, Maphilindo. 
63 Tay suggests that conventions of the ASEAN Way are not ‘static’ and can be changed. Simon S. C. Tay, 
‘Institutions and Process’, p. 269. 
(Conventions) 
(Concept) 
Consultations  Face-saving  Shelving the issue  Informality 
Working together 
Fig. 1 The ASEAN Way (Concept and conventions) 189 
 
The first convention was ‘consultations’, which was introduced into regional cooperation 
in Southeast Asia so that they could know each other.
64 Consultations contributed to the 
alleviation of tension and suspicion in the region during the formative period of ASEAN. 
Frequent meetings helped ‘to crystallise a community of sentiments’ as well as, in the 
process, building confidence.
65 The term ‘consultations’ first appeared during the 
formation of the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA). Three countries, Malaya, the 
Philippines and Thailand, held frequent meetings in working towards the establishment of 
the first regional association. Its foundation document, the Bangkok Declaration, promised 
to ‘establish an effective machinery for friendly consultations’ among the member 
countries.
66 The word ‘consultations’ also appeared in the agreement of Maphilindo in 
1963.
67 Thus, the practice of consultations has been recognised as important and, indeed, 
promoted to the status of a regional custom. 
 
The second convention was ‘face-saving’ behaviour. As mentioned earlier, the practice of 
musyawarah and mufakat highly favours face-saving. Mohammed Hatta argued strongly, if 
indirectly, for recognition of this, and respect for the sensitivity of newly-independent 
countries: ‘Nations recently become independent are strongly influenced by national 
sentiment and feel the need to maintain their self-respect’.
68 This is because ‘[i]nternal 
                                                 
64 The term ‘consultations’ was highlighted in the ‘Conference on Indonesia’ in January 1949. The main 
purpose of the conference was to facilitate the independence of Indonesia. It was composed of Afghanistan, 
Australia, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, Ethiopia, India (host), Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria and Yemen. China (Taiwan), Nepal, New Zealand and Thailand sent observers. The 
Conference also referred to cooperation among participants. One out of the three resolutions made was 
‘further consultations among participants for the establishment of suitable machinery for promoting regional 
co-operation’. However, it did not focus regional cooperation in Southeast Asia but ‘within the framework of 
the United Nations’. See The Conference on Indonesia, January 20-23, 1949 (Delhi: The Publications 
Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting of India, 1949), pp. 14-15. 
65 Estrella D. Solidum, Towards a Southeast Asian Community, p. 205. Leifer sees that ASEAN reduced 
tensions ‘without the implementation of explicit confidence-building measures’. See Michael Leifer, The 
ASEAN Regional Forum, p. 40. 
66 The Bangkok Declaration, 31 July 1961, in Peter Boyce (ed.), Malaysia and Singapore in International 
Diplomacy, pp. 235-236. Italics added. 
67 It also later emerged in Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) of 1976. In the TAC, ‘[T]he High 
Contracting Parties shall maintain regular contacts and consultations with one another on international and 
regional matters with a view to coordinating their views actions and policies’. See Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation, 24 February 1976, <http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm>, accessed 18 November 2008. Italics 
added. 
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consolidation is the primary task’ for the young countries.
69 The government ‘must show 
evidence of economic and social betterment if it is to offset the influence of agitation by 
radical circles’.
70 Furthermore, it was essential for countries in the region to show their 
confidence in the area of foreign policy as well as domestic policy. Therefore, every 
government needed to quickly emerge from the temptation of allowing feelings of 
inadequacy and inferiority to remain in its dealings with other, more mature, states in the 
area of diplomatic relations. The importance of ‘face-saving’ stemmed from such political 
vulnerability of new countries. Such political sensitivity made member countries deal with 
each other with restraint, and principally in the guise of ASEAN cooperation. Hoan Anh 
Tuan, for example, points out that ‘face-saving’ is the product of frequent consultations: 
 
ASEAN members get to know one another, learn about each other’s interests and 
sensitivities, and explore possibilities for expanded co-operation. Additionally, officials at 
different levels are encouraged to contact one another and establish personal relationships 
so that in the event of crisis they can pick up the telephone and call each other, thus 
increasing the possibility of containing any dispute.
71 
 
The third convention dealt with ‘the shelving of difficult bilateral issues’. Such problems 
could also be papered over, or made more opaque, in order to lessen potential damage to 
bilateral ties. Indeed, the acceptable formula is not always generated through negotiations 
between the countries concerned. This convention was forged as a lesson drawn from the 
bilateral dispute between Malaya and the Philippines over Sabah, which plunged the ASA 
into dysfunction. The issue was shelved when the growing tendency to establish ASEAN 
emerged in the region. When the Sabah issue recurred a year after the establishment of the 
Association, it was again shelved so that ASEAN would not, and could not, experience the 
same fate.  
 
                                                 
69 Ibid., p. 449. 
70 Ibid. At a time when the newly-independent countries of ASEAN (and to some extent non-colonised state 
of Thailand) were inexperienced in nation-building, states needed to demonstrate their confidence in their 
ability to govern in the eyes of the people.  
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The fourth convention at play was that of the importance of ‘informality’. One of two 
aspects of informality is the institutional structure. In early 1959, when Tunku Abdul 
Rahman talked with Carlos P. Garcia about regional cooperation, he first resorted to a 
treaty-based organisation plan called the Southeast Asian Friendship and Economic Treaty 
(SEAFET). However, it was finally changed to the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), 
by enshrining a ‘practical and informal basis’.
 72 Indeed, the most focused point for 
regional cooperation in Southeast Asia in this period was ‘to acquire the habit of sitting 
down together’ as many countries as possible.
73 In this respect, the loose association plan 
was practicable in letting as many Southeast Asian states be involved in it as possible. 
Although the first regional organisation, the ASA, failed to generate a broader association 
of states in the region, the concept was successfully adopted by ASEAN. In addition, the 
foundational documents of the ASA and ASEAN – Declarations – are less legally-binding 
than are more formal legal documents such as Charters. This fact is more evidence of how 
loosely-linked the regional organisations in Southeast Asia are. As Snitwongse points out, 
ASEAN countries have been able to work together because there have not been so many 
requirements on member states.
74 
 
The second aspect of informality can be seen in the area of communication. Ikle points out 
that informal meetings took a certain role in the course of East-West negotiations during 
the Cold War era.
75 Therefore, it cannot always be said that the informal aspect in 
communication is a specific custom in Southeast Asia. What aspect, then, of such a form of 
communication gives ASEAN’s style its distinctiveness? The specific point here, 
appearing in case studies throughout the thesis, is the importance of cultural affinity. As 
discussed earlier in this chapter, such cultural affinity helped to generate an atmosphere of 
                                                 
72 Tunku Abdul Rahman, Interview by Kayser Sung, Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 July 1960, p. 162. 
Malaya envisaged several specific items for regional cooperation from the beginning of the plan, such as 
tourism, education, commodities, shipping and civil aviation, common market.  See Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 14 July 1960, p. 51. 
73 Daniel Wolfstone, ‘Manila’s Image of ASAS’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 September 1960, p. 596. 
74 Kusuma Snitwongse, ‘Thirty Years of ASEAN’, p. 184. In particular, excluding bilateral issues from the 
agenda of ASEAN helped to work together among member countries. (Ibid, p. 185.) 
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friendship in important areas of communication between ASEAN states. The friendly 
gestures of Tunku Abdul Rahman towards Sukarno (in Tokyo and Manila in 1963) were a 
crucial factor in making a breakthrough in the bilateral crisis that had emerged between 
their countries. Furthermore, when Indonesia mediated between Malaysia and the 
Philippines during the Corregidor affair in 1968, it employed the informal negotiation style, 
which was based on musyawarah and mufakat. This behind-the-scenes consensus-building 
was accepted in both countries and successfully brought rapprochement. In this respect, 
informality in communication in ASEAN is based on two specific factors: respect and 
restraint.   
 
 
The formation process of the ASEAN Way 
The concept of ‘working together beyond differences’ originated in the above-mentioned 
Summit talks between Sukarno and Tunku Abdul Rahman in Tokyo on 31 May 1963. The 
Tokyo talks were held during the recurrence of verbal war between the two countries. In 
these talks, Sukarno proposed the following to the Tunku: ‘I want to solve this issue with 
you as a friend and neighbour rather than an opponent’.
76 The result of the talks was that 
they successfully created a cooperative relationship. The idea for regional cooperation was 
therefore first written into the Manila Accord at the following Ministerial conference on 11 
June 1963.
77 In the Accord, Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines agreed to establish ‘the 
grouping of the three nations of Malay origin working together in closest harmony’.
78 To 
do so, the three Ministers agreed to hold ‘frequent and regular consultations’.
79 The 
                                                 
76 ‘Ohira, Subandorio Kaidan (Dai Ni-kai) Youshi [The Proceedings of the Foreign Ministerial Talks 
between Ohira and Subandrio, The Second Session], Nantou Ajia-ka [Department of Southeast Asia, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan], 1 June 1963, GSK File A’-423. Author’s translation. 
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subsequent Manila Summit meeting produced impressive agreements through the 
implementation of mutual concessions. Although, as history shows, the Manila agreements 
could not realise reconciliation between the three countries, this exercise of solving the 
intra-regional dispute nonetheless greatly contributed to the idea of ASEAN cooperation. 
Ｗhen the first locally-made regional organisation was proposed in 1959, Indonesian 
Foreign Minister Subandrio saw that the proposed regional organisation was meaningless 
because there was a huge political gap between potential member countries.
80 Indonesia, at 
the time, did not try to express any signs of willingness for harmonisation of its relations 
with other countries nor to overcome political differences. On the contrary, a series of 
Manila conferences in 1963 successfully made the consensus between member countries 
including Indonesia, and produced the concessive agreements in which the concept of 
‘working together beyond differences’ was embodied. Indeed, Malaya was a pro-British 
and anti-communist country without joining the South East Asia Treaty Organisation 
(SEATO), and the Philippines was a pro-American and anti-communist country joining 
SEATO. Indonesia, on the other hand, was a non-aligned country in opposition to SEATO 
and tolerant of communism. These three countries, each demonstrating such distinctive 
perspectives in their politics, sat together and decided to collaborate with one another in 
shaping the framework for Maphilindo, and such a process was the first time this had 
occurred in the history of Southeast Asia.    
 
In the process bringing to a close the three-way dispute over the formation of Malaysia 
1966, the concept of ‘working together’ again appeared in the approaches taken by 
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Firstly, Malaysia and the Philippines resumed 
diplomatic relations, overcoming their differences over the treatment of Sabah. Then, in 
Indonesia, General Suharto clearly showed his willingness to compromise with Malaysia 
by sending the Army leaders
81 to Kuala Lumpur just before the ministerial talks between 
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Indonesia and Malaysia. Eventually, from a practical point of view, the three countries 
concerned succeeded in shelving issues related to the formation of Malaysia.  
 
The Philippine government also showed its willingness to cooperate with other states in the 
region. It suspended the resumption of diplomatic relations with Malaysia, and did so at the 
request of Indonesia. In this regard, the Philippine Secretary of foreign Affairs, Narciso 
Ramos, said, ‘The Philippines is desirous of maintaining friendly relations with Indonesia. 
We do not want any irreparable damage in our relations with the neighbouring country’.
82 
The Philippines’ decision to postpone recognition of Malaysia showed that the Philippines 
put the priority to regional harmonisation rather than national interest.
83 
 
When Tunku Abdul Rahman objected to the Indonesian plan for regional cooperation
84 by 
saying that the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), an organisation formed by Malaya’s 
initiative, already existed, Adam Malik stated that the proposed organisation was the 
enlargement of the ASA.
85 Malik showed restraint towards Indonesia’s plan in order to 
protect the Tunku’s prestige. Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman sounded the proposed 
plan to the Tunku first.
86 The latter was pleased with Thanat’s regard and finally accepted 
the new organisation plan.
87  
 
                                                 
82 The Straits Times, 26 March 1966. 
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and it is ‘extremely important’. See Alan Collins, ‘Mitigating the Security Dilemma’, pp. 107-108. 
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86 The Straits Times, 22 May 1967. 
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In the Corregidor affair, Foreign Ministers of ASEAN states called for the spirit of 
‘working together beyond differences’ at the First Meeting of the ASEAN’s Ad hoc 
Committee on Civil Aviation and the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in June 1968.
88 The 
reconciliation was quickly brought into existence in Jakarta by the Foreign Ministers of 
Malaysia and the Philippines in August. After the short interruption of the harmonious 
atmosphere, in the course of holding the meeting in Bangsen in December 1968, the 
Philippines and Malaysia successfully re-established the Jakarta agreement by the 
Philippines’ withdrawal of its claim to Sabah for the sake of ASEAN’s survival. It is 
noteworthy that Indonesia’s consultation was conducted behind the scenes to ensure that 
the Philippines could withdraw the claim without losing face. The spirit of ‘working 
together beyond differences’ was in full operation in the settlement process of the 
Corregidor affair. When the two countries made rapprochement, the third ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting stated: 
 
[I]t was a matter of paramount importance that ASEAN countries should get together and 
work together for the common good of the group in particular and of the region in general. 
He [Tunku Abdul Rahman] announced that as a result of a discussion between him and the 
Honourable Mr. Carlos P. Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, in the 
spirit of goodwill and friendship and because of the great value Malaysia and the 




ASEAN, the ASEAN Way and the goal of ASEAN 
As discussed above, the sense of primary responsibility to their regional matter has been 
developed in ASEAN countries, with their overarching goal being to secure being 
‘freedom from external interference’ in their internal affairs (Fig. 2).
90 Five countries of 
ASEAN agreed to give national development the top priority: ‘To accelerate the economic 
                                                 
88 For the details of the Corregidor affair, see Chapter 5. 
89 The Joint Communiqué of the Third ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Cameron Highlands, 17 December 1969, 
<http://www.aseansec.org/1233.htm>, accessed 22 October 2008. Italics added. 
90 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration, 27 November 1971, 
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growth, social progress and cultural development in the region’.
91 They also recognised 
that they should maintain peace and stability so that they could focus on national 
development. These are arguably the major objectives of ASEAN cooperation and were 
stipulated in the ASEAN Declaration. The ASEAN Way, which embraces the concept of 

















The countries in the region believed that economic difficulties at home would allow 
external powers to encroach upon their sovereignty. As Malayan Prime Minister Tunku 
Abdul Rahman said in the speech of 23 October 1961: 
 
                                                 
91 The ASEAN Declaration, 8 August 1967, <http://www.aseansec.org/1629.htm>, accessed 5 December 
2008. 
92 The ASEAN Way is ‘means rather than ends’ to maintain and facilitate regional cooperation. Nikolas 
Busse, ‘Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security’, p. 47. Sunitwongse sees the ASEAN Way as ‘political 
process’ of ASEAN. See Kusuma Sunitwongse, ‘Thirty Years of ASEAN’, p. 184. The similar view is taken 
by Acharya. See Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, p. 63. 
Freedom from external interference
Socio-economic development and stability  
Regional cooperation (ASEAN) 
Fig. 2 ASEAN, the ASEAN Way and the goal of ASEAN 
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Neither of us [Malaya and Singapore] wants grave economic unrest, nor do we want to be 
subjected to external interference which would follow. We have seen this happen already 
elsewhere, and we do not want to see it happen here.
93 
 
The ASEAN states were also concerned about subversion by Communist elements at home 
supported by external Communists in Indochina and China.
94 Since the Southeast Asian 
countries lacked sufficient military power to protect themselves, an eventual Communist 
subversion would necessarily lead to Western, and notably US, intervention. In such a 
situation, these countries could become involved in bipolar antagonism; the effects of 
which they had already seen so vividly in Indochina. In order to avoid such a nightmare, 
ASEAN countries recognised that another way to protect Communist infiltration was to 
overcome poverty, which could provide the Communists with fertile grounds for political 
and military infiltration. Therefore, they focused upon economic development in order to 
raise the standards of living at home. Indeed, the ASEAN Declaration itself stipulated the 
need for such an approach: 
 
[T]he countries of South East Asia share a primary responsibility for strengthening the 
economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive 
national development, and that they are determined to ensure their stability and security 
from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national 
identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples.
95 
 
National development would prevent Communist infiltration, and consequently would help 
prevent external interference, and another proxy war in the region. Such a situation would 
therefore enable ASEAN countries to further focus on their national development and 
secure a free hand to decide policies to their individual situations. Therefore, prosperity 
became the stepping-stone towards self-reliance for ASEAN countries. The path to peace 
and prosperity was conceptualised as ‘regional resilience’, which was stipulated in the 
following way in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 1976:  
                                                 
93 Tunku Abdul Rahman, Speech in the House of Representatives in Malaya, 16 October 1961, in 
Department of Foreign Affairs, Australia (ed.), Malaysia, pp. 18-28.  
94 Susumu Yamakage, ASEAN, p. 109. 
95 The ASEAN Declaration, 8 August 1967, <http://www.aseansec.org/1629.htm>, accessed 5 December 
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The High Contracting Parties in their efforts to achieve regional prosperity and security, 
shall endeavour to cooperate in all fields for the promotion of regional resilience, based on 
the principles of self-confidence, self-reliance, mutual respect, cooperation and solidarity 




The origins of the notion of ‘regional resilience’ came from the idea of ‘national 
resilience’.
97 In the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, ASEAN countries were directed to 
‘… endeavour to strengthen their respective national resilience in their political, economic, 
socio-cultural as well as security fields in conformity with their respective ideals and 
aspirations, free from external interference as well as internal subversive activities in order 
to preserve their respective national identities’.
98  
 
Gordon argues that Southeast Asia aimed to ‘work toward the two goals simultaneously: 
national development and regional cooperation’.
99 However, considering that the main 
purposes of ASEAN were ‘[t]o accelerate the economic growth’ and ‘[t]o promote regional 
peace and stability’,
100 regional cooperation should be recognised as an impetus of peace 
and prosperity. Peace (socio-political stability) and prosperity (socio-economic well-being) 
are interdependent.
101 Namely, ‘economic development and national security must go hand 
in hand’.
102 Economic development can be an impetus of bringing about social and 
                                                 
96 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, 24 February 1976, <http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm>, accessed 18 
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102 Pote Sarasin, ‘Economic Development and National Security’, Foreign Affairs Bulletin, 5/3 (December 
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political stability. When economic growth is achieved at a certain level, social stability is 
brought about. Social stability brings political stability, and political stability facilitates 
further policy-making for national development. This positive cycle helps to achieve self-
reliance in the region. Therefore, peace and prosperity largely contribute to regional 
autonomy, and they are most important. As a result, ASEAN cooperation takes the role of 
the facilitator of ‘peace, progress and prosperity in the region’.
103   
 
The former Thai Minister of National Development, Pote Sarasin, put these propositions in 
the following way: ‘ [Economic development] is the process that will not only bring 
material happiness to our people but will also contribute to the maintenance of our national 
security’.
104 The more peace and stability is achieved in the region, the less the region will 
suffer from interference from the outside. When the region gets stronger, economic well-
being is brought more. Indeed, as Tunku Abdul Rahman said, ‘Merdeka [independence] 
has brought about the improvement of the standard of living of the people’.
105  
 
In the Asian-African Conference in 1955, the participants of the conference feared that the 
Cold War antagonism would give rise to a new World War that would deprive newly-
emerging countries of the opportunity for nation-building.
106 The final communiqué stated: 
‘friendly cooperation in accordance with these [ten] principles would effectively contribute 
to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security, while cooperation in 
the economic, social and cultural fields would help bring about the common prosperity and 
well-being of all’.
107 It stated that friendly cooperation would bring about peace and 
security to the world, but this did not suggest that peace would give rise to economic 
prosperity. 
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It should be observed that the concept of the reciprocal relationship between economic 
development and national security has been in practice since late 1950s.
108 Political 
subversion, or intimidation, in Indochina subsequently turned the eyes of countries in 
Southeast Asia to strengthening their own nations by greater mobilisation of resources for 
internal and external peace and stability. If the states devoted to great a proportion of their 
man-power to military activity, fewer resources would be available for economic 
development.
109 This idea was made clearer when the territorial dispute over Sabah 
recurred in 1968. Ghazali Shafie suggested at the time that the conflict should be avoided 
so that the two countries could concentrate on their national development program: ‘[W]e 
are united [under ASEAN] not only by ties of sentiments, but also by urgent and 
compelling interests, tasks of nation building, of economic development…these will 





Cultural affinity helped to alleviate tensions between countries in Southeast Asia. The 
ASEAN Way, it might be concluded in this regard, was formed through the influence of 
Malay culture. However, it employed cultural practice in a necessarily weakened form. In 
particular, the practice of musyawarah and mufakat was introduced to ASEAN countries 
with some alteration, in order to compensate for the equally important absence of an 
exclusive and formally acknowledged ASEAN leader. Instead of coercive decision-making, 
ASEAN forged the convention of shelving unresolvable issues, so that the organisation 
itself could be preserved intact. The oft-cited principle of non-interference should be 
understood as the main tenet of ASEAN cooperation, rather than a specific component of 
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the ASEAN Way. This originated from the fear of interference from external powers, 
particularly because of the impact of the Cold War. In order to avoid external interference, 
ASEAN states recognised regional responsibility for the regional problems and decided to 
cooperate with each other to address their problems directly, and within the context of an 
overarching organisation. ASEAN cooperation is to this day maintained through this, as 
well as for the furtherance of peace and prosperity. In this respect, the principle of non-
interference contributes to maintaining, facilitating and, indeed, deepening of ASEAN 
cooperation.   
  
As discussed above, the ASEAN Way is composed of both the concept and the 
conventions being forged by this concept. The concept is ‘working together beyond 
differences’ and it created a set of conventions. The concept was created to maintain and 
facilitate regional cooperation. It first emerged in 1963 when Sukarno and Tunku Abdul 
Rahman held talks in Tokyo, and was first written into the agreements emanating from the 
Manila conference that followed these talks. It came up in the ending process of the three-
way dispute between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines in 1966, and also emerged in 
the formation process of ASEAN in the following year. It was fully embraced among 
ASEAN member countries during the settlement process of the Corregidor affair in 1968. 
The concept created a set of conventions: holding consultations with member states, saving 





This thesis has demonstrated that the origins of the ASEAN Way can be traced to the 
period preceding the formation of ASEAN itself. It has also argued that the ASEAN Way 
is not just a medley of different conventions, but an idea which elicited a series of 
conventions, emerging in response to a variety of crises in the Southeast Asian region. At 
its heart, the ASEAN Way was the key to forming and maintaining ASEAN cooperation. It 
can be said that the ASEAN Way came to represent the philosophical basis of the 
Association, and beyond that cooperative relations between its member states. In 
demonstrating these significant perspectives, the thesis has explored: (1) the view of 
nation-building in each state in the region after World War II, (2) the formation of 
Western-influenced regional organisations and critical perspectives on these from countries 
of Southeast Asia, (3) the formation process of locally-made organisations, and (4) the 
process of dispute settlement in the region.  
 
Malaya, Singapore and the Philippines undertook nation-building by receiving full support 
from their former colonisers after their independence. These states aimed at a Western 
style of national development. Indonesia, on the other hand, pointed to the limitations of 
Western forms of national development and pursued a nation-building process that was 
distinctive to its own needs and perspectives. Thailand and the Philippines stood out in 
another context again: they were active participants in SEATO. They therefore deeply 
involved themselves in bipolar ideological antagonism that underpinned the origins of this 
organisation, and, in return, received considerable military and financial support from the 
US. Malaya was not as profoundly involved in bipolar antagonisms as were Thailand and 
the Philippines, and instead focussed on raising living standards by receiving full support 
from the British government. Indonesia firmly expressed a non-aligned position and took 
the leadership of the third group in international politics, the so-called Non-Aligned 
Movement. It also rejected the military presence of SEATO in the region. But Indonesia 203 
 
was distinctive in its own context, because it focussed entirely on identity-building rather 
than purely on economic development at home.     
 
Countries in Southeast Asia saw the brutality of a proxy war in Vietnam. The Philippines 
and Thailand, having realised that external superpowers did not care about the region, 
shifted their policy of nation-building by being away from ideological antagonism. They 
therefore came to concentrate on the improvement of living conditions at home; a 
characteristic that most of the Southeast Asian states finally came to hold as crucial to their 
world-views. In shifting their strategic perspective in this way, the Philippines and 
Thailand came to share with Malaya the emphasis on nation-building. Largely as a result 
of this, these three states established the first locally-fashioned regional organisation, the 
Association of Southeast Asia (ASA). However, Indonesia refused the invitation to join the 
latter, thereby limiting considerably its scope of potential efficacy. For Indonesia, the 
reason not to join this organisation was because its member states relied on defence 
agreements with Western countries, and therefore Indonesia regarded the ASA as the 
affiliate of SEATO. On the problematic issue of the formation of Malaysia, which emerged 
soon after the establishment of the ASA, Indonesia criticised Malaysia for being built by 
neo-colonialist. It took an uncompromising stance on the Western influence in the region 
and intervened directly through the launching of Konfrontasi.  
 
The leadership change in Indonesia finally shifted the country’s stance on nation-building. 
With the ouster of Sukarno, the new Indonesian government gave economic development 
the highest priority on the country’s national agenda, shifting attention away from its 
former emphasis on national identity-building. In so doing, Indonesia also came to show its 
desire to work together with neighbouring countries; the first major signal of this being the 
ending of Konfrontasi. Such developments influenced other states in the region, with 
Malaysia and the Philippines achieving rapprochement by shelving the Sabah territorial 
issue, and Malaysia and Singapore agreeing to work together beyond the underlying ethnic 
antagonism that had long characterised their relations. 204 
 
In sum, the countries in Southeast Asia came to recognise that peace and stability was of 
greatest importance to their views, and, by the end of the period of this study, the common 
goal of national development. They also realised that prosperity could protect them from 
external interference, the latter being a major concern shared by all the states of Southeast 
Asia, and especially so since the colonial period. This common understanding of regional 
politics crystallised into the establishment of ASEAN. In forming the latter association, 
they realised the significance of ‘working together beyond difference’ in order to focus on 
national development and prevent external interference; a set of sentiments that were, and 
are, embodied in the concept of the ASEAN Way. This was demonstrated very strongly 
through the ability of the ASEAN states to cooperate in defusing the recurrence of the 
Sabah territorial dispute. In the process of dealing with this dispute, Malaysia and the 
Philippines successfully settled the matter without impairing the centrality of ASEAN’s 
cooperation. Such historical forms of development of regional cooperation gave rise to 
important conventions for the ASEAN states. The more significant examples of these were 
the use of frequent consultations, the recognition of the importance of face-saving, the 
tendency to shelve unsettled issues between member states, and, finally, the use of 
informal techniques in the conduct of diplomacy at bilateral and multilateral levels. Taken 
together, these characteristic features of regional relations, as they became consistent 
practice under the umbrella of ASEAN, grew into the key constituent of the ASEAN Way: 
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